

REQUEST OF DANIEL ELLSBERG

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Defense Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U.S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945 - 1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 5 OCT 1971  
Period: 2 September 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Robert H. Egan

SUMMARY

Mr. Charles Arthur Cooper, Counselor for Economic Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Saigon, RVN, advised his knowledge of Daniel Ellsberg was limited mainly to brief professional associations in 1963, 1967, and 1970. He said Ellsberg was originally in favor of U. S. position in Vietnam but that subsequent to 1967 Ellsberg evidenced a dramatic change in attitude in which he believed the United States should not have engaged in the Vietnam conflict and should make every effort to withdraw immediately. Cooper served as a consultant on the TV Show "Advocate" on the side of opposing U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, but he did not believe Ellsberg appeared on the show. Cooper described Ellsberg as a loner, interested outside of business only in female companionship.

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*J. Fred Buzhardt*  
J. FRED BUZHARDT

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## DETAILS

On 2 September 1971, Mr. Charles Arthur Cooper, Counselor for Economic Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Saigon, RVN, was interviewed by Special Agents Robert H. Hagan and Vincent A. Petruskie.

After being advised of the nature and sensitivity of the investigation, Mr. Cooper provided the following information.

Cooper first met Daniel Ellsberg in 1963 at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California. Cooper was employed by Rand and Ellsberg was working under the supervision of Mr. John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

In 1967, when Cooper went to Vietnam, Ellsberg was in Vietnam but departed shortly after Cooper's arrival. Cooper recalled seeing Ellsberg again in the summer of 1970 in Vietnam. The Cooper/Ellsberg association was primarily professional and most of their discussions centered around Vietnam and the conduct of the war.

In their early meetings in Vietnam, Cooper and Ellsberg were in agreement on the legality and the morality of the Vietnamese struggle and supporting the U.S. position. Since that time, Cooper realized that subsequent to Ellsberg's return from Vietnam in 1967 he evidenced a dramatically changing attitude on the Vietnamese war which finally led to Ellsberg's radical position that the United States should never have entered the conflict and should get out immediately. Ellsberg's criticism of the war seemed to be based on two propositions: (1) that neither the U.S. Government nor the public has been told what really is happening in Vietnam, and (2) the deeper historical factors, i.e. the origins of the war. He criticized the military actions, the bombing, etc., claiming these actions belie the professed U.S. interest in promoting democracy. In discussions between Ellsberg and Cooper, Ellsberg did not direct criticism toward any specific Administration but on our initial involvement and the prosecution of the war in general.

Regarding the OSD Vietnam Task Force Study, Ellsberg stated to Cooper that the Study group members evaded things that lent themselves to interpretation; in other words, the Study was not perfect. Ellsberg never discussed individual personalities on the Study group neither did he discuss any of their inputs nor did he discuss his own input. His discussion always concerned the Study in general.

Cooper did not recall Ellsberg having indicated that the contents of the Study should be made public or that he might take some initiative along that line. However, Cooper was not surprised to learn Ellsberg was the one who made the public release since he had become fully committed



against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Cooper has never seen any finished volumes of the OSD Vietnam Task Force Study. He has no knowledge of Ellsberg retaining any of his working papers from the Study. He did recall that Ellsberg was working on a Study relating to Vietnam in 1968 and 1969 at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California, but could provide no additional information pertaining to it.

The only members on the OSD Vietnam Task Force Study group known to Cooper are Hans Heyman, Jr., with Rand Corporation, and Richard D. Holbrook, formerly with the State Department, now residing in Santa Monica, California.

Cooper was only generally familiar with the Trang Mat Chau matter. : (Chau was a Vietnamese official arrested by his Government for illegal contacts with the Hanoi Government.) However, Cooper noted that Ellsberg was quite vociferous in his defense of Chau, believing Chau to have been innocent of any wrongdoing.

Concerning the "Advocate" a TV program presented in Los Angeles, California, on 19 October 1969, at which Ellsberg was alleged to have been present, Cooper attended one of the rehearsals. He had been asked to participate in the TV show but after consultation with Mr. Henry Rowen, President of Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, he decided against it. Therefore, his connection with the TV program was that of a consultant regarding aspects of the Goodell Amendment (withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Vietnam). As a consultant, Cooper opposed the Amendment. He was not present for the 19 October 1969 "Advocate" television presentation, and thus has no knowledge of who may have accompanied Ellsberg to the show and he has no knowledge of Ellsberg's activities or associates on that date.

Outside his official duties, Cooper described Ellsberg as somewhat of a loner, solely interested in female companionship and somewhat egocentric. Ellsberg exhibited hundreds of snapshots of himself taken in combat uniform and in the company of women who were described as being among his "conquests." In most of these instances, the photographs showed the women in various stages of undress.

Cooper provided no names of associates or acquaintances of Ellsberg who could provide substantive information regarding this investigation. According to him, their association was of a limited and professional nature.



Defense Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U.S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945 - 1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 5 OCT 1971  
Period: 1 September 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Vincent A. Petruskie

SUMMARY

Mr. George D. Jacobson, Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), MACV, Saigon, RVN, advised he associated with Daniel Ellsberg for about 100 days in 1966 in connection with a Study Group Jacobson headed under direction of Ambassador Lodge. The purpose of the Study was to examine the "Roles and Missions" of all U. S. agencies in Vietnam and Ellsberg represented the General Lansdale group. Mr. Jacobson stated that Ellsberg supported the U. S. policies in that period and contributed greatly to Jacobson's Study Group. He has not associated with Ellsberg since that time and could provide no additional information pertinent to this investigation.

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## DETAILS

On 1 September 1971 George D. Jacobson, Deputy for Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), MACV, Saigon, RVN was interviewed by Special Agents Robert H. Hagan and Vincent A. Petruskie.

After being advised of the nature and the sensitivity of the investigation Mr. Jacobson provided the following information.

It was his recollection that he first met Daniel Ellsberg in 1966 after Ellsberg arrived in Saigon to work with General Lansdale's group (Major General Edward Geary Lansdale, USAF (Retired)). In June 1966, Ambassador Lodge appointed Mr. Jacobson to head a "Roles and Missions Study," intended to examine the functions of all U. S. agencies in Vietnam, ascertain if what they were doing was proper and to make recommendations to improve the U. S. position.

In assembling the members from the various agencies for the Study, Mr. Jacobson selected Daniel Ellsberg from General Lansdale's organization. During the approximate 100 days that Ellsberg worked on the Study, Jacobson's contact with him was infrequent. Jacobson found Ellsberg to be well motivated and to have a good attitude toward his duties. Ellsberg agreed with Jacobson that the position of the United States in Vietnam was not immoral, not improper and not illegal. Ellsberg appeared to be a very intelligent, very intense, aggressive, hard-working individual, willing to give all of his time toward his interests; he was very productive and a concerned member of the group in fulfilling its responsibilities. During this time, the task of Jacobson's group was to take the mission statement of every U.S. agency in Saigon, examine it in great depth and make recommendations for changes that might help the Advisory effort in Vietnam. Therefore, Ellsberg had access to a great quantity of classified information regarding the whole U.S. effort in Vietnam. Since the origins of the war were not included in the charter for study, Jacobson had no knowledge of Ellsberg's access to that type of information. Jacobson did not know if Ellsberg retained any of his working papers, but surmised that he did and could have copies of other persons' working papers. Ellsberg had an insatiable curiosity about how both the United States and the Vietnamese were conducting their efforts and appeared desirous to assist both countries. Jacobson has had no personal contact whatsoever with Ellsberg since 1966.

Jacobson mentioned that he was generally aware of Ellsberg's acquaintance with Trang Mat Chau, the Vietnamese official arrested for alleged contacts with the Hanoi Government. The Chau matter became quite a controversy among Americans and American agencies, however, because of his official position, Jacobson had made it a particular point to avoid having any interest in the case. Therefore he could not comment on any Ellsberg-Chau relationship.



Jacobson mentioned that he was also aware that sometime subsequent to their personal association, Ellsberg had written a paper regarding Vietnamese elections. In this paper Ellsberg wrote that the election of Nguyen Cao Ky would be a national disaster for South Vietnam.



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INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
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Regarding U.S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945-1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 5 OCT 1971.  
Period: 25 September 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Thomas G. Reynolds

SUMMARY

Robert D. Pace, Captain, USN, Commander, USS Francis Marion, and former Assistant to Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, was advised that he receipted for the document, subject: "Report of Chairman, JCS On Situation In Vietnam and MACV Force Requirements," 27 February 1968, commonly called "Wheeler Report." Pace stated he furnished the document to Paul C. Warnke, OSD/ISA. He identified his initials in the upper right-hand corner on the first page of the selected eight pages from the "Wheeler Report" recovered from Rand-Santa Monica, California and the reproduced copy of the "Wheeler Report" found in Policies Plans, OSD/ISA, but he was unable to identify any other marking on these copies. He identified Halperin as probably being the action officer concerning the "Wheeler Report."

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## DETAILS

Captain Robert D. Pace, Captain USN, Commander, USS Francis Marion, and former Military Assistant to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs was reinterviewed by Special Agent Reynolds on 25 September 1971 in the presence of Mr. William Gerhard for the purpose of determining his knowledge of the "Report of Chairman, JCS on situation in Vietnam and MACV Force Requirements," 27 February 1968, commonly called the "Wheeler Report."

An exact textual duplicate of 8 selected pages of the originally disseminated copy of the Wheeler Report appeared in the New York Times on 4 July 1971. Daniel Ellsberg, a member of the OSD Vietnam Task Force was in the Pentagon from 24 February to 12 March 1968. He logged the exact 8 pages, which were reproduced from ISA's original copy of the Wheeler Report, into the Rand Santa Monica TS control system on 13 March 1968.

Pace advised as follows:

After reviewing a reproduced copy of the first page of the Deputy Secretary of Defense's copy of the Wheeler Report, he recalled receipting for an ISA copy of the report. ISA's copy was furnished to Mr. Paul C. Warnke, OSD/ISA. He does not recall any reproduction of the "Wheeler Report" or any part thereof. This did not preclude possible reproduction because of the importance of the document and the necessity of taking immediate staff action within ISA. He was unable to recall what became of the document because he was not involved in any substantive work on it. He said that his signing for the document was not the normal procedure but in this case it must have been a result of some priority action or necessity to get it to Warnke immediately. Dr. Morton Halperin, Deputy Assistant for Policy Plans, OASD/ISA would have been the action officer and the document would have had to have been furnished to him for any substantive work resulting from the Wheeler Report.

He believed the following persons were assigned to ISA in February and March 1968 and that they might have been involved in the substantive work:



Dr. Leslie Gelb

Dr. Richard Ullman

Lt Colonel Herbert Y. Schandler

Dr. William Kaufman

Colonel Paul Gorman

In addition, he recalls that Dr. Steadman, Deputy Assistant for Southeast Asia and Pacific Affairs, ISA might have been working on various position papers resulting from the Wheeler Report.

He recalled that there was a "leak" to the press of the Wheeler Report and that Steadman was involved but it was never proven that he was the source of the leak. He also vaguely recalled that a letter to Warnke from an unrecalled member of the ISA staff concerning a contact with the press about the Wheeler Report and the article by Neil Sheehan in the New York Times. Warnke was upset and believed Clark Clifford, Secretary of Defense or his Military Assistant, Colonel Robert Pursley, may have discussed it with Warnke. After the leak, Pace set up a system at Warnke's direction that all contacts with the press would be recorded on 3 x 5 cards maintained in the OSD/ISA files and that a representative of Public Affairs OSD would be present at these press meetings. Halperin talked with Neil Sheehan of The New York Times on many occasions, but Pace did not know any details about these discussions.

He said that the ISA staff or their work was supposed to go through him to Warnke, but it did not always happen that way and many times the Deputies would go directly to Warnke. During this time (February-March 1968) Halperin was frequently "running in and out of Warnke's office." on Vietnam problems.

After reviewing a reproduced copy of the Wheeler Report found in Policy Plans, ISA and a copy of the selected eight pages that were logged into the Rand Santa Monica files on 13 March 1968, he said that the initials in the right-hand corner of the first page were his and would have been placed there by him when he receipted for ISA's copy. He reviewed these copies and was unable to identify any of the markings or writings in the margin. He said that when he marked documents he used a ruler and a felt tip pen. He could not tell what section in ISA the

markings could be attributed to. He said that the notes and writing in the margin did seem familiar to him and thought they looked like they might have been made during some meeting, but could not be sure. It was pointed out to Pace that the ISA copy of the "Wheeler Report" contained a 29 February 1968 change to page 3 and that the page 3 of the eight selected pages recovered from Rand was not the same. He was unable to offer any explanation. He commented that the person who selected the eight pages of the "Wheeler Report" that went to Rand would have had to be very familiar with the report to have made this particular selection inasmuch as they were the most important portions.

Pace said that he does not recall that Halperin was the originator of idea for the Study on Vietnam and that he believes it was originally a Robert S. McNamara idea.

He said that he did tell Dorothy Maffett, secretary to Deputy Assistant Secretary, Policy Plans, OSD/ISA, not to give Gelb any more official papers. He said it probably was just after Maffett had told him about Gelb sending documents from ISA to an unrecalled desintation. He said he discussed it with Nutter, and Nutter told him to do it. Nutter did not want to retain Gelb, and Gelb could not take the numerous hints to leave. He said it got "pretty brutal" near the end, and Nutter finally just called Gelb in and asked him to leave because he was "not on our team."

Persons mentioned in this report are further identified as follows:

Paul C. Warnke, currently employed Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain and Finney, Attorneys at Law, 815 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C.

Clark Clifford currently employed Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain and Finney, Attorneys at Law, 815 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C.

Morton E. Halperin, currently employed at Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Leslie H. Gelb, currently employed at Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.



Hon. Warren G. Nutter, Incumbent Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Richard C. Steadman, currently employed with J. H. Whitney Co., 630 5th Avenue, New York City, New York

Richard Ullman, Professor at Princeton

William Kaufman, Professor at MIT

Brigadier General Robert E. Pursley, USAF, OSD, Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Colonel Paul Gorman, USA, currently assigned U. S. Army Infantry, Fort Benning, Georgia.

Lt Col Herbert Y. Schandler, USA, Coordination Division, Office Chief of Staff, Army, Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Dorothy Maffett, OASD/ISA, Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Defense Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U. S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945 - 1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 5 OCT-1971  
Period: 27 September 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Paul T. Spalla

SUMMARY

Mrs. Kay Prudente (nee Haygood), secretary, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA), advised she accomplished dictation, typing and reproduction for Lt Colonel Schandler, her ISA supervisor. She expressed her distrust of the civilian consultants working at ISA because of their large volume of reproductions, which appeared to her as excessive for their work needs. She specifically noted these actions by Gerry Kahan and Daniel Ellsberg. She was aware of the Gelb Study Group's existence but not the identities of its members. She did not see the completed OSD Vietnam Task Force Study, and was not aware that Gelb or Halperin took any documentation with them from ISA when they departed the Pentagon.

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## DETAILS

On 27 September 1971, Mrs. Kay Prudente (nee Haygood), secretary, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA), The Pentagon, was interviewed by Special Agents Paul T. Spalla and Robert L. Jones. Lt Colonel Schandler had identified Mrs. Prudente as one of the secretaries in OSD/ISA who typed some of his working drafts during his assignment to the OSD Vietnam Task Force (Gelb Study Group). Mrs. Prudente stated essentially as follows:

She has been employed at ISA since the summer of 1967. During this time, she was aware of the Gelb Study Group, but did not know the exact period of its existence nor identities of the group members.

Her work at ISA, consisting of dictation, typing and reproduction, was normally accomplished for her supervisor, Lt Colonel Schandler. However, she was unable to determine whether this work concerned the Gelb Study Group or other ISA Vietnam papers for which, at that time, Schandler was responsible.

She recalled her distrust of the civilian consultants working at ISA, because it appeared to her that the volume of documents they were reproducing and having reproduced was not in consonance with that required for their work. She specifically noted these actions by Gerry Kahan and Daniel Ellsberg. (Note: Kahan was not a member of the Study Group.)

A copy of the Report of Chairman, JCS on Situation in Vietnam and MACV Force Requirements, called the "Wheeler Report" (83 pages) was displayed to Prudente. Upon observation, she believed that she had reproduced a very similar report for one of the consultants, possibly Ellsberg, for whom she specifically recalled reproducing "in a hurry" a document consisting of approximately 100 pages, as he was leaving on a trip. She was also shown an eight-page extract from the "Wheeler Report" which was recovered from Rand, Santa Monica, California. After review, she did not recall ever seeing the extract; however, she was able to identify the initials of Captain Robert Pace, USN, on the front sheet.

(Note: An exact textual duplicate of eight selected pages of the originally disseminated copy of the "Wheeler Report" appeared in The New York Times on 4 July 1971. Daniel Ellsberg, a member of the OSD Vietnam Task Force, was in the Pentagon from 24 February to 12 March 1968. He logged the exact eight pages, which were reproduced from ISA's original copy of the "Wheeler Report," into the Rand-Santa Monica Top Secret Control System on 13 March 1968.)



She knew CPO Fox, who was with ISA but detailed to the Study Group, and it was her observation that he was extremely dedicated to his work and very security conscious.

She never saw the completed Gelb Study Group report in final form, although she did see a stack about two feet high of what was described to her as the final drafts of the Study. She could not remember the manner in which the drafts were bound.

Prudente does not recall seeing any members of the news media in her office since her assignment. She did see two file drawers of documents "left over" from the Study Group upon its dissolution. These were later disposed of during a "file cleaning," but she does not know when, nor in what manner.

She was not aware that either Gelb or Halperin took any material with them when they left ISA. However, she believes Gelb's former secretary, Mary Carmen, may possess information regarding this aspect.

The individuals mentioned above are further identified as follows:

Lt Colonel Herbert Y. Schandler, USA, Coordination Division,  
Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, The Pentagon

Dr. Leslie H. Gelb, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Gerry Kahan, last known to be with Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Captain Robert D. Pace, USN, Commander, USS FRANCIS MARION,  
formerly with ISA

Donald E. Fox, CPO, USN (Ret.), Quaker Lane, Alexandria, Virginia

Mary M. Carmen, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Washington, D. C.



OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

On September 21, 1971 we forwarded two copies of a report dated September 21, 1971 which set forth the interview of Donald P. Kredel. Line 3 of the Summary reflects that Kredel was assigned administrative duties with the Task Force in February 1969. This date should be changed to read February 1968. It would be appreciated if you would make the change on both copies furnished you.

*[Signature]*  
JACK J. CROMAR  
Special Agent

*Per 12/1/71  
10/2/71  
ICC & WFO  
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October 5, 1971

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

The attached seven reports of interviews  
are forwarded for your information.

M.L.

*Jack J. Cromar*  
JACK J. CROMAR  
Special Agent

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Defense Department  
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INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U.S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945 - 1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 5 OCT 1971  
Period: 9 September 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Thomas G. Reynolds

SUMMARY

Mrs. Evelyn K. Uthus, OSD WAE employee working as a secretary, Position, Pay and Management Branch, OSD/Adm was interviewed on 9 Sep 71 and advised she was Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's secretary for a three month period in 1965. She was unable to recall when Ellsberg left the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA). Ellsberg did not reproduce any documents while she worked for him and as far as she knows he was not given personal copies of documents he authored.

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## DETAILS

Mrs. Evelyn K. Uthus, OSD WAE employee presently working as a secretary in the Position, Pay and Management Branch, OSD/Adm was interviewed on 9 Sep 71 by Special Agents Ralph M. Harris and Thomas G. Reynolds concerning her knowledge of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's activities while he was assigned as Special Assistant to John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA).

She advised that she was employed as a secretary in the executive offices OSD/ISA from 19 August 1962 until 7 May 1967 and was third secretary to The Assistant Secretary of Defense from 7 November 1965. During her tenure she replaced Jean Stoneman as Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's secretary when Stoneman resigned (date not recalled). She worked for Ellsberg for approximately three months in 1965 but could not recall the specific dates. She was unable to recall when Ellsberg left the executive offices. Ellsberg did not reproduce any documents while she worked for him and as far as she knows he was not given any personal copies of documents he might have authored. She said that she probably reproduced documents for him but they would have been controlled on the "snowflakes" (document control records). She commented that security within ISA was the strictest in OSD. She had no knowledge of the OSD Vietnam Task Force and never worked on any material for them.



## Newspaper Profile of Materials From The Pentagon Papers

Newspaper: The Miami Herald

Dates of Publication: On 27 June and 4 July The Miami Herald published articles based on the Pentagon Study.

Description of Articles: The articles in The Miami Herald consisted of narrative commentary on the Pentagon Papers utilizing frequent direct quotations purported to have come from the Pentagon Papers. Attribution was given to writers for the Knight newspaper chain and wire services, and all stories were filed under Washington datelines. The Miami Herald used similar, but not exactly duplicative material as the Los Angeles and The Philadelphia Inquirer, the other Knight newspapers reporting on the Pentagon Papers.

Listing of Published Documents: No documents were published separately by The Miami Herald.

Sources of Documents: Research has not yet been undertaken to match document excerpts quoted in the narrative texts with their possible sources. (7 volumes of Rand Working Papers). However, an initial scan of the narrative indicates that the Herald did not have unique source material unavailable to The New York Times.

THIS INFORMATION IS THE RESULT OF BIBLIOGRAPHIC RESEARCH ACCOMPLISHED  
AS OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1971. CORRECTIONS AND/OR ADDITIONS WILL BE MADE AS  
CONTINUING RESEARCH WARRANTS.

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Defense Department  
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INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U. S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945 - 1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 21 OCT 1971  
Period: 23 September 1971.  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Thomas G. Reynolds

SUMMARY

Lt Colonel Herbert Y. Schandler, U. S. Army Coordination Division, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, after being advised of his rights and waiving his right to have a lawyer present, was reinterviewed. Subsequent to a detailed review of several OSD Task Force Study volumes, he identified Volume IV. C. 6. C. as authored by him while assigned as an Assistant for Southeast Asia Affairs, Policy Planning, Office, Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. A portion of the source material he used in writing the volume came from a black notebook maintained by Dr. Morton Halperin. The remaining source material was obtained from "various sources." Included in one of the preceding was the "Wheeler Report" though he was not certain which contained it, but he identified in Volume IV. C. 6. C. footnotes 11 through 16 as "Wheeler Report" references he used, and as the "meat" of the "Report." He also confirmed his use of the "Wheeler Report" in late February or early March 1968 while in ISA and working for Dr. Leslie Gelb. He was a member of what was called the "Clifford Working Group," preparing position papers on, and as a follow-on to the "Wheeler Report." He recalled a "Wheeler Report" meeting in Dr. Gelb's office attended by Colonel Paul Gorman, Dr. Richard Ullman, Colonel Volney Warner, Dr. Halperin, Dr. Gelb, and himself, and asserted everyone around Dr. Halperin in ISA was then working on this "Report." Daniel Ellsberg was in ISA at this time, and was "pretty close" with Halperin, and should have had access to the "Wheeler Report." Schandler did not reproduce any portions of the "Wheeler Report" in early 1968, but did so in preparing Volume IV. C. 6. C. to insert direct quotations into his product.

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J. FRED BUZHARDT



## DETAILS

Lt Colonel Herbert Y. Schandler, USA, Coordination Division, Office of Chief of Staff, Army, and former Assistant for Southeast Asia Affairs, Policy Planning, OSD/ISA, was reinterviewed on 23 September 1971 by Special Agents Thomas G. Reynolds and Robert L. Jones for the purpose of determining if he wrote Volume IV.C.6.C. of the OSD Vietnam Study and his knowledge of the Report of Chairman, JCS on Situation in Vietnam and MACV Force Requirements, 27 February 1968, commonly called the "Wheeler Report."

An exact textual duplicate of eight selected pages of the originally disseminated copy of the "Wheeler Report" appeared in The New York Times on 4 July 1971. Daniel Ellsberg, a member of the OSD Vietnam Task Force, was in the Pentagon from 24 February to 12 March 1968. He logged the exact eight pages, which were reproduced from ISA's original copy of the "Wheeler Report," into the Rand-Santa Monica Top Secret Control System on 13 March 1968.

Schandler was advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Justice, and informed of the matter under investigation. He indicated he understood his rights, waived his right to have a lawyer present, and advised as follows:

After a review of Volumes IV.C.6.A, IV.C.6.B and IV.C.6.C., he said that he wrote Volume IV.C.6.C. in its entirety. The back-up or source material used to produce this volume was obtained from "various sources," but a large portion came from a black notebook maintained by Dr. Morton Halperin, Deputy Director, Policy Planning, OSD/ISA. This notebook contained documents produced by the "Clifford Working Group" which he defined as a group organized as a result of the "Wheeler Report." Documents recorded in the following footnotes to Volume IV.C.6.C. were taken from this notebook: 17 through 28; 30 through 34, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 59, 66, 70 and 83 (see attachment for their specific identity). Schandler said footnotes 11 through 16 refer to the "Wheeler Report" which he knew to be pertinent to his study work and had previously been available to him in his position in OSD/ISA. He does not recall if Halperin's notebook contained this "Report" in toto or a reproduced portion; but if included, was probably in a shortened form.

He believed he had the full text of the "Wheeler Report" when he was writing Volume IV.C.6.C.; however, he could have been using only the main document, as the enclosures were not germane to his written product. He acknowledged he reproduced portions of the "Wheeler Report" where there existed a necessity to quote it verbatim in the text of his input to the Study. He would reproduce a copy of a pertinent page, then cut out the desired comment, patch it into his draft, and destroy the residue.



Schandler had the document earlier because of his work in OSD/ISA and that Policy Planning was the action office in ISA. Some time in late February or very early March 1968, he was working on various follow-on position papers generated as a result of the "Wheeler Report." The "Wheeler Report" came to him from Paul C. Warnke, Deputy Secretary of Defense/ISA through Dr. Leslie Gelb, Foreign Affairs Officer, OSD/ISA Policy Planning Staff, his immediate superior. He recalls that at this time a meeting was held on the "Wheeler Report" in Dr. Gelb's office. Those in attendance were Colonel Paul Gorman, Dr. Richard Ullman, Colonel Volney Warner (who was from the White House and is now an assistant to General Westmoreland), Halperin, and Gelb. The results of the work produced at this meeting were furnished to Halperin. Subsequently, all related higher level work produced by ISA was carried on in Halperin's office, and "everyone" in ISA who was around Halperin (immediate staff) was working on this. Secretary of Defense Clifford had told Warnke what he wanted and Warnke had relayed the requirements to Halperin. The Halperin guideline directives, not recalled by exact content, were set forth in the document footnoted 17 to Volume IV. C. 6. C. He recalls that the Halperin-level group (of this Clifford Working Group) included Gorman and Daniel Ellsberg who were working in ISA at the time. He could not specifically identify other members. He worked on the "Wheeler Report" and follow-on position papers for Gelb only a few days (4 or 5), because he became involved with work on the negotiations in Paris, France.

He recalled something about a leak of the "Wheeler Report" to the press, but it was not discussed to any extent because the "Clifford Working Group" had gone beyond the "realm of consideration" of the information in the "Wheeler Report" when the leak was published. To the best of his knowledge, the full text of the "Wheeler Report" was in the possession of Halperin, and he does not know what became of the basic document or copies, if any. Ellsberg should have had access to the Report in his work with Halperin, and he termed Halperin and Ellsberg as "pretty close." Subsequently, Gelb asked him to contact some of his "Army friends" to find out why the JCS was "bent out of shape" over a document ISA produced as a result of the "Wheeler Report," called "Demographic Frontier," that he believed was authored by Gorman.

He did not reproduce any portion of the "Wheeler Report" at this time, nor does he recall seeing a document containing only selected pages from the "Wheeler Report." He was asked to review a full text of the "Wheeler Report" to select important pages. He identified pages 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 12, 13, 14, and possibly 15 as being the "meat of the 'Wheeler Report.'" He could not identify any of the authors of the markings on this document. (Note: All except page 15 were in the reproduced portions logged into the Rand-Santa Monica Top Secret Control System on 13 March 1968.) After being shown and reviewing the eight pages of the "Wheeler



"Report" recovered from Rand-Santa Monica, he was unable to identify the author of any of the markings or handwritten notes. He evinced surprise that Rand had received these pages and could offer no explanation as to how Rand got a copy.

The standard procedure for reproduction within ISA was to obtain permission of the originator and then reproduce copies which would be picked up on ISA document control records. Donald E. Fox, CPO, USN (Ret.) did all the reproduction for the Policy Planning Staff in ISA; however, any reproduction from Halperin's office would probably have been done by Dorothy Maffett, Halperin's secretary, who still occupies the same position in ISA.

Halperin left his position in ISA to work for Dr. Henry Kissinger at the White House in January 1969; and Gelb, who replaced him temporarily, left in April 1969 "on bad terms." Schandler considered that Gelb was "not one of them" (i.e., the New Administration), but provided no specifics.

Persons mentioned in this report are further identified as follows:

Paul C. Warnke, currently employed with Clifford, Warnke, Blass, McIlwain and Finney, Attorneys at Law, 815 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C.

Clark Clifford, currently employed with Clifford, Warnke, Blass, McIlwain and Finney, Attorneys at Law

Morton E. Halperin, currently employed at Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Leslie H. Gelb, currently employed at Brookings Institution

Richard Ullman, Professor at Princeton University, New Jersey

Colonel Paul Gorman, USA, currently assigned to U. S. Army Infantry, Fort Benning, Georgia

Donald E. Fox, CPO, USN (Ret.), U. S. Post Office, Bailey's Cross Roads Branch, Virginia

Enclosure

FOOTNOTES

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2. "U.S. Aides Predict All-Out Red Drive as Prelude to Talks," by George R. Packard, Philadelphia Bulletin, 11 Jan 68, p. 1.
3. JCSM 91-68, 12 Feb 68, Subject: "Emergency Reinforcement of COMUSMACV."
4. JCS Msg 9926, 130218Z Feb 68, Subject: "Deployment of Brigade Task Force of 82nd Airborne Division to SVN."
5. Ibid.
6. JCS Msg 9929, 130341Z Feb 68, Subject: "Deployment of Marine Corps Regiment (Reinforced) to SVN."
7. Ibid.
8. CINCPAC Msg to JCS/CINCSRIKE, 150125Z Feb 68, Subject: "Deployment of Marine Regiment " JCS in 12316.
9. DJSN 259-68, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: "Marine Deployments to Vietnam", dated 6 Mar 68.
10. JCSM 95-68, 13 Feb 68, Subject: "Emergency Reinforcement of COMUSMACV."
11. Report of Chairman, JCS on Situation in Vietnam and MACV Force Requirements, 27 Feb 1968
12. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
13. Ibid., p. 12.
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15. Ibid., p. 13.
16. Ibid., p. 14.
17. Handwritten notes by Morton Halperin from conversation with Paul Warnke, 29 Feb 1968
18. Memorandum from William Bundy to General Taylor and Mr. Warnke, 29 Feb 1968



19. Halperin notes, op. cit.
20. Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the Director, Subject: The Outlook in Vietnam, dated 25 Feb 1968
21. Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum, Subject: Communist Alternatives in Vietnam, dated 29 Feb 1968
22. Ibid., p. 1
23. Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum, Subject: Questions Concerning the Situation in Vietnam, dated 1 March 1968
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25. Department of State, Memorandum for the Group, Subject: Checklist of Factors Affecting Alternative Courses of Action, dated 29 Feb 1968, initialed by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
26. W. P. Bundy, Draft Memorandum for the Group, op. cit., 29 Feb 68.
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28. Department of State, "Possible Soviet Responses to Various US Actions in Indochina -- Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia;" "Probable Chinese Responses to Certain US Courses of Action in Indochina--Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia;" "Probable Western European Reaction to Various US Courses of Action in Indochina -- Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia," undated papers
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31. W. P. Bundy, Draft Memorandum, Subject: Asian Reaction to a Major U.S. Force Increase, dated 1 Mar 68
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33. Undated Memorandum, Subject: Viet-Nam Alternatives, signed M.D.T., General Taylor took, as the U.S. objective, the statement of Pres. Johnson in his speech at Johns Hopkins University in April 1969: "Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves, only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their country in their own way."
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74. Ibid., pp. 4-6.
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| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02504 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02505 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02506 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02507 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02508 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02509 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02510 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02511 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02512 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02513 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02514 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02515 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02516 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02517 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02518 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02519 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02520 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02521 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02522 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02523 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02524 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02525 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02526 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02527 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02528 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02529 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02530 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02531 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02532 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02533 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02534 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02535 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02536 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02537 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02538 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02539 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02540 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02541 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02542 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02543 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02544 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02545 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02546 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02547 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02548 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02549 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02550 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02551 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02552 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02553 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02554 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02555 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02556 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02557 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02558 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02559 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02560 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02561 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02562 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02563 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02564 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02565 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02566 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02567 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02568 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02569 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02570 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02571 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02572 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02573 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02574 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02575 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02576 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02577 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02578 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02579 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02580 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02581 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02582 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02583 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02584 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02585 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02586 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02587 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02588 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02589 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02590 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02591 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02592 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02593 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
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| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02595 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02596 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02597 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02598 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02599 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02600 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02601 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02602 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02603 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02604 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02605 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02606 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02607 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02608 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02609 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
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| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02612 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02613 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02614 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02615 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02616 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02617 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02618 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02619 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02620 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02621 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02622 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02623 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02624 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02625 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02626 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02627 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02628 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
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| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02630 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02631 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02632 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02633 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02634 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02635 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
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| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02637 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02638 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02639 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02640 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02641 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02642 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02643 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02644 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02645 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02646 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02647 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02648 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02649 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02650 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02651 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02652 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECONOMICS | 1-16-67 | CL | 02653 | - | CG01 | 67 | 0 | 0010 |   |



|          |          |    |       |         |   |      |   |
|----------|----------|----|-------|---------|---|------|---|
| ECGNMICS | 02-10-69 | CL | 00451 | 0001 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-03-69 | CL | 00700 | 0001 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-05-69 | CL | 00701 | 0001 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-06-69 | CL | 00702 | 0001 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-06-69 | CL | 00703 | 0001 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-06-69 | CL | 00704 | 0001 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-06-69 | CL | 00705 | 0001 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-06-69 | CL | 00706 | 0001 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-06-69 | CL | 00707 | 0001 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-06-69 | CL | 00708 | 0001 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-06-69 | CL | 00709 | 0001 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 09-04-69 | CL | 00767 | 0007 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 08-20-60 | L  | 15543 | 0007 68 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 11-07-67 | M  | 07443 | 0003 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 12-30-60 | M  | 09004 | 0002 68 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 05-18-69 | M  | 06355 | 0003 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-20-69 | X  | 00044 | 0001 63 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-20-69 | X  | 00043 | 0001 64 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-20-69 | X  | 00267 | 0001 64 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-20-69 | X  | 00268 | 0001 64 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-20-69 | X  | 00370 | 0001 64 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-20-69 | X  | 00274 | 0001 64 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-20-69 | X  | 00276 | 0001 64 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 03-20-69 | X  | 00380 | 0001 64 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 11-07-67 | X  | 30497 | 0001 67 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 02-25-68 | X  | 00101 | 0003 68 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 04-11-68 | X  | 00152 | 0003 68 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 05-15-68 | X  | 00195 | 0005 68 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 05-15-68 | X  | 00196 | 0001 68 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 05-15-68 | X  | 00197 | 0001 68 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 05-15-68 | X  | 00198 | 0001 68 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 05-15-68 | X  | 00199 | 0001 68 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 05-15-68 | X  | 00200 | 0001 68 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 12-23-68 | X  | 00045 | 0004 68 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |
| ECGNMICS | 05-22-69 | X  | 00187 | 0002 69 | 0 | 0010 | ✓ |

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|-----------|----------|----|--------|---|------|----|---|------|--|
| ECONOMICS | 07-10-68 | CL | 217357 | 0 | 0014 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 08-12-68 | D  | 217504 | 1 | 0016 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 09-04-69 | D  | 217704 | 0 | 0042 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
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| ECONOMICS | 12-26-68 | D  | 218116 | 1 | 0037 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 12-04-68 | D  | 218155 | 0 | 0047 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 06-18-69 | D  | 218486 | 0 | 0145 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 09-16-69 | CL | 218814 | 0 | 0029 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 09-15-69 | D  | 218023 | 0 | 0032 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
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| ECONOMICS | 07-14-69 | C  | 219073 | 0 | 0018 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
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| ECONOMICS | 12-31-69 | D  | 219784 | 0 | 0019 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 01-06-70 | D  | 219781 | 0 | 0042 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 02-04-70 | D  | 219897 | 0 | 0137 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 02-23-70 | CL | 219556 | 0 | 0030 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
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| ECONOMICS | 09-11-69 | R  | 200466 | 0 | 0197 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
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| ECONOMICS | 01-30-69 | RM | 205827 | 0 | 0101 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
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| ECONOMICS | 03-26-69 | RM | 205895 | 0 | 0206 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 03-23-69 | RM | 205897 | 0 | 0147 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 09-17-69 | RM | 205914 | 0 | 0193 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 06-20-69 | RM | 205923 | 0 | 0366 | 10 | 0 | 0    |  |
| ECONOMICS | 03-20-69 | CL | 200015 | A | 0001 | 61 | 0 | 0010 |  |
| ECONOMICS | 03-20-69 | CL | 200075 | - | 0001 | 62 | 0 | 0010 |  |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 200197 | - | 0001 | 67 | 0 | 0010 |  |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 200158 | - | 0001 | 67 | 0 | 0010 |  |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 200199 | - | 0001 | 67 | 0 | 0010 |  |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 200206 | - | 0001 | 67 | 0 | 0010 |  |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 200201 | - | 0001 | 67 | 0 | 0010 |  |
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| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 200203 | A | 0001 | 67 | 0 | 0010 |  |



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|           |   |          |    |        |   |      |    |   |      |
|-----------|---|----------|----|--------|---|------|----|---|------|
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0264 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0265 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0266 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0267 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0268 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0269 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0270 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0271 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0272 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0273 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0274 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0275 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0276 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0277 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0278 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0279 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0280 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0281 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0282 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0283 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0284 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0285 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0286 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0287 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0288 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0289 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0290 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0291 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0292 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |
| ECONOMICS | 3 | 03-13-68 | CL | >C0293 | - | CC01 | 67 | 0 | CG10 |

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SIGNATURE

David S. Johnson

230.. TOTAL NUMBER OF ITEMS LISTED ABOVE



[illegible][illegible]







|           |   |          |    |         |         |      |    |
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| ECONOMICS | S | 11-27-68 | CL | 02342 A | CC01 68 | 0010 | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | S | 12-18-68 | CL | 02468   | CC01 68 | 0010 | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | S | 12-18-68 | CL | 02468 A | CC01 68 | 0010 | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | S | 12-18-68 | CL | 02468 D | CC01 68 | 0010 | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | S | 12-18-68 | CL | 02468 C | CC01 68 | 0010 | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | S | 12-31-68 | CL | 02526   | CC02 68 | 0010 | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | S | 02-10-69 | CL | 00451   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-05-69 | CL | 00700   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-05-69 | CL | 00701   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-06-69 | CL | 00702   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-06-69 | CL | 00703   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-06-69 | CL | 00704   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-06-69 | CL | 00705   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-06-69 | CL | 00706   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-06-69 | CL | 00707   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-06-69 | CL | 00708   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-06-69 | CL | 00709   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-06-69 | CL | 00767   | CC07 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 08-20-68 | CL | 15543   | CC07 68 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 10-16-69 | CL | 18527 A | CC03 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 10-28-69 | CL | 20189   | CC07 69 | 0010 | H2 |
| ECONOMICS | S | 11-07-67 | CL | 07443   | CC03 67 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 12-30-68 | CL | 09004   | CC02 68 | 0010 | H2 |
| ECONOMICS | S | 09-18-69 | CL | 06395   | CC03 69 | 0010 | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-20-69 | CL | 00044   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-20-69 | CL | 00043   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-20-69 | CL | 00267   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-20-69 | CL | 00270   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-20-69 | CL | 00276   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 03-20-69 | CL | 00280   | CC01 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 11-07-67 | CL | 00497   | CC01 67 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 02-29-68 | CL | 00101   | CC03 68 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 04-11-68 | CL | 00152   | CC05 68 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 05-15-68 | CL | 00195   | CC05 68 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 05-15-68 | CL | 00196   | CC02 68 | 0010 | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | S | 05-15-68 | CL | 00197   | CC01 68 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 05-15-68 | CL | 00198   | CC01 68 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 05-15-68 | CL | 00199   | CC01 68 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 05-15-68 | CL | 00200   | CC01 68 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 12-23-68 | CL | 00645   | CC04 68 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 05-22-69 | CL | 00187   | CC02 69 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 05-07-68 | CL | 00880   | CC01 68 | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | S | 05-07-68 | CL | 00880   | CC01 68 | 0010 |    |

SIGNATURE

*David Ellsberg*

347 = TOTAL NUMBER OF ITEMS LISTED ABOVE





|           |    |          |    |        |    |      |    |  |      |
|-----------|----|----------|----|--------|----|------|----|--|------|
| 12-20-68  | D  | 17262    | 1  | 0069   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 06-21-68  | D  | 17269    | 0  | 0009   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 07-10-68  | DL | 17357    | 0  | 0014   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 08-12-68  | 0  | 17504    | 1  | 0016   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 02-04-69  | 0  | 17704    | 0  | 0042   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 09-18-68  | DL | 17791    | 0  | 0013   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 09-27-68  | 0  | 17816    | 0  | 0054   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 10-02-68  | D  | 17837    | 0  | 0023   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 10-09-68  | D  | 17879    | 0  | 0082   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 10-10-68  | DL | 17881    | 0  | 0009   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 10-10-68  | DL | 17882    | 0  | 0009   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 11-20-68  | D  | 18081    | 0  | 0015   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 11-29-68  | 0  | 18116    | 0  | 0035   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 12-26-68  | 0  | 18116    | 1  | 0037   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 12-04-68  | 0  | 18155    | 0  | 0047   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 06-18-69  | 0  | 18486    | 0  | 0145   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 09-16-69  | DL | 18614    | 0  | 0029   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 09-15-69  | 0  | 18823    | 0  | 0032   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 10-13-69  | DL | 18985    | 0  | 0014   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 07-14-69  | 0  | 19073    | 0  | 0018   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 09-05-69  | 0  | 19096    | 0  | 0047   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 09-17-69  | 0  | 19113    | 0  | 0057   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 09-05-69  | DL | 19196    | 0  | 0023   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 12-18-69  | 0  | 19748    | 0  | 0027   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 12-31-69  | 0  | 19764    | 0  | 0019   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 01-08-70  | D  | 19781    | 0  | 0042   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 02-04-70  | D  | 19897    | 0  | 0137   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 02-23-70  | DL | 19958    | 0  | 0030   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 02-23-70  | D  | 19959    | 0  | 0024   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 09-11-69  | R  | 00466    | 0  | 0197   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 09-20-68  | RM | 05435    | 0  | 0101   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 08-01-68  | RM | 05505    | 0  | 0130   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 03-06-68  | RM | 05617    | 0  | 0189   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 02-03-69  | RM | 05729    | 1  | 0187   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 10-31-68  | RM | 05729    | 0  | 0201   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 01-02-69  | RM | 05775    | 0  | 0237   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 09-11-69  | RM | 05823    | 0  | 0172   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 01-30-69  | RM | 05827    | 0  | 0101   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 02-17-69  | RM | 05858    | 0  | 0320   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 03-26-69  | RM | 05895    | 0  | 0206   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 05-23-69  | RM | 05897    | 0  | 0147   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 09-17-69  | RM | 05914    | 0  | 0193   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
| 06-20-69  | RM | 05923    | 0  | 0366   | 10 | 0    |    |  |      |
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| ECONOMICS | S  | 03-20-69 | CL | 000975 | -- | 0001 | 62 |  | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | S  | 03-13-68 | CL | 00197  | -- | 0001 | 67 |  | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | S  | 03-13-68 | CL | 000198 | -- | 0001 | 67 |  | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | S  | 03-13-68 | CL | 000199 | -- | 0001 | 67 |  | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | S  | 03-13-68 | CL | 000200 | -- | 0001 | 67 |  | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | S  | 03-13-68 | CL | 000201 | -- | 0001 | 67 |  | 0010 |



|           |          |    |        |   |      |    |      |
|-----------|----------|----|--------|---|------|----|------|
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 00202  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 00203  | A | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 00204  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 00205  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 00206  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 00207  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 00267  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 00268  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 00363  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 00364  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 03-13-68 | CL | 00365  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
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| ECONOMICS | 03-12-68 | CL | 00367  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 09-16-67 | CL | 000837 | A | 0005 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 09-12-67 | CL | 01982  | A | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
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| ECONOMICS | 11-07-67 | CL | 02400  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
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| ECONOMICS | 01-09-68 | CL | 02450  | A | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 11-15-67 | CL | 02451  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
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| ECONOMICS | 11-16-67 | CL | 02490  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 11-16-67 | CL | 02491  | - | 0001 | 67 | 0010 |

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|           |   |          |    |          |         |      |
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| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-16-67 | CL | ✓02492   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
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| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-16-67 | CL | ✓02504   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-16-67 | CL | ✓02505   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-16-67 | CL | ✓02506   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-16-67 | CL | ✓02507   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
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| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-16-67 | CL | ✓02509   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-16-67 | CL | ✓02510   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-16-67 | CL | ✓02511   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-16-67 | CL | ✓02512   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-16-67 | CL | ✓02513   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-16-67 | CL | ✓02514   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-22-67 | CL | ✓02518   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-22-67 | CL | ✓02519   | 0002 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-22-67 | CL | ✓02520   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-22-67 | CL | ✓02521   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-22-67 | CL | ✓02522   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
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| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-22-67 | CL | ✓02524   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-22-67 | CL | ✓02525   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-22-67 | CL | ✓02526   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-22-67 | CL | ✓02527   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-21-67 | CL | ✓02528   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
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| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-22-67 | CL | ✓02530   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-22-67 | CL | ✓02531   | 0001 67 | 0010 |
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| ECONOMICS | 5 | 12-22-67 | CL | ✓02789   | 0009 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 12-22-67 | CL | ✓02789 A | 0008 67 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-07-68 | CL | ✓02840 A | 0001 66 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 06-28-65 | CL | ✓01253   | 0001 66 | 0010 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 07-25-63 | CL | ✓01304   | 0003 66 | 0010 |



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| ECONOMICS | 5 | 07-25-68 | CL | 01384 | 0003 | 68   | 0010 |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-27-68 | CL | 02342 | A    | 0001 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 12-18-68 | CL | 02468 |      | 0001 | 68   | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 12-18-68 | CL | 02468 | A    | 0001 | 68   | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 12-18-68 | CL | 02468 | B    | 0001 | 68   | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 12-18-68 | CL | 02468 | C    | 0001 | 68   | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 12-31-68 | CL | 02526 |      | 0002 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 02-10-69 | CL | 00451 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-05-69 | CL | 00700 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-05-69 | CL | 00701 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-06-69 | CL | 00702 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-06-69 | CL | 00703 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-06-69 | CL | 00704 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-06-69 | CL | 00705 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-06-69 | CL | 00706 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-06-69 | CL | 00707 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-06-69 | CL | 00708 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-06-69 | CL | 00709 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 09-04-69 | CL | 00767 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 08-20-68 | L  | 11543 |      | 0007 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 10-16-69 | L  | 10527 | A    | 0034 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 10-28-69 | L  | 20185 |      | 0009 | 69   | H2 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-07-67 | M  | 07443 |      | 0003 | 67   | H2 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 12-30-68 | M  | 09004 |      | 0002 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 09-18-69 | M  | 06395 |      | 0003 | 69   | E2 |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-20-69 | X  | 00044 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-20-69 | X  | 00043 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-20-69 | X  | 00267 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-20-69 | X  | 00268 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-20-69 | X  | 00270 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-20-69 | X  | 00274 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-20-69 | X  | 00276 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 03-20-69 | X  | 00280 |      | 0001 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 11-07-67 | X  | 00497 |      | 0001 | 67   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 02-29-68 | X  | 00101 |      | 0003 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 04-11-68 | X  | 00152 |      | 0505 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 05-15-68 | X  | 00195 |      | 0005 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 05-15-68 | X  | 00196 |      | 0001 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 05-15-68 | X  | 00197 |      | 0001 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 05-15-68 | X  | 00198 |      | 0001 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 05-15-68 | X  | 00199 |      | 0001 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 05-15-68 | X  | 00200 |      | 0001 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 12-23-68 | X  | 00645 |      | 0002 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 05-22-69 | X  | 00187 |      | 0002 | 69   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 05-07-68 | CL | 00880 | C    | 0001 | 68   |    |
| ECONOMICS | 5 | 05-07-68 | CL | 00880 | C    | 0001 | 68   |    |

SIGNATURE ..... 347-0 TOTAL NUMBER OF ITEMS LISTED ABOVE

# SEMI-ANNUAL TOP SECRET INVENTORIES - D. ELLSBERG

SPRING 1969 (sighted by J. L. Butler, TSCO on 4/29/69) (9 documents)

| Doc. #  | cy. # | rec. date | Document description                   |
|---------|-------|-----------|----------------------------------------|
| TS-3193 | 1A    | 4/7/69    | Vietnam Documents, 1961.               |
| TS-3194 | 1A    | 4/7/69    | Ellsberg Manuscript - 1st draft        |
| TS-3262 | 2A    | 4/7/69    | DL-16671-1-ISA by W. E. Simons         |
| TS-3263 | 1A    | 4/7/69    | DL-17061-ISA by W. E. Simons           |
| TS-3266 | 3A    | 4/7/69    | DL-17055-ISA by G. H. Shubert          |
| TS-3268 | 2A    | 4/7/69    | DL-17100-ISA by G. H. Shubert          |
| TS-3271 | 2A    | 4/7/69    | DL-16769-1-ISA by W. E. Simons         |
| TS-3275 | Draft | 4/7/69    | DL-17268-ISA by H. Heymann             |
| TS-3286 | 30A   | 4/7/69    | RM-5617-ISA/ARPA by M. Gurtov - Part 2 |

FALL 1969 (sighted by J. L. Butler, TSCO on 11/18/69) (16 documents)

|         |       |        |                                        |
|---------|-------|--------|----------------------------------------|
| TS-3262 | 2A    | 4/7/69 | DL-16671-1-ISA by W. E. Simons         |
| TS-3263 | 1A    | 4/7/69 | DL-17061-ISA by W. E. Simons           |
| TS-3268 | 2A    | 4/7/69 | DL-17100-ISA by G. H. Shubert          |
| TS-3271 | 2A    | 4/7/69 | DL-16769-1-ISA by W. E. Simons         |
| TS-3193 | 1A    | 4/7/69 | Vietnam Documents - 1961               |
| TS-3194 | 1A    | 4/7/69 | Ellsberg Manuscript - 1st Draft        |
| TS-3275 | Draft | 4/7/69 | DL-17268-ISA by H. Heymann             |
| TS-3286 | 30A   | 4/7/69 | RM-5617-ISA/ARPA by M. Gurtov - Part 2 |

## Write-ins (by JLB)

|           |    |          |                                  |
|-----------|----|----------|----------------------------------|
| TS-3473-A | 1A | 10/23/69 | US/VN Relations '45-'67 - IV.B.1 |
| TS-3473-C | 1A | 10/23/69 | " " " " - IV.B.3                 |
| TS-3474-A | 1A | 10/23/69 | " " " "                          |
| TS-3474-H | 1A | 10/23/69 | " " " "                          |
| TS-3474-J | 1A | 10/23/69 |                                  |
| TS-3474-K | 1A | 10/23/69 |                                  |
| TS-3474-L | 1A | 10/23/69 |                                  |
| TS-3474-M | 1A | 10/23/69 |                                  |

SPRING 1970 (sighted by J. L. Butler, TSCO on 4/17/70) (25 documents)

|         |       |          |                                        |
|---------|-------|----------|----------------------------------------|
| TS-3000 | 52A   | 11/18/69 | 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis             |
| TS-3193 | 1A    | 4/7/69   | Vietnam Documents, 1961                |
| TS-3194 | 1A    | 4/7/69   | Ellsberg Manuscript - 1st Draft        |
| TS-3262 | 2A    | 4/7/69   | DL-16671-1-ISA by W. E. Simons         |
| TS-3263 | 1A    | 4/7/69   | DL-17061-ISA by W. E. Simons           |
| TS-3268 | 2A    | 4/7/69   | DL-17100-ISA by G. H. Shubert          |
| TS-3271 | 2A    | 4/7/69   | DL-16769-1-ISA by W. E. Simons         |
| TS-3275 | Draft | 4/7/69   | DL-17268-ISA by H. Heymann             |
| TS-3286 | 30A   | 4/7/69   | RM-5617-ISA/ARPA by M. Gurtov - Part 2 |

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SPRING 1970 (con't)

|                  |    |          |                                                                 |
|------------------|----|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| TS-3474-B        | 1A | 3/4/70   | Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, Feb. - June 1964.     |
| TS-3474-H        | 1A | 10/23/69 | U. S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1967 - Vol. 1 |
| TS-3474-J        | 1A | 10/23/69 | U. S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1967 - Vol. 2 |
| TS-3474-K        | 1A | 10/23/69 | U. S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1967 - Vol. 3 |
| TS-3474-L        | 1A | 10/23/69 | Air War in North Vietnam, Vol. 1                                |
| TS-3474-M        | 1A | 10/23/69 | Air War in North Vietnam, Vol. 2                                |
| <u>Write-ins</u> |    |          |                                                                 |
| TS-3476-A        | 1A |          |                                                                 |
| TS-3476-B        | 1A |          |                                                                 |
| TS-3474-C        | 1A |          |                                                                 |
| TS-3476-D        | 1A |          |                                                                 |
| TS-3476-C        | 1A |          |                                                                 |
| TS-3474-F        | 1A |          |                                                                 |
| TS-3474-D        | 1A |          |                                                                 |
| TS-3474-E        | 1A |          |                                                                 |
| TS-3474-G        | 1A |          |                                                                 |
| TS-3468          | 1A |          | (Confidential)                                                  |

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Daniel Ellsberg, Economics  
9/14/70

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Security Officer

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Santa Monica, Calif

(To be held for Dan. Ellsberg)

SECRET: contents of package:

1. Dept. of State Memo fr W.W. Rostow to Planning Group Members (Secret to be handled ... Limited Official Use when attachment removed) w/ attachment: Paper "The Transformation of Korea - 1961 - 1965 - dated 1/7/65 - 26 pages. SECRET
2. Carbon copy of letter to The Ambassador fr Ed Lansdale dtd 9/29/65 re: Returning Used ----- Weapons, 2 pages. Secret
3. 2 page carbon copy of letter to Mr. Leonard Maynard, Acting AD/FO and Col. G.D. Jacobson, AD/FO from John Paul Vann, USAID Cadre Proj. Manager re: Conversation on 30 May with Col. Tran Ngoc Chau. Secret
4. Xerox cy of memo to Ambassador Lodge fr. Ed Lansdale, no date, re: Thoughts on Viet Nam - 7 pages. Secret
5. Directive AB 110 - dated Dec. 22, 1965, cy 68/100 (PPO-577-65) - 22 Secret pages and 15 confid. pages.
6. Part I of "Summary Of Major Conclusions and Recommendations" - 13 pages. Secret
7. Memo for the Record: Eyes Only for Gen. Lansdale fr. D. Ellsberg, dtd 2/26/66 re: Col. Chau and -----, 8 pages. Secret. (Carbon Copy)
8. Paper - The Operational and Intelligence Exploitation of "Rallies", ----- and -----, 37 pages. Secret
9. Suggestions For The Establishment of Provincial Intelligence Centers (The Permanent offices of The CIOCs and the PICCS), cy #94 dated March 3, 1965, 83 pages including Table of Contents. SECRET
10. DIRECTIVE ON Rural Reconstruction Policies - Pm.Ky dated 12/11/65 (Nr 1535-LEMP-CT-M), 6 pages. SECRET
11. Report to Principals fr. Co-Chairman w/annex a, b, c and d, re: Warrenton Mtg. on -----, Jan. 8-11, 1966 - 21 secret pages, 5 confid. pages.
12. State Dept. Memorandum to E. Lansdale and D. Ellsberg fr. G.H. Melvin re: Corruption, dtd 12/1/65 - 2 pages. Secret
13. Incoming msg. frn AmConsul Danang No. 175, dated May 28, 1966 (Control #5-3459) 5 pages. SECRET
14. Incoming msg. (xerox copy) No. 149, May 19, 1966 (Control #5-2096-B) - 1 page. Secret
15. " " " No. 134, May 16, 1966 (Control #5-1705-B) - 2 page. Secret
16. " " " - Ref. Saigon's 5520 - Control #6-2100-B, dated 6/17/66 - 3 pages. Secret
17. Memorandum For SLO from MACSA, RE: Review of Roles and Missions of Rural Construction -----, ----- and -----, dated 1/31/66, cy 2 of 7, (J33-69-66) 3 pages. Secret
18. ~~CONFIDENTIAL: USMACV AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, cy 13 of 18, dated 8/8/66 (Control #5-1665-66). Secret~~
19. Memo for Amb. Porter fr. Gen. W.C. Westmoreland transmitting letter to Maj. Gen. Jonathan O. Seaman fr. Gen. Westmoreland w/attachment: Staff Study on Effectiveness of -----, dated 1/19/66 with Annex A, B, D, E, F, H, I and J plus Route chart (Annexes C and G missing), 26 Secret pages and 2 confid. pages.
20. Action Council Action Memorandum to List, dated 8/23/66 re: Minutes of special meeting, 5/25/66 - 7 pages. Secret.
21. Memorandum for Amb. Lodge fr. Maj. Gen. W.B. Rosson w/encl: "Comments on Recommendations of Roles and Missions Study Group" - 5 pages in all. Secret
22. National Interrogation Center Questionnaire No. B-37 - 6 pages - Confidential.
23. Notes on the Malayan ----- Program (Crieu Hoi) - dated November 1964 - 7 pages-Confid.



1. General Acheson's To March 31 Evaluation of ... Prospects for "evolutionary development in ... National Priority Area, dtd. 11/30/. . . 1 pages, [REDACTED] LIMITED UO.
2. D. Ellsberg Memo to Gen. Lansdale: Some Vietnamese Thoughts on Representative Institutions ... , dtd. 7/25/66. 5 pages, 3 copies [REDACTED] LIMITED UO
3. D. Ellsberg Memo to J. Barlow: GVN Doctrine, undated, 4 pages. CONFIDENTIAL
4. E. Lansdale Memo to SIO Staff: December, undated, 4 pages. CONFIDENTIAL
5. Memo for the record, etc. 18 - IDNY, 1966: Field Trip-Cadre Liaison Visit to An Giang Pro  
4 pages, (OOB).
6. D. Ellsberg Memo, dtd. 6/6/66: Eval. of Forces and Cadre for Village/Hamlet Security and Revolutionary Development. 4 pages. CONFIDENTIAL.
7. 1 page draft: Discussion, Conclusions and recommendations of working Group on Expansion of EO Cadre Program, dtd. 5/9/66. CONFIDENTIAL
8. 3 pages, Title: Eval. of Popular Force Performance and Comparison with Revolutionary Dev. Cadre. CONFIDENTIAL.
9. 2 pages: ADDED: (first line), A review of the monthly reports from 37 provinces indicates u.  
of 30....., 3 copies. CONFIDENTIAL.
10. Discussion: a. General: A failing of many previous programs in South Vietnam.....(first li.  
CONFIDENTIAL. 15 pages.
11. E. Lansdale Memo to The Ambassador & U.S.Mission Council Members, dtd. 11/8/66 with attach.  
Memo by E. Lansdale: The Battleground in 1967. 9 pages. CONFIDENTIAL
12. Foreign Service of the USA outgoing Telegram, dtd. 11/16/66, Control: SAIGON 11066(16124:  
3 pages. CONFIDENTIAL
13. Summary of Briefing on Rural Construction Given by Lt. Col. Chau at USAID-2, dtd. 2/22/66,  
4 pages. CONFIDENTIAL
14. MACV302 Paper, dtd. 8/16/65: Concept For Security of the Rural Population. 10 pages,  
both sides, CONFIDENTIAL.
15. Speech at I Corps, dtd. 11/15/65, by E. Lansdale(?). 5 pages. CONFIDENTIAL.
16. Foreign Service/USA TG, Control: 6-1100-B, dtd. 6/9/66, 4 pages. CONFIDENTIAL.
17. "... at 2/2/66: Position on Corruption. 4 pages. CONFIDENTIAL.
18. "... n. M. Vin/SIO Memo to E. Lansdale, dtd. 2/19/66: Proposal for Protection Against  
Corruption. 5 pages. CONFIDENTIAL.
19. Annex F (Concept on Use of Forces) to Directive AB 140, dtd. 151211H Dec., 1965, with  
Appendix 2, 6 pages plus 2 page appendix) CONFIDENTIAL.
20. John A. Neallis Memo to Members of the Mission Liaison Group, dtd. 2/10/66 with attach.:  
Criteria for Control, 6 pages.
21. Activities that occur during phases of Rural Construction, 9 pages.
22. Proposed draft mission directive on The Concept of Rural Construction and Certain  
Definitions and Procedures, 7 pages. CONFIDENTIAL.
23. Foreign Service/USA outgoing TG, Control: 6-2225-A, dtd. 6/18/66, 5 pages, CONFIDENTIAL
24. " " incoming TG, Control: 5-2098-B, dtd. 5/19/66, 1 page, CONFIDENTIAL
25. " " outgoing TG, Control: 6-658-A, dtd. 6/6/66. CONFIDENTIAL 4 pages.
26. " " TG, Control: SAIGON 5590, dtd. 9/9/66(090750Z),  
4 pages, CONFIDENTIAL.
27. Page 4 & 5, Recommendation: 1. A Target date of 1 Jan., 1967 should be set for.... CONFI.D.
28. Howard W. Schmitz/AGC ltr., dtd. 2/25/66, Ser. 0338, with attachments: Annex F (Concept o.  
Use of Forces) to Directive AB 140, etc. 151200H Inc., 1965, with Appendix 1, and Incls. ..  
to Appendix 1, plus Appendix 2. 8 page total. CONFIDENTIAL. 2 cys.
29. E. Lansdale Memo, to Members, US Mission Liaison Group re: GVN Doctrine (1 pg.) With attach.  
D. Ellsberg Draft, dtd. 2/4/66: GVN Concepts or Rural Construction. 7 pages. CONFIDENTIAL.
30. Transcript of Conversation, dtd. 11/23/65: General Thang on Rural Construction Cadre,  
2 copies, 2 pages each. CONFIDENTIAL.
31. Memo from Dave Hudson to Gen Lansdale, etc. 1/31/66: Rpt. on Binh Dinh, 8 pgs. CONFIDENTIAL.
32. D. Ellsberg Draft, dtd. 2/3/66: GVN Concepts of Rural Construction, 8 pgs.. CONFIDENTIAL.
33. Revolutionary Development- Concepts and Strategy Concepts, pages 1 thru 29 plus pages 13  
and 29 of same. CONFIDENTIAL.
34. D. Ellsberg Memo to Gen. Lansdale, etc. 9/7/66: Conversation with Col. Chau-9/6/66,  
1 page, CONFIDENTIAL-EYES ONLY.
35. E. Lansdale Memo to SIO Staff, etc. 6/4/66: SIO Task Outline, 3 pages, CONFIDENTIAL.



- Evaluation of Popular Force Performance and Comparison with Revolutionary Development Committee, 3 pages, CONFIDENTIAL.
- Memo from D. Ellsberg to Gen. Canale: Mission Council Meeting- July 25, 1966, 9 pages, CONFIDENTIAL. 2 copies
- Dept./State TC, Nr. A-136, dtd. 9/7/66, 10 pages, CONFIDENTIAL.
- H. F. Nooney/GS, ltr. to Assist. Chief of Staff/G2, re: SICR U-UPE-WO511, dtd. 8/30/66 with attach.: 5 page translation, Control #ZAOI5577, re Subversive Act.s of the VC, COMINT
- NACTN QU to Ofc./Dep. Ambassador, Am. Emb., Saigon, Vietnam, dtd. 8/31/66, re Spec. Joint Rpt. on Revolutionary Development, 5 pages, CONFIDENTIAL.
- NACTN HUNT paper, Spec. Joint Rpt. on Revolutionary Dev.'mt., dtd. 8/31/66, 5 pgs., CONFIDENTIAL
- NACTN QMS paper, " " " " " " , dtd. 9/2/66, 2 pgs., CONFIDENTIAL
- NACTN QTN paper, " " " " " " , dtd. 8/31/66, 1 pg., CONFIDENTIAL
- NACV-MT-KT paper, dtd. 8/31/66 re: Spec. Joint Rpt. on Revolutionary Development, 3 pages, CONFIDENTIAL.
- Special Joint Report on Revolutionary Development (RD) (cont.), Sept. 1, 1966, pgs. #2 & #3. CONFIDENTIAL
- Spec. Rpt. on Revolut. Dev., dtd. 8/31/66: Province Vinh Binh, 2 pgs., CONFIDENTIAL.
- " " " " " " , dtd. 8/31/66: Province Vinh Long, 1 pg. CONFIDENTIAL.
- NACV-9th-AG, Spec. Rpt. on Revolut. Dev., dtd. 9/1/66, pgs. 3 & 4, CONFIDENTIAL.
- Prov. Kien Giang: " " " " " " , dtd. 8/31/66, 1 page, CONFIDENTIAL.
- " Chuong Trien " " " " " " , dtd. 8/31/66, 1 page, CONFIDENTIAL.
- NACTN-PAS Special " " " " " " , dtd. 8/31/66, 3 pages, CONFIDENTIAL.
- L. Revolutionary Dev. Pgm., undated, 1 page, CONFIDENTIAL.
- NACTN-AX ltr. to Dep. Ambassador, U.S. Embassy, Saigon, dtd. 8/30/66, re Spec. Joint Revolut. Dev. for An Xuyen Province, 2 pages, CONFIDENTIAL
- Same as above, for Province HAC Lieu, 1 page, dtd. 8/30/66, CONFIDENTIAL.
- Special Joint Report on Revolutionary Development (RD) for:

  - Province: Long Khanh, Period ending 8/31/66, 2 pages. CONFIDENTIAL
  - Province: Binh Long, " " " " " " CONFIDENTIAL
  - Province: Binh Duong, dtd. 9/2/66, 2 pges, CONFIDENTIAL
  - Province: Bien Hoa, period ending 8/31/66, 2 pages, CONFIDENTIAL
  - Province: Phuoc Tuy, " " " " " " CONFIDENTIAL
  - Province: Gia Dinh, dtd. 9/1/66, 7 pages, CONFIDENTIAL
  - Province and City: Tuyen Duc Province and Autonomous City of Dalat, period ending 8/28/66
  - Province: Pleiku, period ending 8/31/66, 2pages, CONFIDENTIAL
  - Province: Marlac, " " " " " " CONFIDENTIAL
  - Province: Binh Thuan," " " 8/30/66, 4 pages, CONFIDENTIAL
  - Province: Lai Dong, " " 8/31/66, 2 pages, CONFIDENTIAL

- Roger E. Loomis Memo for D. Ellsberg, dtd. 6/9/66 with attach: Disposition form, Subject: Status of RF/PF, dtd. 5/16/66, 2 pages, CONFIDENTIAL

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- K. A. Knowlton ltr. to Wm. J. Porter, dtd. 12/6/66 with enclosures:  
Senior Advisors' Mo. Eval. Rpt. for the :  
Sec Inf. Div., Mo. of Aug. 1966, 10 pages,  
2nd Inf. Div., Mo. of Aug., 1966, 6 pages,  
1st ACR, Mo. of Aug., 1966, 3 pages,  
Ranger BNS (ARVN), Aug., 1966, 3 pages,  
General Comments, dtd. 9/4/66, by Cecil F. Hunnicutt CONFIDENTIAL  
Month of Sept.: 5th Inf. Div., 8 pgs.; 25th Inf. Div., 5 pgs.; 10th ACR, 3 pgs.;  
Ranger BNS (ARVN), 3 pgs., with Cecil F. Hunnicutt General Comments, dtd. 10/4/66. CONFID.  
Month of October: 5th Inf. Div., 11 pgs.; 25th Inf. Div., 5 pgs; 10th ACR, 3 pgs.,  
Ranger BNS (ARVN), 3 pgs., with General Comments, by C. F. Hunnicutt, dtd. 11/6/66, CONFIDENTIAL
- NASTN-PLG5 ltr. to COMUSMACV Reports Control Officer, undated, re NACV/USAID/JUSPAO Provincial Team Report, with enclosures: Encl.#2-Binh Duong Province  
Enclous.#3-Binh Long Province  
Enclous.#4-Phuoc Long Province, all dtd. 2/16/66.  
CONFIDENTIAL



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0 CL00203A 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
0 CL00204 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
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0 CL00206 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
0 CL00207 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
0 CL00267 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
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 4 0 CLO2453- 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
 5 0 CLO2454A 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
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 7 0 CLO2456- 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
 8 0 CLO2459- 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
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 13 0 CLO2464- 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
 14 0 CLO2465- 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
 15 0 CLO2466- 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
 16 0 CLO2467- 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
 17 0 CLO2468- 0001 S 09-28-70 67

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 DESTROYING OFFICER

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 DATE OF DESTRUCTION

*H. L. Burt*  
 WITNESSING OFFICER

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# MAIL AND RECORDS

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 120 0 CLO2470- 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
 210 CLO2471- 0001 S 09-28-70 67  
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*H. L. Brod*  
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 WITNESSING OFFICER

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 0 CL02520- 0001 / S 09-28-70 67  
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 3 CL01445- 0002 / S 09-28-70 70  
 7 CL01707- 0003 / S 09-28-70 70  
 3 X00383- 0002 / S 09-28-70 70  
 3 X00383- 0003 / S 09-28-70 70  
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 3 X00383- 0005 / S 09-28-70 70  
 3 X00383- 0006 / S 09-28-70 70  
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*H. L. Burt*  
 DESTROYING OFFICER

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 DATE OF DESTRUCTION

*J. F. Ogden*  
 WITNESSING OFFICER

*812*  
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*90*



LIST OF TITLES OF THE  
OSD VIETNAM TASK FORCE

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  3. Moscow-London Track (This material not printed.)
  4. 1967-1968 (This material not printed.)

LESLIE H. GELB,  
 Chairman, OSD Task Force.



Top Secret  
Control No.

Title of Document

|          |                                                                                                                                           |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| TS-2329  | 143 pages of handwritten and typewritten working papers and notes of Dan Ellsberg's on "PACOM-JCS"                                        |
| TS-2329A | 22 pages added to TS-2329                                                                                                                 |
| TS-2330  | 73 pages of typewritten and handwritten working papers and notes of Dan Ellsberg's on "ISA"                                               |
| TS-2330A | 14 pages added to TS-2330                                                                                                                 |
| TS-2337  | 76 pages of handwritten working papers and notes of Dan Ellsberg's on "NOTES FOR GILPATRICK"                                              |
| TS-3000  | The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History                                                                                      |
| TS-3151  | Loose leaf notebook containing work papers regarding Vietnam 1964 "+"                                                                     |
| TS-3151B | Loose leaf notebook containing work papers regarding Vietnam 1964 + Book II                                                               |
| TS-3193  | Collection of documents on Vietnam, 1961                                                                                                  |
| TS-3194  | Manuscript by D. Ellsberg regarding Vietnam 1961 (rough first draft)                                                                      |
| TS-3234  | Report of Chairman, JCS on Situation in Vietnam and MACV Force Requirements                                                               |
| TS-3262  | Revision of DL-16671-ISA, TS-3212, Military Pressures Against North Vietnam: Action and Policy Debate Following the Tonkin Gulf Incidents |
| TS-3266  | The U.S. and the French Colonial War                                                                                                      |
| TS-3268  | U.S. Training of the Vietnamese National Army                                                                                             |
| TS-3271  | Revision to DL-16769 Military Pressures Against North Vietnam: Policy Decisions and Implementing Actions                                  |
| TS-3275  | Military Pressures Against North Vietnam: FLAMING DART and ROLLING THUNDER, Jan-Jun 1965                                                  |

| <u>Top Secret<br/>Control No.</u> | <u>Title of Document</u>                                                                                                                                   |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| TS-3286                           | FINAL VERSION -- PART 2 only -- Negotiations and Vietnam:<br>A Case Study of the 1954 Geneva Conference                                                    |
| TS-3435                           | Interagency Report on U.S. Strategic Alternatives                                                                                                          |
| TS-3453                           | Report on Analysis of Alternative Nuclear Strategies and<br>Force Postures.                                                                                |
| TS-3473A                          | Evolution of the War, The Kennedy Program and Commitments<br>1961                                                                                          |
| TS-3473C                          | The Advisory Build-up, 1961-1967                                                                                                                           |
| TS-3474A                          | Evolution of the War; U.S. Programs in South Vietnam,<br>November 1963 - April 1965                                                                        |
| TS-3474B                          | Evolution of the War; United States-Vietnam Relations<br>1945-1967 and Military Pressures Against North Vietnam -<br>Action and Debate, February-June 1964 |
| TS-3474C                          | Evolution of the War; Military Pressures Against North<br>Vietnam, July-October 1964                                                                       |
| TS-3474D                          | Evolution of the War; Military Pressures Against North<br>Vietnam, November - December 1964                                                                |
| TS-3474E                          | Evolution of the War; The ROLLING THUNDER Program Begins                                                                                                   |
| TS-3474F                          | Evolution of the War; Marine Combat Units Go to DaNang,<br>March 1965                                                                                      |
| TS-3474G                          | Phase I in the Build-up of U.S. Forces -- The Debate,<br>March-July 1965                                                                                   |
| TS-3474H                          | U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments 1965-1967<br>- Volume I                                                                                         |
| TS-3474J                          | U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments 1965-1967<br>- Volume II                                                                                        |
| TS-3474K                          | United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: U.S. Ground<br>Strategy and Force Deployments 1965-1967- Volume III                                            |



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

7 OCT 1971

LY TO  
R. OF:

ICSP

JECT:

Data Concerning Rand Corporation Security

TO: OSD(GC) (Mr. Buzhardt)

During a briefing of USAF actions to assume custody of classified documents at Rand (3 Sep 71), you indicated interest in obtaining additional information on certain points. The information is presented below:

a. How many documents were found during the inventory for which Rand had not established an accountability record?

|              |                          |
|--------------|--------------------------|
| Santa Monica | 20 Secret (all pre-1950) |
| Washington   | 21 Secret (all pre-1965) |

b. How many security containers does Rand possess and how many are used for storage of unclassified material?

|              | <u>Used for<br/>Classified</u> | <u>Used for<br/>Unclassified</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|--------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|
| Santa Monica | 1,303                          | 576                              | 1,879        |
| Washington   | 106                            | 1                                | 107          |
|              |                                |                                  | <u>1,986</u> |

Note: In addition Santa Monica has 11 vaults and strongrooms; Washington has 3.

c. How much classified microfilm/microfiche was found in Rand files?

| <u>Classification</u> | <u>Santa Monica</u> |                | <u>Washington DC</u> |                |
|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------|
|                       | <u>M-Film</u>       | <u>M-Fiche</u> | <u>M-Film</u>        | <u>M-Fiche</u> |
| Top Secret            | 0                   | 0              | 0                    | 0              |
| Secret                | 114                 | 3,497          | 13                   | 0              |

d. What type of microfilm/microfiche equipment does Rand possess?

Santa Monica (See atch 1).  
Washington - None

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

*R. H. [Signature]*  
R. H. [Signature], Colonel, USAF  
Director of Security Policy, TIG

1 Atch  
List of Microfilm/Microfiche

38

Top Secret  
Control No.

Title of Document

|          |                                                                                                                                               |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| TS-3474L | The Air War in North Vietnam - Volume I                                                                                                       |
| TS-3474M | The Air War in North Vietnam - Volume II                                                                                                      |
| TS-3474R | Statistical Survey of the War 1965-1967                                                                                                       |
| TS-3475A | Justification of the War - Public Statements - Volume I                                                                                       |
| TS-3475B | Justification of the War - Public Statements - Volume II                                                                                      |
| TS-3476A | Justification of the War - Internal Commitments: The<br>Roosevelt Administration, 1940-1945                                                   |
| TS-3476B | Justification of the War - Internal Commitments: The<br>Truman Administration, 1945-1952 - Book I - 1945-1949                                 |
| TS-3476C | Justification of the War - Internal Commitments: The<br>Truman Administration, Book II - 1950-1952                                            |
| TS-3476D | Justification of the War - Internal Commitments: The<br>Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1960 - Book I                                         |
| TS-3476E | Justification of the War - Internal Commitments: The<br>Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1960 - Book II - 1954 -<br>The Geneva Accords         |
| TS-3476F | Justification of the War - Internal Commitments: The<br>Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1960 - Book III<br>The Geneva Accords - 15 March 1956 |
| TS-3476G | Justification of the War - Internal Commitments: The<br>Eisenhower Administration, 1953 - 1960 - Book IV:<br>1956 French Withdrawal - 1960    |
| TS-3476J | U.S. Involvement in the War - Internal Documents:<br>The Kennedy Administration: January 1961 - November 1963<br>- Book II                    |
| TS-3477  | Negotiations 1965-1967: The Public Record                                                                                                     |



List of Microfilm/Fiche  
 Production and Reading  
 Equipment(as of 9 Sep 71)

| <u>Property<br/>Number</u> | <u>Description</u>                |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 6691                       | Microcard Reader                  |
| 14903                      | Lens for Microfilm Reader/Printer |
| 13153                      | Microfilm Printer )               |
|                            | ) Fiche Duplication               |
| 13154                      | Microfilm Developer)              |
| 13635                      | Camera Micro-fila                 |
| 6695                       | Microcard Reader                  |
| 10711                      | Thermofax Reader/Printer          |
| 12135                      | Dukane Reader                     |
| 12182                      | Microfiche Reader                 |
| 12185                      | Microfiche Reader                 |
| 12421                      | Microfilm Reader/Printer          |
| 12440                      | Microfilm Reader Dukane           |
| 12442                      | Microfilm Reader                  |
| 12808                      | Microfilm Reader                  |
| 13264                      | Microfiche Reader                 |
| 13283                      | Microfiche Reader BSH             |
| 14216                      | Microfiche Reader B&H             |
| 14217                      | Microfiche Reader BSH             |
| 14603                      | Microfilm Reader                  |
| 14604                      | Microfilm Reader                  |
| 14605                      | Microfilm Reader                  |
| 14860                      | Film Reader Recordak              |
| 15411                      | Microfiche Reader BSH             |
| 15412                      | Microfiche Reader BSH             |
| 15413                      | Microfiche Reader BSH             |
| 15414                      | Microfiche Reader BSH             |

Arch # 2 to 6411

Property  
Number

Description

9-2666

Film Reader Recordak

9-3350

Microfilm Printer

10037

Camera Polaroid


10313

Processor Fotorita

13639

Processor Prostar





GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

21 OCT 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information  
Regarding U.S. - Vietnam Relations 1945-1967

GENESIS OF THE OSD VIETNAM STUDY

(This memorandum report has been prepared from pertinent FBI and OSD reports of investigation and other miscellaneous source documents previously furnished designated recipients.)

Brigadier General Robert E. Pursley advised that Secretary of Defense McNamara in May 1967 verbally requested a study documenting the United States' involvement in Southeast Asia (SEA). General Pursley believed this study was Mr. McNamara's own idea based upon prior events that had convinced the Secretary that he was not sufficiently knowledgeable of all details concerning the U.S. involvement in SEA. Mrs. Dorothy Maffett, when she was secretary to Dr. Morton Halperin, reported she had prepared a memorandum for Dr. Halperin to the Secretary of Defense in May 1967 wherein Dr. Halperin suggested the preparation of a history of the Vietnam War. Maffett claimed this memorandum was returned approved by Secretary McNamara. Only interviews of both Mr. McNamara and Dr. Halperin can resolve the question as to who originally suggested the study. In any event, Mr. McNamara either requested or approved it in May 1967 and the initiation of the study has been confirmed by recovered documentation. These records reflected that on 27 May 1967 Lt Colonel (now Brigadier General) Robert G. Gard submitted a list of preliminary questions to Mr. McNamara to "insure we are proceeding in accordance with your instructions." This memorandum disclosed that the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, International Security Affairs, and Systems Analyses were consulted in drawing up the list of questions to be answered in the Study for Mr. McNamara's approval. The memorandum



also stated "it appears to us that a project of this magnitude and desired quality may require a highly competent task group of four or five personnel, to include a particularly well qualified chairman, with access to DOD offices and other appropriate Government agencies to operate under our general guidance and direction." Since General Gard indicated the then Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA, Mr. John McNaughton and other unidentified ISA staff members as having prepared these questions, it would appear the covering memorandum cited above may be identical to the one recalled by Mrs. Maffett. In any case, the proposed questions were approved and marked "excellent" by Mr. McNamara.

On 16 June 1967, based on General Gard's discussions with Mr. McNaughton and with concurrences of Dr. Enthoven and Dr. Anthony, a proposal was made that "the scholarly analysis" requested by Mr. McNamara would be performed by a seven-man task force under Dr. Halperin. This task force would work full time for about three months and the study was expected to be completed by "mid-September 1967." On 16 June 1967 Mr. McNamara expressed doubt that Dr. Halperin or Dr. Martin Bailey would have, or should take, time to work on the project.

On 17 June 1967 a memorandum revising the study proposal was approved by Mr. McNamara. The memorandum identified the task group as follows: Dr. Leslie H. Gelb, OSD/ISA (Chairman); One representative from OSD/SA; one representative from OSD/Comp; Dr. William Kaufmann, MIT; Mr. Melvin Gurtov, Rand Corporation; one military officer - Executive Officer, Lt Smith, USMA.

On 26 June 1967, Dr. Gelb submitted a progress schedule for the "Southeast Asia Task Group" to Mr. McNamara. The schedule identified 15 study sections with working questions to be completed by 5 July 1967. The tentative dates for submission of papers to the Secretary were from 14 July through 25 August 1967. The final paper, entitled "Vietnam As A Just War," was to be completed by 15 September 1967.

On 26 September 1967, Dr. Gelb, in a memorandum to the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, advised "the objective of the task force remains to provide a comprehensive retrievable scholarly analysis of the full range of U. S. involvement in Vietnam." An outline of the completed study as then planned identified six parts which were considerably



expanded from the original 15 sections identified on 26 June 1967.  
The task force was assigned a two-office complex in Room 3E-880.

On 6 October 1967 General Gard, in a memorandum to Dr. Gelb, advised that "the Secretary read your memo outlining the task force study and the draft essays." Gard reported that the Secretary was "very pleased with the scope of the study and thoroughness with which the issues are being examined."

On 3 November 1967 Dr. Gelb, in a task force status report, identified 20 inputs as "completed," five unassigned, and 19 being worked on by assigned personnel.

On 8 November 1967, Dr. Gelb identified 23 personnel who had been assigned to the task force, as follows:

|                         |             | <u>In</u> | <u>Out</u> |         |
|-------------------------|-------------|-----------|------------|---------|
| Gelb, Leslie H., Dr.    | ISA         | 12 June   |            |         |
| Gurtov, Melvin          | Rand        | 12 June   | 15 Sept    |         |
| Kaufmann, Wm. W., Dr.   | M.I.T.      | 12 June   | 1 Sept     | 1/2     |
| Kleinberg, David        | SA          | 12 June   | 15 July    | 1/2     |
| Bush, Jerry E.          | Compt       | 12 June   | 31 Aug     | liaison |
| Smith, Stephen K., 1Lt  | USMA        | 20 June   | 30 Aug     |         |
| Schweitzer, R. L., LtC  | Army        | 28 June   | 10 Sept    |         |
| Gearin, Cornelius, LTC  | Army        | 6 July    | 15 Oct     |         |
| Gorman, Paul F., LTC    | ISA         | 17 July   | 30 Nov     |         |
| Holbrooke, Richard      | State       | 15 Aug    | ?          | ?       |
| Moorsteen, Richard, Dr. | ISA-Rand    | 15 Aug    |            | 1/2     |
| Odeen, Philip           | SA          | 1 Sept    | 30 Nov     | 1/2     |
| Ellsberg, Daniel, Dr.   | Rand        | 1 Sept    | 30 Nov     | ?       |
| Simko, Andrew M., LTC   | Army        | 5 Sept    | 30 Nov     |         |
| Gillette, Michael, Maj. | SA          | 6 Sept    | 30 Nov     |         |
| Clelland, Donald, Maj.  | Air Staff   | 13 Sept   | 3 Nov      |         |
| Simons, Wm. E., LTC     | Rand-AF     | 17 Sept   | 15 Oct     |         |
| Schubert, Gustave H.    | Rand        | 18 Sept   | 27 Oct     |         |
| Galvin, John R., Maj.   | Army        | 25 Sept   | 30 Nov     |         |
| Heymann, Hans           | Rand        | 10 Oct    |            | 1/2     |
| Pierre, Andrew J.       | Hudson Inst | 1 Nov     | 30 Nov     |         |

Part-Time at Rand:

Schubert, Gustave H. - Completing paper in progress

Simons, Wm. E., LTC - Completing paper in progress

Administrative Staff:

In

Out

Lt. Stephen Smith, USA

20 Jun 67 30 Aug 67

Miss Anne Wassil, secretary

June 67

Franklin D. Terrell

May 67

Oct 67

Sgt. Clyne A. Goode

Oct 67

Mrs. Kay Burchinal (nee Kellogg), secy

Jun 67

Miss Delores Nagy, secretary

May 67

On 11 November 1967, Mr. McNamara was informed that the 30 November 1967 completion date would not be met even for the historical sections. Dr. Halperin had proposed returning Dr. Gelb to his primary duty in OSD/ISA, effective 1 December 1967. The proposed task force, based on Dr. Halperin's suggestions would be: Gelb, Leslie H., Dr., Chairman (1/2); Fritz, Charles E., IDA; Heymann, Hans, Rand; Moersteen, Richard, Dr., ISA-Rand; Ponturo, John, IDA; Admin: CPO Donald E. Fox, USN.

On 27 November 1967 General Gard, in a memorandum, stated "the Secretary of Defense recently approved the extension to 31 March 1968 of an ad hoc OSD task force."

On 19 January 1968 General Gard, in a memorandum to Mr. Nitze, reported the status of studies as of 18 January 1968. The status report reflected 22 inputs completed or submitted, 11 inputs in draft or in process, and 11 inputs to be completed by 31 March 1968. A copy of the status report is appended as Attachment 1. General Gard noted that "only recently have we received studies in any number." He informed Mr. Nitze that they "would be pleased to discuss the task force with him and could provide him copies of the studies that had been submitted".

On 29 January 1968, Dr. Gelb reported that six full-time and four part-time professionals were working on "papers." He indicated that unless four professional personnel were added to the task force they would "fall short by about seven important studies." He proposed obtaining two



researchers from IDA and two military officers from OSD/Systems Analysis. The total effort of the task force was described as constituting "about 44 studies."

A review of OSD interviews confirmed assignment of the following personnel to the task force in January 1968: Dr. Leslie H. Gelb (Chairman); Colonel Paul F. Gorman; Mr. Willard H. Mitchell, OSD/ISA; Miss Susan Stensrud, OSD/ISA; Mr. John Ponturo, IDA; Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, Rand; Dr. Martin J. Bailey, OSD/SA; Dr. William W. Kaufmann, MIT; Colonel William E. Simons, USAF; One researcher from IDA - probably Dr. Johnstone. Administrative Staff: CPO Donald E. Fox, USN; Miss Anne Wassil (departed in Jan 68); Miss Kay Kellogg; Miss Delores Nagy; Miss Margaret S. Enright.

On 1 February 1968, Mr. Nitze was informed the task force had obtained the services of "two experienced IDA researchers." It was noted the "remaining issue is the availability of two more personnel."

Interviews by OSD confirmed the assignment of Mr. John Ponturo, Mr. Howard M. Margolis, Dr. Edward C. Janicik, and Dr. Paul H. Johnstone from IDA. In addition, a Major Gillette was to be assigned to the task force and Major Dale Vesser was placed on temporary loan to the group from 2 April to 30 April 1968.

On 1 March 1968, Dr. Gelb identified the task force effort as consisting of 42 studies. Dr. Gelb reported to the Military Assistant that 24 studies had been submitted and completed; six studies were in draft, and 12 were being processed and researched. It was estimated all but five of the ones in draft and processing would be completed by 31 March 1968. The last five were to be completed "except for final editing and analysis," by April 30. Dr. Gelb stated tentative arrangements had been made with the Institute for Defense Analyses to retain the "four IDA researchers" until the end of April 1968.

On 11 April 1968, Dr. Gelb advised Dr. Janicik of a meeting to discuss deadlines for submission of Janicik's paper organized around the OSD manpower programs, force level justification, and relation of force level and composition to strategy. This correspondence reflected that Dr. Janicik had submitted no drafts of his assigned input prior to 11 April 1968.



In March 1968 Lt Colonel John Seigle, USA was assigned to replace Colonel Gorman. Colonel Gorman left the task force in April-May 1968 on temporary duty to the Peace Delegation, Paris, France.

Consensus of OSD interviewees and available records indicate the task force--by early May 1968--consisted of the following: Dr. Gelb (Chairman); Lt Colonel Seigle; Dr. Janicik, IDA (part-time); Dr. Bailey, OSD/SA (part-time); Mr. Mitchell, OSD/ISA; Captain Frank R. Fahland, USN. Administrative: CPO Fox; Karla Gail Von Huben, USMC; Margaret S. Enright; Delores Nagy.

An outline of studies dated 2 May 1968 reflected that 39 inputs had been submitted and the remaining eight inputs were scheduled for completion by 31 May 1968.

By June 1968, Lt Colonel Dana G. Meade and Lt Colonel James F. Edgar were assigned TDY to the task force.

In July 1968, Dr. Gelb vacated the Task Force offices and returned to his regular office in Policy Plans, OSD/ISA. The small number of remaining task force members, including Lt Colonel Seigle, Lt Colonel Meade, and Lt Colonel Edgar, moved to a second floor E-Ring conference room and to a small office in OSD/ISA. Lt Colonels Seigle, Meade, and Edgar were reassigned from the task force between 19 and 21 August 1968. Miss Margaret S. Enright and Sgt Karla Gail Von Huben, USMC left the task force in August 1968.

Consensus of OSD interviewees reflects the OSD Vietnam Task Force ceased operations as a separate working group in August 1968, and assigned personnel returned to their respective offices. Mr. Mitchell advised that the study group was formally disbanded in August 1968. Mrs. Carolyn R. Newlin, OSD/ISA, recalled that when Dr. Gelb returned to Policy Plans, OSD/ISA, a large bookcase with various books on Vietnam was moved into his office area. In addition, a four-drawer safe with Task Force material was moved into Lt Colonel Schandler's office in OSD/ISA.

The period between August and December 1968 was relatively inactive, and whatever work was being accomplished was apparently done in Policy Plans, OSD/ISA. Dr. Gelb stated the study was essentially completed by November 1968. Lt Colonel Schandler, from November to the "end of



December 1968," worked on "Program 5 Deployments and Tet, Post Tet Decision-Making in Washington." Mr. Mitchell assisted Dr. Gelb in preparing summaries and chronologies of some of the volumes through the "Fall of 1968."

On 18 December 1968 Mr. Paul Warnke, in a memorandum to Mr. George Elsey, recommended distribution of the study to nine recipients and requested clerical assistance for Dr. Gelb in reproducing the study.

On 14 January 1969 Dr. Gelb, in a memorandum for record, identified eleven recipients as having been approved by Mr. Warnke to receive "full sets of the Task Force studies."

On 15 January 1969 Dr. Gelb, in a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, submitted his final report with an attached "outline of studies."

During the period January to July 1969, the study was produced in fifteen copies, and final corrections were made by Dr. Gelb until his departure from OSD in April 1969. In a letter dated 8 July 1969, Dr. Gelb -- then at Brookings Institution -- reported the "reproduction of all" the OSD Vietnam Task Force papers had been completed. Records reflect distribution continued through 3 October 1969 when a full set was provided Rand Corporation.

*J. Fred Buzhardt*  
J. FRED BUZHARDT

Enclosure

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OSD VIETNAM TASK FORCE

OUTLINE and STATUS

As of 13 Jan. 1963

STATUS

Background and the U.S., 1940-1950

- A. U.S. Policy, 1940-1950
- B. Ho Chi Minh: Asian Tito?
- C. The Character and Power of the Viet Minh

Completed

2/5 (In dra. - completed)  
Completed

The First War, 1950-1954

- A. U.S., France and Vietnamese Nationalism
- B. Toward a Negotiated Settlement

Completed - Submitted  
Completed - Submitted

The Geneva Accords

- A. U.S. Military Planning and Diplomatic Maneuver
- B. The Role and Obligations of the State of Vietnam
- C. The Viet Minh Position and Sino-Soviet Strategy
- D. The Intent of the Geneva Accords

Submitted

Submitted

Submitted

Submitted

Continuation of the War

U.S. MAP for Diem: The Eisenhower Commitments, 1954-1960

- A. NATO and SEATO: A Comparison
- B. Aid for France in Indochina, 1950-1954
- C. The French Withdrawal, 1956
- D. Reorganization of RVNAF, 1956-1959
- E. Origins of the Insurgency

Submitted  
Submitted  
2/20 (In dra. - process)  
3/3  
2/5 (In dra. - )

Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy Commitments, 1961-1963

1. The Kennedy Programs, 1961

- a. Organizing for Counterinsurgency
- b. Issues for Decisions
- c. The First Decisions

2/15 (In dra. - )  
2/15 (In dra. - )  
2/15 (In dra. - )



cont.)

The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-1963  
The Advisory Build-up, 1961-1963  
Planned Withdrawal of U.S. Forces  
in Vietnam, 1963-1965

Action: The Johnson Commitments,  
1964-1967

NSM 273 (Nov 63 - Feb 65)  
NSM 283 and Honolulu Conference  
(Mar 64 - Feb 65)  
The PAI-Cadre Program  
Military Pressures Against North Vietnam

- a. February - June 1964
- b. July - December 1964

Rolling Thunder (Feb-May 64)  
The Go to Da Nang  
COMUSMACV's 44 Battalion Request  
(June-July 1965)  
The Role of Missions for U.S.  
Land Forces (1965-1967)  
Air War in the North (1965-1967)  
Emphasis on Pacification, 1966-1967  
US/CVN Relations: 1963-1967

#### Justification of U.S. Involvement

##### The Public Record

1. The Truman Administration
2. The Eisenhower Administration
3. The Kennedy Administration
4. The Johnson Administration

##### Internal Commitments

1. The Truman Administration
2. The Eisenhower Administration
3. The Kennedy Administration
4. The Johnson Administration

#### Timeline of the Conflict

Negotiations, 1965-1967: The Public Record  
Announced Negotiating Positions  
Histories of Contacts

#### STATUS

2/15 (In draft)

2/29

1/25 (In draft)

3/31

3/31

3/31

3/31

Submitted

2/15 (In process)

2/29 (In process)

Submitted

Completed

3/31

3/31 (In process)

Submitted

2/29 (In draft)

Submitted

Submitted

Submitted

Completed *Submitted*

2/15

2/15

2/29

2/29

Submitted

Submitted

2/15 (In process)

*Submitted*

Defense Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U. S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945 - 1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 21 OCT 1971  
Period: 6 October 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: William L. Richards

SUMMARY

Mrs. Dorothy Louise Jamison Maffett, secretary, OSD/ISA, was reinterviewed concerning her knowledge of the Wheeler Report. She believes this is the same JCS report utilized by Halperin, Warnke, Nitze, Enthoven, Helms, Rostow, Bundy and Katzenbach during the weekend of 1 March 1968 in preparation for a White House meeting at 1700, 4 March 1968, concerning escalation of the Vietnam war. Maffett assisted the group in the preparation of large three-ring notebooks which were furnished each attendee. The JCS report was too bulky to include in its entirety in the notebooks assembled the night of 1 March 1968, and decision was made to include only a comparatively small number of pages. She has never furnished or made copies of documents for Ellsberg, and specifically denied Ellsberg access to the notebooks assembled on 1 March 1968.

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Approved:

*J. Fred Buzhardt*  
J. FRED BUZHARDT



## DETAILS

Mrs. Dorothy Louise Jamison Maffett, secretary, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs), OSD/ISA was reinterviewed on 6 October 1971 by Special Agents William L. Richards and Jerry C. Sharp to determine her knowledge of the "Report of Chairman, JCS on Situation in Vietnam and MACV Force Requirements," dated 27 February 1968. The report is commonly referred to as the "Wheeler Report," and an exact textual duplicate of eight selected pages appeared in The New York Times newspaper on 4 July 1971; it was entitled "Wheeler's '68 Report to Johnson After the Tet Offensive." Daniel Ellsberg, according to Rand Corporation travel voucher records, was at the Pentagon during the period 24 February to 12 March 1968. On 13 March 1968, Ellsberg logged a reproduced copy of the same eight selected pages of the Wheeler Report into the Rand Top Secret Control System at Santa Monica, California. These eight pages have been identified as having been reproduced from the OSD/ISA original distribution copy of the Wheeler Report since the former Military Assistant, Captain Robert D. Pace, USN, identified his initials on the first page and the change to page 3 issued on 28 February 1968 was not reflected in the eight pages held by Rand.

After being shown a copy of the ISA distribution copy of the Wheeler Report and informed of the extreme sensitivity and importance of the document, Mrs. Maffett advised as follows:

Although she could not recall the specific details or content of the Wheeler Report, she believes this to be the JCS report concerning the need for additional forces in Vietnam, which was utilized by Morton E. Halperin, Paul C. Warnke, Paul Nitze, Alain Enthoven, Richard Helms, Walter Rostow, William Bundy, and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach during meetings held in the Pentagon throughout the weekend beginning on Friday, 1 March 1968 in preparing for a meeting to be held at the White House on Monday, 4 March 1968, at 1700. The subject was whether to escalate the Vietnam war. Maffett worked the entire weekend supporting the group. Special large three-ring notebooks were prepared in part by Thelma Stubbs, Janie Harris, and Maffett, two copies for each attendee. At least one notebook was completed and reproduced late Friday night. The JCS report was vividly recalled by Maffett due to the "thick document" (approximately 100 pages) and JCS's use of long paper which required special folding for punching and inserting in the three-ring binders. After the document was reproduced in toto, a decision was made not to include the full JCS report in the notebooks due to the bulk and time required to fold each page. A comparatively small number of pages (exact number unknown) of the report was finally used. She recognized Captain Pace's initials on the JCS report. Maffett volunteered that this was the night of the incident she mentioned during her previous interview that Ellsberg sat in the back of the office until after Halperin departed and then



had asked to see a copy of the notebook she had assembled. She refused to permit Ellsberg to see the above-described notebook which was assembled on Friday, 1 March 1968. Ellsberg had nothing officially to do with the project and in her opinion did not have a need to know since he was a Rand consultant at the time. She has never furnished or made copies of documents for Ellsberg. Ellsberg was working for Rand at the time because Maffett recalls depositing at least two Rand paychecks in the Pentagon Branch of the First and Merchants Bank for him. This occurred on two separate occasions; and after seeing these checks she recalls being astounded to learn that Ellsberg was being paid \$35,000 per year by Rand.

Maffett reviewed document receipts "Receipt for Classified Material," SD Form 120, which she maintains, and identified the following as receipts for the Top Secret notebooks:

"Draft Pres. Memo \_\_\_\_ Book No. \_\_\_\_ Cy \_\_\_\_" (Distributed by Dr. Halperin to each attendee):

| <u>Addressee</u>           | <u>Number</u> | <u>Book No.</u> | <u>Received By</u> | <u>Date Received</u> |
|----------------------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| General Taylor             | I-041195      | 4               | W.B. Hawley        | 1 Mar 68             |
| Mr. Katzenbach, Dept State | I-041196      | 5               | W.B. Hawley        | 1 Mar 68             |
| Mr. Wm Bundy/DOS           | I-041197      | 6               | W.B. Hawley        | 2 Mar 68             |
| Mr. Helms, Dir CIA         | I-041198      | 7               | W.B. Hawley        | 1 Mar 68             |
| Mr. W. Rostow, White House | I-041169      | 8               | W.B. Hawley        | 2 Mar 68             |
| Dr. Enthoven               | I-041155      | 10              | (Illegible)        | 2 Mar 68             |

A reproduced copy of each receipt is appended to this report.

Mrs. Maffett identified W. B. Hawley as a White House courier who picked up the books at the Pentagon on the dates appearing on the receipts which she entered at the time Hawley signed the receipt. She specifically remembers Hawley picked up the 1 March 1968 books at 1900 hours.

Mrs. Maffett advised this matter was very closely held, and the Top Secret notebooks were not logged into the ISA Records and Control. The receipts she furnished represent the books distributed outside DOD, and she believes that Copies No. 1, 2, 3, and 9 could have been furnished to Clifford, Warnke, Halperin and the JCS. Halperin's copy has either been destroyed or taken with him when he departed the Pentagon in January 1969.



Persons mentioned in this report are further identified as follows:

Lyndon B. Johnson, former President of the United States, now at Johnson City, Texas.

Clark Clifford, former Secretary of Defense, now Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney, Attorneys at Law, 815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C.

Earle G. Wheeler, General, USA (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Dr. Morton E. Halperin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, now at Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Dr. Paul C. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, now with Clifford, Warnke, McIlwain & Finney, Attorneys at Law, 815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C.

Paul Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, now U. S. Representative, SALT Talks.

Dr. Alain Enthoven, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis, now with The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California

Richard Helms, Director CIA, Washington, D. C.

Walter Rostow, former Special Assistant to President Johnson, now at University of Texas, Austin, Texas

William Bundy, formerly with Department of State, now at MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, former Under Secretary of State, now IBM Armonk, NY

Mrs. Thelma Stubbs, former secretary to Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, now secretary to the Secretary of Defense

Janie Harris, OSD Manpower and Reserve Affairs, -Room 3E-966, Pentagon

Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, formerly with The Rand Corporation, now with MIT.

W. B. Hawley, White House Courier, Washington, D. C.

| RECEIPT FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL                                                                                                            |                                         |                                                                                                                   |                    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| ADDRESSEE<br>General Taylor                                                                                                                |                                         | PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN<br>TO OSD IMMEDIATELY                                                                      | NUMBER<br>1-041195 |
| ORIGINATOR OR CUSTODIAN<br>Dr. Halperin/DASD/ISA                                                                                           |                                         | CLASSIFICATION<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TS <input type="checkbox"/> S<br><input type="checkbox"/> C | DATE OF TRANSFER   |
| TELEPHONE NUMBER<br>73331                                                                                                                  |                                         |                                                                                                                   |                    |
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| DATE RECEIVED<br>17 Mar 68                                                                                                                 | RECEIVED BY (Signature)<br>W. B. Hawley |                                                                                                                   |                    |
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| ORIGINATOR OR CUSTODIAN<br>Dr. Halperin/DASD/ISA                                                                                           |                                         | CLASSIFICATION<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TS <input type="checkbox"/> S<br><input type="checkbox"/> C | DATE OF TRANSFER   |
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| ADDRESSEE<br>Mr. Wm. Bundy/DOS                                                                                                             |                                         | PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN<br>TO OSD IMMEDIATELY                                                                      | NUMBER<br>1-041197 |
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| ORIGINATOR OR CUSTODIAN<br><b>Dr. Halperin</b>                                                                                                                                         |                                                | CLASSIFICATION<br><input type="checkbox"/> TS <input type="checkbox"/> S<br><input type="checkbox"/> C | DATE OF TRANSFER          |
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Defense Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: 'Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U. S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945 - 1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 21 OCT 1971  
Period: 4 October 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Robert L. Jones

SUMMARY

Jean (NMI) Fitzgerald, Captain, USN, Mayport, Florida, formerly assigned to Policy Planning, OSD International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA), was interviewed on 4 October 1971. He stated he was never a member of the OSD Vietnam Task Force although he worked for Dr. Leslie Gelb in ISA during two periods of assignment to ISA (August 1965 to October 1967, and February to July 1969). During the earlier period, Dr. Gelb made him aware of the existence of the Task Force and directed him to review selected classified cables in the Task Force offices. The review provided no pertinent information; and Dr. Gelb, as well as a civilian member of the Task Force whose name he does not recall, were so advised. He was unaware of any unauthorized reproduction of the Task Force material and denied knowing Ellsberg or having contact with the news media regarding the Task Force Study.

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Approved:

*[Handwritten Signature]*



## DETAILS

Jean (NMI) Fitzgerald, Captain, USN, Commander USS YOSEMITE AD-19, Mayport, Florida, formerly assigned to OSD International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA), was interviewed on 4 October 1971 by Special Agents Ralph M. Harris and Robert L. Jones, and provided the following:

He was assigned to Policy Planning, ISA from August 1965 to October 1967, and again from February to July 1969. During the earlier assignment, in approximately July 1967, his supervisor in ISA, Dr. Leslie Gelb, briefed him as to the general nature of the OSD Vietnam Task Force (Gelb Study Group), the sensitivity of its purpose, and directed him to accomplish one related task: This, because he had an "SI" clearance, was to review some SI cable traffic stored in the Task Force offices adjacent to the Secretary of Defense, and advise an unrecalled civilian member of the Task Force if pertinent information existed in the cables. None did, so he believed he orally advised Gelb of the fact and left a handwritten note to the civilian to that effect.

Although never assigned to the Task Force, he did know that ISA members were involved in the Study Group; and on his second tour in ISA he saw finished volumes in blue covers (number unknown) that were in ISA for reference purposes. He could not recall exactly when this was, but thought he and Lt Colonel Schandler may once have searched a volume for information relating to the Paris Peace Talks.

Fitzgerald was unaware of any unauthorized reproduction of Task Force papers or finished volumes, though he had heard in 1969 from an unknown source that copies were "all over town"; i.e., CIA, State Department, Contractor Consultants. He could provide no further details and denied ever meeting Daniel Ellsberg or of having any contact with the news media concerning the Task Force or its studies.

The individuals mentioned above are further identified as follows:

Dr. Leslie H. Gelb, formerly Chairman, Task Force, now with Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Lt Colonel Herbert Y. Schandler, formerly with Policy Planning, OSD/ISA, now with JCS, The Pentagon.

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

21 October 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FBI (ATTN:

[REDACTED]

*McLach*

Attached for your information are six reports of investigation.

*[Signature]*  
JOHN J. STAHL, JR.  
Chief, OSD Investigating Team

*10*

EX-101 REC-2

*65-74060-214*

4 OCT 28 1971

*38*

*Rec'd 10-27-71*  
*10-27-71*  
ENCLOSURE

*file 10/27*  
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59 NOV 1 1971

*38*



Defense Department  
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INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

|                                                                                                                                         |                                                                                                       |
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| Title: Unauthorized Disclosure<br>of Classified Information<br>Regarding US-Vietnam<br>Relations 1945 - 1967,<br>Beginning 13 June 1971 | Date: 21 OCT 1971<br>Period: 28 September 1971.<br>Status: Pending<br>Prepared By: John J. Stahl, Jr. |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

SUMMARY

On 28 September 1971, the Honorable J. Fred Buzhardt, The General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense, advised he had interviewed Dr. William W. Kaufman, former consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and currently a Faculty Member at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Kaufman stated that in Oct 66 then Secretary of Defense McNamara visited the Institute of Politics at Harvard University and had been subjected to adverse student reaction on national policies relating to Southeast Asia. Mr. McNamara suggested perhaps it would be well for a study to be made of the decision-making process on Vietnam. Responsibility for the in-house study was given to Warnke who delegated it to Halperin. He recalled that Colonels Gearin, Gorman and Schweitzer were alarmed that the study was being shaped so that it would constitute a "rationale for a buy-out" from Vietnam, and that he concurred in their conclusion. When Kaufman left the study, some drafts had been prepared, as the original time period set for the study had been three months. He had no further contacts with the study, although he did see and converse with several study members during subsequent months. Kaufman had never seen the study prior to The Times releases, but was aware that the study had been completed and distributed--at least to former Secretary McNamara. He recalled that Gelb was disturbed at McNamara's reaction to the study. Kaufman stated he had no knowledge of the circumstances or actions by which the Pentagon Papers were disclosed to the press. He acknowledged that when the publication took place, it occurred to him that Ellsberg was the potential source and based this suspicion on his knowledge that Ellsberg was irresponsible.

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J. FRED BUZHARDT 38



## DETAILS

On 28 September 1971, the Honorable J. Fred Buzhardt, The General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense, advised Special Agent John J. Stahl, Jr. that he had interviewed Dr. William W. Kaufman, Faculty Member at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The former consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided the following information:

In October 1966, then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara visited the Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University at Cambridge Massachusetts, for a two- or three-day seminar during which Secretary McNamara was subjected to adverse student reaction on national policies relating to Southeast Asia. On the last night of the seminar, Mr. McNamara had dinner with the "Fellows of the Institute," and during the discussion suggested that perhaps it would be well for a study to be made of the decision-making process on Vietnam along the lines of the SKYBOLT Study done in 1963 by Richard Neustadt. Secretary McNamara then suggested to Neustadt, who was present, that he might want to submit an unsolicited proposal to perform such a study. Some time subsequently, Kaufman was informed by Neustadt that Neustadt had prepared a proposal for such a study and had discussed it with Secretary McNamara, but that the proposal was not accepted by McNamara. Kaufman believes that the Neustadt proposal was declined by McNamara because of conditions attached by Neustadt relating to access to materials for those performing the study and the subsequent use of information acquired for other studies and writings. McNamara indicated to Neustadt that the study would be done in-house, according to Kaufman.

Kaufman related that he was a consultant to the Department of Defense from 1961-1968 and frequently worked for the Secretary of Defense. In mid-June 1967, he was at the Pentagon and became aware that a study of U.S.-Vietnam Relations was being undertaken. Dr. Kaufman's discussions were primarily with Dr. Morton Halperin. It is Kaufman's understanding that responsibility for the in-house study was given to Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul Warnke by Secretary McNamara, and that this responsibility was delegated by Warnke to Halperin. Kaufman worked with Halperin for a couple of months thereafter and attempted to assist in setting up and directing the study. Dr. Leslie H. Gelb, formerly of the staff of Senator Jacob Javits, was employed by Halperin to act as director of the study. To the best of Kaufman's knowledge, no limitations or specific instructions were provided by Secretary McNamara, and Kaufman specifically does not



remember ever hearing of any directions that the study would be confined to analysis of documents or that interviews with participants in the decision-making process were prohibited. Kaufman related that he had many sessions with Halperin and Gelb; and in many of these sessions, that Brigadier General Robert Gard, one of the Military Assistants to Secretary McNamara, attended and participated. Kaufman recalled that Ellsberg's name came up in his discussions with Halperin and Gelb in June of 1967. Kaufman recalls expressing his opinion then that Ellsberg lacked professional competency--an opinion which Kaufman professes to have held for a long period of time prior to 1967 and has never altered.

Kaufman stated that from the beginning of the discussions he had questions in his mind as to precisely what Secretary McNamara wanted done and how the Secretary wanted the study to be structured. Kaufman said he was convinced that Halperin and Gelb wanted to use the study for the purposes of discrediting the Government's policies on Vietnam. He also stated that he personally could not conceive that McNamara wanted anything more than a documentary collection. Kaufman recalled that another participant in the discussions of how the study should be structured was Richard Holbrook, who was a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) and is now on a duty assignment as an FSO in Morocco.

Kaufman recalled that one of the first papers actually written was prepared by Melvin Gurtov. The Gurtov paper was on the Geneva Accords of 1954, a subject on which Gurtov had previously written a book.

Kaufman prepared a paper during the period between June and August 1967 for the study group in which he attempted to show the consistency of the main thrust of U.S. policies on Vietnam and Southeast Asia from the early Eisenhower Administration days through 1967. Kaufman does not know to what extent the paper was ever used by the study group, but recalls that it received a cool reception from Halperin and Gelb.

He recalled that Colonels Cornelius Gearin, Paul Gorman, and Robert Schweitzer were alarmed that the study was being shaped so that it would constitute a "rationale for a bug-out" from Vietnam. Kaufman stated that he generally concurred in the conclusion of the Colonels, and discontinued any participation in the study in early August 1967.

At the time Kaufman left the study, some drafts had already been prepared as the original time period set for the study had been three months. He stated he had no further contacts with the study, although he did see and converse with several people working on the study during subsequent months.



In the late fall of 1967, Kaufman was requested by William Bundy of the State Department to review a paper on North Vietnam's participation in the war. The paper had originally been prepared by a member of the Gelb study group. The paper was rewritten a number of times for the possible purpose of releasing it as a State Department White Paper. After about three months' work by Kaufman, with participation by Colonel Gorman, it was decided that the paper should not be issued as a White Paper; but, instead, was incorporated in a letter to Congressman Evans some time around the end of 1967 or the first part of 1968.

Kaufman stated that Bundy was familiar with the study being conducted by the Gelb study group and made materials available from the State Department to the study group. Kaufman stated that Gelb discussed the study with Bundy a few times.

Following the spring of 1968, Kaufman worked as a consultant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) on a post-Tet assessment. He was aware that Ellsberg was also working on a post-Tet assessment.

From 1969 through June 1970, Kaufman worked at Brookings Institution where Gelb was also employed. At this time, the Gelb study had been completed and some distribution made of it. Kaufman had never seen the study prior to The New York Times publication. He was aware, however, in late 1969 and early 1970 that the study had been completed and distributed--at least to former Secretary McNamara. Kaufman recalled that Gelb was disturbed at McNamara's reaction to the study which, according to Kaufman's understanding, was one of displeasure at the study defects. He stated that Gelb attempted unsuccessfully to secure an audience with McNamara in order for Gelb to explain Gelb's reasoning behind the study approach.

Kaufman also mentioned that a dispute arose -- and still exists -- over the ownership of a paper of approximately 75 pages in length which Ellsberg delivered to the Political Science Association. Kaufman stated Gelb claimed ownership of the paper, and also that MIT claimed ownership since Ellsberg, during the period the paper was prepared and delivered, was on the payroll of MIT.

Kaufman stated he had no knowledge of the circumstances or actions by which the Pentagon Papers were disclosed to the press. He acknowledged that when The Times publication took place, it occurred to him that Ellsberg was the potential source and he based this suspicion on his opinion that Ellsberg was irresponsible.



Individuals mentioned herein are further identified as follows:

Mr. Robert S. McNamara, World Bank, Washington, D. C.

Professor Richard Neustadt, Assistant Dean, John F. Kennedy School of Government, and Director, Institute of Politics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dr. Morton H. Halperin, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Paul C. Warnke, Attorney at Law, 815 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C.

Dr. Leslie H. Gelb, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Dr. Melvin Gurtov, University of California at Riverside, California

Dr. Richard C. Holbrook, American Embassy, Rabat, Morocco

Mr. William Bundy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, 10 Hilliard Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Brig. General Robert G. Gard, USA, Discipline & Drug Policy Office, DCSPER, USA, The Pentagon

Colonel Paul F. Gorman, USA, Fort Benning, Georgia

Lt Colonel Cornelius Gearin, USA, Office Deputy Chief of Staff, Military Operations, The Pentagon

Lt Colonel Robert L. Schweitzer, USA, Walter Reed Hospital, Washington, D. C.





A 47-volume set of the Gelb Study sent to Rand in September 1969.

Eighteen volumes of a 38-volume set of the Gelb Study taken from Rand Washington by Ellsberg and carried to Santa Monica.

A miscellaneous collection of documents and working papers relating to the Gelb Study which had been in the possession of Ellsberg at various times in Santa Monica.

b. Subsequently, a considerable volume of documents and records were made available, e.g., ISA residual files, for examination as to possible relevancy to the investigation.

c. Briefly, the following was determined from an initial examination of the available documents:

Of the 134 separate documents printed in The New York Times,

87 documents were identified as appearing in various volumes of the Gelb Study.

31 documents were identified as appearing in the miscellaneous Rand papers.

16 documents were not identified in any of the materials retrieved from Rand.

d. Continued research into the available materials, and various Rand records relating thereto, failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the 16 unidentified documents which appeared in The New York Times. Without such an identification, or a rational explanation thereof, The Rand-Ellsberg to Sheehan link was yet to be established.

3. At this point two questions were posed:

a. Can documentary evidence demonstrate that the source of the NYT articles could only have been Rand-Ellsberg (unique documents)? The answer to this question was that documentary evidence could not so demonstrate.

b. Can documentary evidence demonstrate that the source of the NYT articles could reasonably have been Rand-Ellsberg? The answer to this question was two-fold: (1) It obviously could not be proved conclusively that Ellsberg did not have all the documents appearing in the NYT. (He could have had an unlimited number of classified documents of which there is no record whatsoever in his personal possession). However, there were certain documentary peculiarities that indicated that the NYT source might have been other than Rand-Ellsberg. In short, the answer to this question was in doubt.

4. Accordingly, the research effort was directed toward an examination of the following:

a. The unexplained absence of the 16 unidentified documents in any of the volumes of the Gelb Study or the miscellaneous papers known to have been in the possession of Ellsberg at Santa Monica.

b. The content and narrative use of these unidentified documents, particularly a series of five sequential cables originating from Saigon.

c. The apparent textual and documentary anomalies in certain of the volumes of the Gelb Study which suggested that the source materials of the NYT might have been different from the Study volumes available to Ellsberg.

#### 5. Methodology:

a. To proceed with the examination, the following were analyzed:

(1) The three different preface descriptions used by the NYT in its introduction to each of the 134 documents.

(2) The Gelb Memorandum to SECDEF, dated 15 January 1969, Subject: Final Report, OSD Vietnam Task Force

(3) The Enclosure to the above Memorandum, entitled "Outline of Studies."



(4) The New York Times Inventory - provided during court hearings - supposedly listing materials in its possession.

(5) Volumes of the Gelb Study which contained references to, or partial quotes from, the 16 unidentified documents. . .

b. The purpose of this analysis was to:

(1) Develop, if possible, a reasonable explanation for the 16 unidentified documents.

(2) Determine if documentary evidence existed which would indicate a possible alternative source of The New York Times articles.

c. In our research effort certain assumptions were made:

(1) That The New York Times was consistently accurate in its publication of the 134 documents - with the single possible exception of document #132.

(2) That The New York Times prefatory comments describing the 134 documents was consistent throughout the series of articles.

(3) That The New York Times Inventory of materials in their possession was an accurate and complete listing of their holdings.

6. Results of the Research Effort: The following conclusions were reached:

a. That documentary evidence exists which demonstrates that The New York Times source materials did not come from Rand-Ellsberg.

b. That a number of draft volumes of the Gelb Study, together with a collection of related documents, was assembled some time prior to the printing and distribution of either the initial 38-volume set or the final 47-volume set.

c. That this assemblage of draft volumes and document collections was the source of The New York Times articles.

7. Discussions, analyses and documents support of the above conclusions are contained in the following appendices:

Appendix 1 - Significance of the Times Prefaced Descriptions

Appendix 2 - Discussion of Bibliographic Anomalies

Appendix 3 - Details of Bibliographic Anomalies

Appendix 4 - Correlation between the Times Source Set and the Final Version of the Gelb Study

Appendix 5 - Supporting Documents

1. A Correlation Chart
2. Equatable Title Correlation
3. Quantitative Documentary Comparison
4. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense  
Subject: Final Report OSD Vietnam Task Force, 15 January 1969
5. OSD Vietnam Task Force Outline of Studies
6. The New York Times Inventory
7. "1945 Pleas By Ho Revealed by U.S.,"  
Neil Sheehan, The New York Times,  
September 22, 1971

*Frederick H. Stires*  
FREDERICK H. STIRES

*Edward S. Wiley*  
EDWARD S. WILEY



# SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TIMES PREFACED DESCRIPTIONS

When The New York Times printed documents and document excerpts from the Gelb Study it prefaced each document with a brief descriptive paragraph. In our early research no particular pattern or significance was discernible in these prefacing remarks. Later, we determined that the Times prefaced descriptions contained terms which could be separated into three distinct categories, with a particular significance attached to each.

The Times published a total of 134 documents in its series on the Gelb Study. In 44 instances the Times used the words "... as provided in the body of the Pentagon's study" or some minor variation thereof in the prefaced descriptions. In 87 instances the Times did not state in the prefaced description that the document printed was from the body of the study. In three instances the Times used the term "....accompanies the Pentagon's study" or some minor variation thereof.

A careful examination of five items listed in para. 5 of the memorandum has provided a logical explanation for the Times terminology in its prefacing descriptions.

In his Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense; dated 15 January 1969, Dr. Gelb provides a description of the Study which is analogous to that of the Times. Gelb describes the Study as "...thirty-seven studies and fifteen collections of documents contained in forty-three volumes."

Identifies a part of its holdings by a series of titles which are equatable to specific "studies" (Gelb's term) contained in parts I through IV.C.10. of the Study. In his memorandum of 15 January 1969, Gelb describes parts V and VI, A. and B. as the "Documentary Record section." The New York Times Inventory has two items ((1) Internal Policy Commitments; (2) Public Policy Statements) which are equatable to collections of documents in part V (Documentary Record section) of the Gelb Study.

Continuing, the Times inventory, contains five items identified as "Documents relating to....." and one item identified as a "Summary of the Command and Control Study on the Tonkin Gulf Incident."

All 44 documents published by the Times which were prefaced with the term "as provided in the body" have been located in the portion of the Study described by Gelb as "studies" (Parts I through IV.C.10).

Of the 90 documents published by the Times which were not prefaced with either of the terms "as provided in the body" or "accompanies", 43 were located in the Documentary Record section (part V) of the Gelb Study. The remaining 47 documents are unlocated in the Gelb Study, but the dates and subject matter can be associated with the five collections of documents described by the Times as "relating to" the study. The Times appears to have been consistent in its methodology with respect to prefaced descriptions.



the Times employed the words "in the body". When the Times source of a published document was either the Documentary Record section of the Gelb Study or one of the five external document collections, the Times made no distinction.

With respect to the three documents published by the Times where the prefaced description contained the term "accompanying" the Times has made a distinction. We do not have an explanation for this.

Research efforts were then directed toward checking and rechecking the pattern that had begun to emerge. In the course of validating our work we were able to correct earlier misidentifications and to define with some precision certain bibliographic anomalies that seem to be present in the source set from which the Times worked but which were not present in the sets of the Gelb Study available to Rand/Ellsberg.

## APPENDIX 2

### DISCUSSION OF BIBLIOGRAPHIC ANOMALIES

The source materials from which The New York Times published its series of articles appeared to have had certain characteristics not present in the sets available to Rand-Ellsberg.

They are discussed in two categories:

#### 1. Three Cables Relating to an Appendix

Document numbers 45, 50 and 57, and the accompanying remarks printed by the Times could only be constructed if the Times worked with two Rand volumes simultaneously. While we did not dismiss such a possibility, we considered such a writing effort awkward and searched for an explanation. In examining the Rand volumes in which references and texts of documents 45, 50 and 57 are contained, we found footnote references to an appendix to volume IV.B.5. That volume actually has no appendix in any of the sets examined.

The footnote comment referring to these three documents, "attached in appendix," in volume IV.B.5, when no appendix exists to that volume, and the appearance of these documents in volume V.B.4, suggested that at some earlier point in time volume IV.B.5. existed in a form other than that in which it now appears in the Rand sets.



As the Gelb Study finally evolved, a documentary relationship exists between volumes IV.B.5 and V.B.4. The former is a study of "The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem", and the latter contains documents relating thereto.

## 2. The Five Missing or "Deleted" Cables

Among the documents published by the Times which had not been located anywhere in either the sets of the Gelb Study available to Rand-Ellsberg, or in the Rand miscellaneous papers, were five cables (document numbers 36, 38, 39, 42 and 43) from Saigon to Washington during the latter part of August 1963. Since companion cables relating to the subject matter concerned appear in volume V.B.4 of the Gelb Study, these five missing cables logically belong there also.

Two days following release of a declassified set of the Gelb Study to the House Armed Services Committee, The New York Times, on September 22, 1971, under Neil Sheehan's byline, observed that "The Government censors deleted some material already published by The New York Times . . . " and that "Among these deletions are five messages between Washington and the United States Embassy in Saigon in the fall of 1963, . . . " The Government did not delete these cables; they never appeared in the set the Government declassified.

Accordingly, we concluded that The New York Times version of the  
Gelb Study differed in regard to volume V.B.4 from the declassified  
set and the sets available to Rand.



DETAILS OF BIBLIOGRAPHIC ANOMALIES1. Three Cables Relating to an Appendix

Document 45, White House Cable to Lodge on Pressure for  
Saigon Reforms

A. This document is discussed in Rand volume IV.B.5., p. 29, and a part of this discussion was printed in the Times. However, the text of the document as published by the Times appears only in V.B.4., Bk. II, pp. 545-547.

B. The New York Times could have published its version from the sum of the material in Rand volumes IV.B.5. and V.B.4., Bk. II, but not from the material contained solely in either.

Document 50. Kennedy Position on Coup Plots.

A. This document is discussed in Rand volume IV.B.5., p. 42, and a part of this discussion was printed in the Times. However, the text of the document as published by the Times appears only in V.B.4., Bk II, p. 574.

B. The New York Times could have published its version from the sum of the material in Rand volumes IV.B.5 and V.B.4., Bk. II, but not from the material contained solely in either.

Document 57. Lodge Response to Bundy on Letting Coup Plan

Proceed

A. This document is discussed in Rand volume IV.B.5., p.48, and a part of this discussion was printed in the Times.

However, the text of the document as published by the Times appears only in V.B.4., Bk.II, pp. 600-606.

B. The New York Times could have published its version from the sum of the material in Rand volumes IV.B.5, and V.B.4., Bk. II, but not from the material contained solely in either.

2. The Five Missing or "Deleted" Cables

Document 36. Washington Message to Lodge on Need to Remove

Nhus

A. The Rand volumes discuss this cable and quote a part of the text in Volume IV.B.5., p. 16.

B. Nowhere in the Rand volumes can the text published by The New York Times be found.

Document 38. C. I. A. Station Chief's Cable on Coup Prospects

in Saigon

A. The Rand volumes discuss this cable and quote a part of the text in Volume IV.B.5., p. 19.

B. Nowhere in the Rand volumes can the text published by The New York Times be found.



Toward a Coup

A. The Rand volumes discuss this cable and quote a part of the text in Volume IV.B.5., p.20.

B. Nowhere in the Rand volumes can the text published by The New York Times be found.

Document 42, Lodge's Response to Rusk on Diem's Closeness to Brother

A. The Rand volumes discuss this cable and quote a part of the text in Volume IV.B.5., p.21.

B. Nowhere in the Rand volumes can the text published by The New York Times be found.

Document 43, Cable by U. S. General in Saigon to Taylor on End of August Plot

A. The Rand volumes discuss this cable in Volume IV.B.5., p. 21, but no part of the text is quoted.

B. Nowhere in the Rand volumes can the text published by The New York Times be found.

CORRELATION BETWEEN THE TIMES SOURCE SET AND THE FINAL  
VERSION OF THE GELB STUDY

Having reached a point in our research where certain bibliographic differences between the Times source set and the final version of the Gelb Study had been defined, we attempted to develop a chart which would correlate the Times inventory with information contained in Gelb's "Outline of Studies," and a listing of the final 47-volume set. This turned out to be an impossible task because we knew too little about the true structure of the Times materials.

We then turned our attention to The New York Times and reconstructed some of its difficulties as the Times attempted to define the structure of a final version of the Gelb Study. The Times correlation problem was the exact reverse of ours.

By examining the Sheehan and Smith comments, it soon became apparent that the Times experienced considerable difficulty in defining the structure of the final Gelb Study. Prior to commencement of publication of the series on June 13, 1971, the Times knew very little about how a final version of the Study looked.

In the June 13, 1971, edition of The New York Times, Neil Sheehan wrote "The Pentagon study was divided into chronological and thematic chapters of narratives and analysis, each with its own documentation attached..."



That statement refers to one of the anomalies in the Times' source set: the existence of an appendix to a study. Sheehan's article continues "... the Times - which has obtained all but one of nearly 40 volumes - has collated these materials into major segments of varying chronological length, that broadly covers the two decades before 1960 to one that deals intensively with the agonizing debate in the weeks following the 1968 Tet offensive." Sheehan's expression "all but one of nearly 40 volumes" is illustrative of his uncertainty of the number of volumes in the final version. In the same edition, of June 13, 1971, Hedrick Smith is equally indefinite as to the number of volumes in the Gelb Study. Smith states, "They wrote nearly 40 book-length volumes..."

Once the Times' series was in print, the Times' reporters were able to ask questions in an effort to clarify the actual number of volumes. Within a few days Hedrick Smith, in preparing the Foreword for the Bantam book, has refined his count somewhat by writing "They wrote 42 book-length volumes, backed up by annexes of cablegrams, memorandums, draft proposals, dissents and other documents - 47 volumes in all." Thus, even at this date, the Times could not correctly correlate all the titles of their materials with a 47-volume set. They now know only that a final 47-volume set of the Gelb Study had been produced.

The Times also attempted to clarify how much of the Gelb Study it lacked. In the June 13 edition of the Times, Hedrick Smith explains "Moreover, there are other important gaps in the copy of the Pentagon study obtained by

The New York Times. It lacks the section on the secret diplomacy of the Johnson period." Later, in the Foreword of the Bantam book, that same sentence is revised to read: "Moreover, there is another important gap in the copy of the Pentagon study obtained by The New York Times: It lacks the four volumes on the secret diplomacy of the Johnson period. Obviously, Smith is closing the gap and getting closer to an accurate definition of a 47-volume set.

Some doubt also existed in Smith's mind as to how the Gelb Study was ultimately disseminated. In the June 13 edition of the Times he wrote: "Because of its extreme sensitivity, very few copies were reproduced - from 6 to 15, by various accounts. One copy was delivered by hand to Mr. McNamara, then president of the World Bank. His reaction is not known, but at least one other former policy maker was reportedly displeased by the study's candor." In the Foreword of the Bantam book that sentence is altered to: "Three of the 15 copies that were eventually produced were hand delivered by Mr. Gelb to Mr. McNamara, then president of the World Bank. He is reported to have said since that he was satisfied with the study, though more than one other former policy maker is known to have been displeased by the results."

Sometime after Smith's article which appeared in the June 13 edition was written, and before the Foreword in the Bantam book was prepared, the Times obtained a copy of the Gelb SecDef memorandum. That acquisition obviously assited Smith considerably. In the first sentence of his article of June 13 he wrote: "In June 1967 at a time of great personal disenchantment with the Indochina war . . . McNamara commissioned a major study of how



and why the United States had become so deeply involved in Vietnam." With the help of the specific date contained in the Gelb memorandum, the same sentence appeared in the Foreword of the Bantam book as: "On June 17, 1967, at a time..." Smith quotes extensively from the Gelb memorandum in the Bantam Foreword.

In the Times edition of June 13 Hedrick Smith wrote: "In the fall of 1968, it was transmitted to Mr. Warnke, who reportedly 'signed off' on it."

A significant change occurred in this sentence when it was written in the Foreword of the Bantam book. Rather than a time of "the fall of 1968," Smith now had the specific date of the Gelb memorandum, so the sentence appeared: "On January 15, 1959 (sic), Mr. Gelb, head of I.S.A.'s Office of Policy Planning, who had acted as director of the Vietnam history task force, forwarded a letter to the then Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford informing him that the work was completed. Mr. Warnke reportedly 'signed off' on the letter of transmittal to Mr. Clifford."

The above quoted Sheehan and Smith comments on the structure of the Gelb Study, its date and method of distribution, combined with bibliographic and documentary findings, demonstrate rather clearly that the Times did not have a final version of the Gelb Study - either a 38 or 47-volume set.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. A Correlation Chart
2. Equatable Title Correlation
3. Quantitative Documentary Comparison
4. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,  
Subject: Final Report OSD Vietnam Task Force,  
15 January 1969
5. OSD Vietnam Task Force Outline of Studies
6. The New York Times Inventory
7. "1945 Pleas By Ho Revealed by U.S.,"  
Neil Sheehan, The New York Times,  
September 22, 1971



# CORRELATION CHART

|                                                                                                     | 1<br>2*                       | 3*                                | 4*                  |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------|
| INVENTORY OF MATERIALS                                                                              | GELB'S<br>"Outline of Studies | GELB'S<br>SECDEF Memo             | Final 47-Vol Set    |
| ru IV = 23 Equatable Titles                                                                         | I thru IV = 29 vols           | 37 Studies                        | I thru IV = 29 vols |
| and B = 11 Equatable Titles                                                                         | V A and B = 11 vols           |                                   | V A and B = 11 vols |
| Documents Relating to Studies<br>1950-1954 Period                                                   |                               |                                   |                     |
| Documents Relating to the Kennedy Period                                                            |                               |                                   |                     |
| Documents Relating to the Study of<br>Military Pressures Against NVN,<br>February 1964-January 1965 | VI A and B = 2 vols           |                                   | VI A and B = 2 vols |
| Documents Relating to the Studies on<br>the Ground and Air Wars for 1965-1968                       | VI C = 4 vols                 | 15 collections<br>of<br>documents | VI C = 4 vols       |
| Summary of the Command and Control<br>Study on the Tonkin Gulf Incident                             |                               |                                   |                     |
| UNABLE TO DETERMINE                                                                                 | 46 vols                       | 43 vols                           | 46 vols             |

EQUATABLE TITLE CORRELATION

SOURCE SET  
(NUMBER OF  
VOLUMES UNKNOWN

NYT INVENTORY

GELB STUDY  
(43 VOLUMES)

TITLES  
EQUATABLE  
TO  
STUDIES

STUDIES

I. - IV.C.10

DOCUMENTARY  
RECORD

V. - VI.B.

TITLES  
EQUATABLE  
TO  
DOCUMENTARY  
RECORD  
DOCUMENTS  
"RELATING TO"

SUMMARY OF COMMAND  
AND CONTROL STUDY

TRACK  
VOLUMES

STUDY

APPENDIX

STUDY

APPENDIX

STUDY

APPENDIX

ACCOMPANYING  
DOCUMENTS

2140

38



# QUANTITATIVE DOCUMENTARY COMPARISON

Gelb Letter

37 studies

15 collections of documents

Published Documents

44 + p

N - x

x

3

NYT Inventory

20 titles ("narrative-analyses")

2 titles ("Internal Policy Commitments" and "Public Policy Statements")

5 titles ("Documents Relating to")

("Accompanying")

Summ. of Cmd. & Cntl. Study

1. The value of p is a number of documents published by the NYT supported by footnote references which indicate the available texts were to be published in an appendix to a Study volume (I. through IV. C

2. The value of x is a number of documents published by the NYT which meet these criteria:

a. Published text cannot be found in a Study volume (I. through IV. C. 10.)

b. No supporting footnote in a Study volume refers to an appendix

c. Is neither document 15, 107 nor 108

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington, D. C.

15 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Mr. Paul C. Warnke, ASD/ISA  
Dr. Morton H. Halperin, DASD/Policy Planning  
and Arms Control/ISA

SUBJECT: Final Report, OSD Vietnam Task Force

On June 17, 1967, Secretary Robert S. McNamara directed that a Task Force be formed to study the history of United States involvement in Vietnam from World War II to the present. Mr. McNamara's guidance was simply to do studies that were "encyclopedic and objective." With six full-time professionals assigned to the Task Force, we were to complete our work in three months. A year and a half later, and with the involvement of six times six professionals, we are finally done to the tune of thirty-seven studies and fifteen collections of documents contained in forty-three volumes.

In the beginning, Mr. McNamara gave the Task Force full access to OSD files, and the Task Force received access to CIA materials, and some use of State Department cables and memoranda. We had no access to White House files. Our guidance prohibited personal interviews with any of the principal participants.

The result was not so much a documentary history, as a history based solely on documents -- checked and rechecked with ant-like diligence. Pieces of paper, formidable and suggestive by themselves, could have meant much or nothing. Perhaps this document was never sent anywhere, and perhaps that one, though commented upon, was irrelevant. Without the memories of people to tell us, we were certain to make mistakes. Yet, using those memories might have been misleading as well. This approach to research was bound to lead to distortions, and distortions we are sure abound in these studies.



P  
Y

To bring the documents to life, to fill in gaps, and just to see what the "outside world" was thinking, we turned to newspapers, periodicals and books. We never used these sources to supplant the classified documents, but only to supplement them. And because these documents, sometimes written by very clever men who knew so much and desired to say only a part and sometimes written very openly but also contradictorily, are not immediately self-revealing or self-explanatory, we tried both to have a number of researchers look at them and to quote passages liberally. Moreover, when we felt we could be challenged with taking something out of context, we included the whole paper in the Documentary Record section of the Task Force studies. (Parts V and VI. A and B). Again seeking to fend off inevitable mistakes in interpretation and context, what seemed to us key documents were reviewed and included in several overlapping in substance, but separate, studies.

The people who worked on the Task Force were superb--uniformly bright and interested, although not always versed in the art of research. We had a sense of doing something important and of the need to do it right. Of course, we all had our prejudices and axes to grind and these shine through clearly at times, but we tried, we think, to suppress or compensate for them.

These outstanding people came from everywhere--the military services, State, OSD, and the "think tanks." Some came for a month, for three months, for six months, and most were unable, given the unhappiness of their superiors, to finish the studies they began. Almost all the studies had several authors, each heir dutifully trying to pick up the threads of his predecessor. In all, we had thirty-six professionals working on these studies, with an average of four months per man.

The quality, style and interest of the studies varies considerably. The papers in Parts I, II, III, and IV.A, concerning the years 1945 to 1961 tend to be generally non-startling--although there are many interesting tidbits. Because many of the documents in this period were lost or not kept (except for the Geneva Conference era) we had to rely more on outside resources. From 1961 onwards (Parts IV.B and C and VI.C), the records were bountiful, especially on the first Kennedy year in office, the Diem coup, and on the subjects of the deployment of ground forces, the decisions surrounding the bombing campaign against North Vietnam, US-GVN relations, and attempts at negotiating a settlement of the conflict.

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Almost all the studies contain both a Summary and Analysis and a Chronology. The chronologies highlight each important event or action in the monograph by means of date, description, and documentary source. The Summary and Analysis sections, which I wrote, attempt to capture the main themes and facts of the monographs--and to make some judgments and speculations which may or may not appear in the text itself. The monographs themselves stick, by and large, to the documents and do not tend to be analytical.

Writing history, especially where it blends into current events, especially where that current event is Vietnam, is a treacherous exercise. We could not go into the minds of the decision-makers, we were not present at the decisions, and we often could not tell whether something happened because someone decided it, decided against it, or most likely because it unfolded from the situation. History, to me, has been expressed by a passage from Herman Melville's Moby Dick where he writes: "This is a world of chance, free will, and necessity -- all interweavingly working together as one; chance by turn rules either and has the last featuring blow at events." Our studies have tried to reflect this thought; inevitably in the organizing and writing process, they appear to assign more and less to men and free will than was the case.

(Signed) Leslie H. Gelb

Encl - Outline of Studies

LESLIE H. GELB  
Chairman, OSD Task Force



I. Vietnam and the U.S., 1940-1950 (1 Vol.)

- A. U.S. Policy, 1940-1950.
- B. The Character and Power of the Viet Minh
- C. Ho Chi Minh: Asian Tito?

II. U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954 (1 Vol.)

- A. U.S., France and Vietnamese Nationalism
- B. Toward a Negotiated Settlement

III. The Geneva Accords (1 Vol.)

- A. U.S. Military Planning and Diplomatic Maneuver
- B. Role and Obligations of State of Vietnam
- C. Viet Minh Position and Sino-Soviet Strategy
- D. The Intent of the Geneva Accords

IV. Evolution of the War (23 Vols.)

## A. U.S. MAP for Diem: The Eisenhower Commitments, 1954-1960 (5 Vols.)

- 1. NATO and SEATO: A Comparison
- 2. Aid for France in Indochina, 1950-54
- 3. U.S. and France's Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1954-56
- 4. U.S. Training of Vietnamese National Army, 1954-59
- 5. Origins of the Insurgency

## B. Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy Commitments, 1961-1963 (5 Vols.)

- 1. The Kennedy Commitments and Programs, 1961-63
- 2. Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-63
- 3. The Advisory Build-up, 1961-67
- 4. Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, 1962-64
- 5. The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-Nov. 1963

## C. Direct Action: The Johnson Commitments, 1964-1968 (16 Vols.)

- 1. U.S. Programs in South Vietnam, November 1963-April 1965:  
NSAM 273 -- NSAM 288 -- Honolulu
- 2. Military Pressures Against NVN (3 Vols.)
  - a. February - June 1964
  - b. July - October 1964
  - c. November - December 1964
- 3. ROLLING THUNDER Program Begins: January - June 1965
- 4. Marine Combat Units Go to DaNang, March 1965

- c. Volume II: Program 6
- 7. Air War in the North: 1965 - 1968 (2 Vols.)
  - a. Volume I
  - b. Volume II
- 8. Re-emphasis on Pacification: 1965 - 1967
- 9. U.S. - GVN Relations (2 Vols.)
  - a. Volume 1: December 1963 - June 1965
  - b. Volume 2: July 1965 - December 1967
- 10. Statistical Survey of the War, North and South: 1965 - 1967

V. Justification of the War (11 Vols.)

A. Public Statements (2 Vols.)

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               B--The Eisenhower Administration  
               C--The Kennedy Administration  
 Volume II: D--The Johnson Administration

B. Internal Documents (9 Vols.)

- 1. The Roosevelt Administration
- 2. The Truman Administration: (2 Vols.)
  - a. Volume I: 1945 - 1949
  - b. Volume II: 1950 - 1952
- 3. The Eisenhower Administration: (4 Vols.)
  - a. Volume I: 1953
  - b. Volume II: 1954-Geneva
  - c. Volume III: Geneva Accords - 15 March 1956
  - d. Volume IV: 1956 French Withdrawal - 1960
- 4. The Kennedy Administration (2 Vols.)
  - Book I
  - Book II

VI. Settlement of the Conflict (6 Vols.)

- A. Negotiations, 1965-67: The Public Record
- B. Negotiations, 1965-67: Announced Position Statements
- C. Histories of Contacts (4 Vols.)
  - 1. 1965-1966
  - 2. Polish Track
  - 3. Moscow-London Track
  - 4. 1967-1968

LESLIE H. GELB  
 Chairman, OSD Task Force

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DOCUMENTS IN THE POSSESSION  
OF THE NEW YORK TIMES

The following is an inventory list supplied by the New York Times of materials in the Times possession relating to the Vietnam Archive commissioned by Secretary of Defense McNamara. The Times has not admitted to any other materials in its possession relating to this Archive.

United States Policy in Indochina 1940 to 1950

United States Aid for France in Indochina 1950 to 1954

United States Involvement in the French-Indochina War 1950 to 1954

The United States and France's Withdrawal from Vietnam 1954 to 1956

Geneva Conference of 1954

Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam 1954 to 1960

The Kennedy Commitments and Programs 1961 to 1963

The Coup Against Ngo Dinh Diem 1963

The Advisory Buildup 1961 to 1967

The Strategic Hamlet Program 1961 to 1963

Phased Withdrawal of United States Forces 1962 to 1964

United States - South Vietnamese Relations 1963 to 1967

United States Programs in South Vietnam 1963 to 1965

The First Phase in the Buildup of United States Forces March to July 1965

Marine Combat Units Go To Danang - March 1965

Pacification Programs 1965 to 1967

The Ground War in South Vietnam 1965 to 1968

The Military Pressures Against North Vietnam in three volumes -  
February 1964 to January 1965

The Beginning Stage of the Bombing Campaign Against North Vietnam -  
January 1965 to June 1965

The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam in two volumes -  
July 1965 to March 31, 1968

Internal Policy Commitments

A chronological list and summary of major internal policy documents for the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations on Indochina.

Public Policy Statements on Indochina for Four Administrations,  
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson

Documents Relating to Studies covering the period 1950 to 1954  
including the Geneva Conference of 1954

Documents Relating to the Kennedy Period  
including the Coup Against President Diem and covering the years from 1961 to 1963 plus two documents for this period not cited in the narrative, a message from President Kennedy to Ambassador Lodge and Mr. Lodge's reply, in late 1963

Documents Relating to the Study of Military Pressures Against  
North Vietnam February 1964 to January 1965

Documents Relating to the Study of the Beginning Stage of the  
Air War Against North Vietnam January 1965 to June 1965

Documents Relating to the Studies on the Ground and Air Wars  
for 1965 to 1968

A Summary of the Command and Control Study on the Tonkin  
Gulf Incident.



# REVEALED BY U.S.

## Censored Pentagon Papers to Be Published Monday

By NEIL SHEEHAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 21—The Nixon Administration released to Congress today a censored 7,800-page version of the Pentagon papers. The text will be available to the public next week.

The decision to release the papers for publication by the Government Printing Office removed much of the remaining veil of secrecy that the Administration fought so hard to preserve through the courts after The New York Times and other newspapers began last June to publish articles and documents from the top-secret study of the Vietnam war.

The censored version contains new and previously unpublished material, such as eight unanswered letters and telegrams from Ho Chi Minh appealing for help for his followers in 1945-46. The Government censors deleted some ma-

terial already published by The New York Times and other newspapers.

Among these deletions are five messages between Washington and the United States Embassy in Saigon in the fall of 1963, when the Kennedy Administration was encouraging a coup d'état against the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem.

Other deletions included several pages in the section on the Johnson Administration's covert military operations against North Vietnam and a number of key policy memorandums.

The four volumes on the secret diplomatic negotiations of the Johnson years, which none of the newspapers obtained, were withheld entirely. Rudy A. Johnson, a Pentagon legislative aide, said in a letter to Congress that those volumes "deal exclusively with sensitive negotiations seeking peace and the release of prisoners" and "their disclosure would adversely affect continuing efforts to achieve those objectives."

Pentagon spokesman, said the decision to release the expurgated version had nothing to do with the forthcoming publication by The Beacon Press of Boston of a version of the papers obtained through Senator Mike Gravel, Democrat of Alaska. Beacon is to issue a 2,952-page, four-volume edition in mid-October.

Mr. Friedman said the release was "solely in response" to an order last June from President Nixon to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird that as much as possible be published as soon as possible. On June 22, he noted, Mr. Laird set up a group to declassify the study within 90 days.

The work of declassification, Mr. Friedman added, was accomplished by about 100 State and Defense Department officials as well as by personnel from other agencies, apparently including the Central Intelligence Agency.

Some Congressional sources noted that the decision to publish the censored version came with unannounced suddenness.

Uniformed military personnel wheeled four sets, each of which fills two foot-square boxes, into the offices of the House and Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees this morning. The committees were told only this morning that the papers were arriving.

### \$60 a Set to the Public

Representative F. Edward Hébert, Democrat of Louisiana and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, quickly sent a set to the Government Printing Office for publication.

A. N. Spence, the Public Printer, said that the unclassified version, in 12-volume cloth-bound sets printed by photo offset, would be published Monday. The price to the public will be \$60, he added.

Mr. Spence said that he had thought at first of printing about 5,000 sets but had decided to print 2,500 to 2,700 because "we just found out that our competitor in Boston is coming out with them for \$20."

Beacon will sell its set for \$45 in cloth and \$20 paperbound, according to Robin Stair, its director.

Mr. Spence said he had already received telephonic inquiries from several commercial bookstores, but he was quoted as expressing doubt that a large

to make the documents available," he explained.

## Duplicity Laid to U.S.

By STEVEN V. ROBERTS

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, Sept. 21—A lawyer for Dr. Daniel Ellsberg charged today that the Federal Government had "used duplicity and failed to honor an order of the court" in seizing 28 boxes of Dr. Ellsberg's personal papers and possessions.

The seizure took place late yesterday after an Assistant United States Attorney, David R. Nissen, had obtained a search warrant from a Federal magistrate.

The tangled legal battle began last week when the grand jury investigating the Pentagon papers case here issued a subpoena for several dozen boxes Dr. Ellsberg had stored with the Bekins Moving and Storage Company.

Dr. Ellsberg, now a research fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has said that he gave the Pentagon papers to the news media. He was indicted here in June on two counts of stealing and possessing secret Government documents.

In fighting the subpoena, Dr. Ellsberg's attorney argued that the Government was conducting "a blanket fishing expedition" and could not use the grand jury to investigate Dr. Ellsberg further since he was already under indictment. Mr. Nissen replied that the Government was investigating persons other than Dr. Ellsberg and needed his property for that investigation.

### Subpoena Was Quashed

Federal District Judge William Mathew Byrne Jr. took the case under submission and ordered Bekins not to release Dr. Ellsberg's property to anyone. He also ordered the Government attorneys to inform him if they obtained a search warrant to seize the property. Yesterday morning he quashed the subpoena.

Morse A. Taylor, lawyer for Dr. Ellsberg, asked if the Government was still required to inform the court if it obtained a search warrant. Mr. Taylor came away feeling that the Government had agreed to inform the court, and so, apparently, did Judge Byrne.

When Judge Byrne was informed of the situation, he heard further arguments, reviewed the transcript and ruled that the Government attorney had violated no court ruling. He also said that any motion by Dr. Ellsberg's attorneys to quash the search warrant was premature and would have to be made after the evidence seized in the search was presented in court.

"What is so irritating," Mr. Taylor said, "is that the Government, by choosing a position of duplicity—which is the whole point of the Pentagon papers anyway—violated the spirit and intent of the courts' order."

NYT

SEPT. 22, 1971

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Defense Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U. S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945 - 1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 2 SEP 1971  
Period: 24, 27 August 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: William L. Richards

SUMMARY

Ruth Shirley Wickham, former secretary to Daniel Ellsberg and Dr. Leslie Gelb, was interviewed on 24 and 27 August 1971. She advised she did not see Ellsberg pack or remove anything when he departed the Pentagon in the summer of 1965, and she did not advise anyone that Ellsberg had packed or removed anything. CPO Donald E. Fox packed and removed boxes of documents for Dr. Gelb in the Spring 1969. Fox told her he took the boxes to Brookings Institution. Wickham was unable to describe the material packed in the boxes; however, she recalled some were classified and that she told Colonel Robert Hixon that Dr. Gelb was packing classified documents and possibly they were to be moved to Brookings Institution. She also heard that Dr. Morton H. Halperin had classified material packed in boxes; however, she does not know the disposition of these boxes.

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*Fred Buzhardt*  
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Ruth Shirley Wickham, secretary to the Deputy Director (Policy Plans and National Security Counsel Affairs Staff), International Security Affairs (ISA), was interviewed on 24 and 27 August 1971 by Special Agents William L. Richards and John H. Kramb to determine her knowledge of Daniel Ellsberg's alleged removal of classified documents from the Pentagon in approximately 1965. Brigadier General Robert E. Hixon, when interviewed on 31 July 1971, advised that Wickham told him in confidence that Daniel Ellsberg had included a lot of classified papers in boxes of material he packed to take with him when he was preparing to depart the Pentagon. Miss Wickham advised substantially as follows:

While she was assigned as the secretary and staff assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterinsurgency, ISA, in the summer of 1965, Ellsberg was moved from the Secretary of Defense area in the "E" ring of the Pentagon to her office space in Room 4C-826, Pentagon. Although Ellsberg retained his title as Special Assistant to Mr. John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, it was common knowledge that he was moved due to his inefficiency. Ellsberg accomplished very little work during the short period he worked in her area. Much of the time Ellsberg spent seeking another position, and after about three months departed with General Edward G. Lansdale on a special task force to Vietnam.

She did not see Ellsberg pack anything when he was preparing to depart on this assignment. Wickham accompanied him to his car on the day he departed, and she has no recollection of Ellsberg carrying anything except possibly a brief case. Wickham did not pack anything for Ellsberg nor did she see any boxes being carried out by Ellsberg at any time. Since she did not work weekends, she does not know if he removed anything on weekends. At the time of Ellsberg's departure he gave her last-minute instructions to tell the OSD Security Division that he did not have time to receive a debriefing but would "take care of it" when he got to California. She called the OSD Security Division and advised them of this, and she knows for a fact that someone from the Security Division called Ellsberg at his apartment and he did return for his debriefing. Wickham delivered sunglasses he left behind to him while he was being debriefed.

Ellsberg's security habits were careless and absent-minded. No documents were reproduced for Ellsberg other than perhaps a one- or two-page letter; however, she could not recall if these documents were classified. Wickham did not see Ellsberg reproduce any documents. Ellsberg's social life seemed to interfere with his work in that he arrived late and had numerous luncheon engagements. These engagements included visits and phone calls from members of the press media, including representatives from (she believes) Time Magazine.



She cannot recall the identity of these individuals, and she has no notes relating to their identity.

Ellsberg instructed Wickham on numerous occasions to place Government tie-line calls to Patricia Marx in California as official business telephone calls. Patricia Marx also called Ellsberg numerous times at work; however, all of these calls were prepaid.

Thelma Stubbs, presently secretary to the Secretary of Defense, who worked in the "front office" with Ellsberg, described him as a "pack rat." Wickham was told by Stubbs that she had gone through Ellsberg's safe and had sent some things to his new office in "C" ring. Ellsberg did not bring a substantial amount of material with him.

Wickham did not tell Brigadier General Robert Hixon, then Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, that Ellsberg had classified documents in boxes for removal, nor does she know who may have told him this. In this regard, she identified Dr. Leslie Gelb, Task Force Chairman, as an individual who in the Spring of 1969 had boxes packed including classified matter and carried out of the Pentagon. CPO Donald E. Fox also had previously told her that sometime in early 1969 he packed boxes of classified material for Dr. Halperin, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, but he did not tell her what subsequently happened to the boxes. Fox told her that Dorothy Maffett, Secretary to the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Policy Plans and National Security Counsel Affairs Staff), ISA, had informed General Hixon when Halperin was packing classified materials. Wickham recalls telling General Hixon that Dr. Gelb was packing classified documents, possibly for removal to Brookings Institution. She became aware of this, since she was Dr. Gelb's ISA secretary during the time he chaired the OSD Vietnam Task Force. When the Task Force was disbanded and Gelb returned to ISA, he brought Delores Nagy, a Task Force secretary, and Fox with him. (Nagy typed corrections, and Fox performed administrative duties in finalizing the Task Force reports.) Wickham believes Nagy typed some sort of glossary or index of the materials Fox packed in the boxes for Gelb. She could not be certain of the exact number of government packing boxes used by Fox, but estimates seven or eight boxes were involved. Fox carried boxes out to a government car which he had ordered. Fox told her he took the boxes to the Brookings Institution. Wickham was unable to describe the material packed in the boxes except that there were many documents, some classified.

In June 1971, when she heard that the news media had revealed the "Pentagon Papers" and with the knowledge that Dr. Gelb had removed documents, Dr. Gelb became suspect in Wickham's mind as possibly being involved in the disclosure.



The individuals mentioned in this report are further identified as:

Daniel Ellsberg, 10 Hilliard Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Brigadier General Robert E. Hixon, National Military Command Center, Pentagon.

General Edward G. Lansdale, U. S. Army (Retired), Alexandria, Virginia.

Dr. Leslie Gelb, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Dr. Morton H. Halperin, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Delores Nagy, State Department, Washington, D. C.

Donald E. Fox, CPO, USN (Retired), U.S. Post Office, Bailey's Cross Roads, Va.

Dorothy Maffett, Secretary, DASD, Room 4E-820, Pentagon.

Patricia Marx (Mrs. Daniel Ellsberg), 10 Hilliard Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Defense Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U. S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945 - 1967  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 2 SEP 1971  
Period: 26 August 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: John H. Kramb

SUMMARY

Mrs. Ruth L. Sinclair, former part-time secretary to the OSD Vietnam Task Force (Gelb Study Group), was interviewed on 26 August 1971. She advised she worked three days per week for less than two months, approximately March-April 1968, as a member of the Task Force stenographic pool. Her work consisted mostly of typing rough drafts with a limited amount of dictation. She typed no finished material and did not see any finished material. She did no reproduction work. She knows of no security laxness and recalls an oral security briefing when first assigned, but she does not remember a debriefing. She has not discussed her Task Force work with unauthorized personnel.

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## DETAILS

Mrs. Ruth Leona Sinclair, secretary, Installations and Logistics, OSD, was interviewed by William L. Richards and John H. Kramb on 26 August 1971 to determine the extent of her participation with the OSD Vietnam Task Force (Gelb Study Group) and procedures incident thereto. Mrs. Sinclair advised in substance:

She performed part-time secretarial work for the OSD Vietnam Task Force (Gelb Study Group) for less than two months, approximately March and April 1968. She worked only three days a week during this period. She worked for Margaret Enright, Chief Secretary to the Task Force, as part of a stenographic pool, taking some dictation but mostly typing rough drafts for Task Force members. She typed no finished material, and did not see any finished material. All drafts were returned, with the notes, to the authors. She did no reproduction work.

Mrs. Sinclair was orally briefed regarding security when first assigned, but she does not remember a debriefing. She has not discussed her Task Force work with anyone other than the members for whom she worked. As concerns security laxness, there was "absolutely none." The Task Force worked in a large room in 2-C corridor, the Pentagon, in an area occupied by Systems Analysis, with the secretarial pool at one end separated from the researchers and writers by portable partitions. The only member of the Task Force she specifically remembers doing any work for was Colonel Gorman, from whom she took dictation. Others she recalled being assigned were Dr. Leslie Gelb and Colonel John W. Seigle. She was unaware of any personnel or policy problems, had no knowledge of visitor control, and knew of no news media visiting.

Those individuals mentioned in this report are fully identified as:

Dr. Leslie Gelb, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Miss Margaret S. Enright, Secretary, SAFIL, Room 4D-870, Pentagon.

Colonel John W. Seigle, Coordinator for Army Studies, U. S. Army, Pentagon.

Colonel Paul F. Gorman, U. S. Army, Ft. Benning, Georgia.

Defense Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U.S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945-1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 23 AUG 1971  
Period: 13 August 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Robert H. Hagen

SUMMARY

Rear Admiral William Lemos, formerly assigned in OSD, International Security Affairs (ISA) advised he had limited involvement with the OSD Vietnam Task Force. His duties with ISA primarily involved pacification programs in Vietnam. His knowledge of the OSD Vietnam Task Force was limited to attending three or four meetings in the spring or summer of 1967. Upon learning the group was not dealing with pacification programs, he attended no further meetings and he has never seen any rough draft or final material prepared by the Task Force. Admiral Lemos provided no information relating to the reproduction, release or dissemination of the Task Force material. He has made no unauthorized disclosure of any material or information relating to the Task Force to anyone.

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## DETAILS

On 13 August 1971, Special Agents Robert H. Hagan and Dallas G. Weddle interviewed Rear Admiral William Lemos, Deputy Chief of Staff (I&M) CINCLANTFLT, Norfolk, Virginia. Rear Admiral Lemos was formerly assigned to OSD, International Security Affairs (ISA) and reportedly had been associated with the OSD Vietnam Task Force (Gelb Study Group). After being advised of the nature and sensitivity of this investigation, he provided the following information:

He was assigned as the Director, East Asia-Pacific Region under the Deputy Assistant Secretary East Asia and Pacific, ISA, from approximately July 1966 to August 1968. He went to sea for about five months and returned in early 1969 to ISA and became Director of Policy and Plans under Dr. Leslie H. Gelb.

His tour in ISA from July 1966 to August 1968 was spent totally on the pacification program in Vietnam, therefore, his interests were not at all historical but in the future of Vietnam. During the early part of his assignment he met on a weekly basis with Mr. Richard Steadman his superior, who was then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, and Dr. Victor Heyman, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of what is now the SEA or Vietnam Analysis Group in ISA, regarding the pacification efforts. During the spring of 1967, Dr. Gelb asked to join in these meetings. He recalled that Phillip Odeen, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis and Mr. Thomas C. Thayer, also assigned to Systems Analysis, attended some of these meetings. These meetings pertained to pacification, and he cannot recall Dr. Gelb's interests in attending.

He first became aware of the Vietnam Task Force during the spring or summer of 1967 and that it was chaired by Dr. Leslie Gelb. Rear Admiral Lemos' affiliation with the Task Force was limited to attending, along with Dr. Heyman, three or four of the early meetings. He could not recall how he became "uninvolved" with this group but believed it was because that which was discussed did not relate to his duties regarding the pacification programs.

He recalled that Dr. Gelb had mentioned the sensitivity of the matters under study but he was not otherwise aware of specific security procedures. He knew only that about eight people were crowded into a room near the office of the Secretary of Defense; working with Dr. Gelb.

He was shown a facsimile of the cover of a volume of the OSD Task Force Study, and stated categorically that he had never seen it. He also advised that he had never seen any material used by the Study Group to include rough drafts or final copies prepared by them.

His knowledge of personal papers and briefing books of officials in OSD was limited to material prepared by his office for Secretary McNamara's briefing books, a duplicate copy of which was prepared for Mr. McNaughton then Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA). This material related specifically



to current pacification programs in Vietnam. After the material was furnished he never saw it again although he knew it was used by Secretary Mellamara in his trips to Vietnam or during major discussions in the Washington area and that it was maintained in the Secretary's office. Mr. Halperin and perhaps others had inputs for the book on Vietnam, but he was not aware of the contents.

In early 1969 he returned from sea duty and even though he was working directly for Dr. Gelb, then an Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, ISA he can recall no discussion regarding the work of the OSD Vietnam Task Force or its report. His own interests again being the Vietnam pacification program.

Regarding portions of the Task Force report being furnished to Colonel Paul Gorman at the U. S. Delegation in Paris in May 1969, Rear Admiral Lemos was only generally aware of this matter. The reason being primarily that Colonel Schandler, who received and transmitted the request, reported directly to Dr. Gelb on certain interagency matters and, in particular, the Paris Peace Talks. Therefore, any notice to him on the transmittal of the material would have been administrative in nature. In any event, he did not see the material reportedly furnished to Colonel Gorman.

Rear Admiral Lemos stated that he has had no contact with the news media or non-DoD personnel regarding the matter under inquiry. Other than with his wife, Susan, who was associated with the Task Force for a period of time, he has not discussed the matter at all, except for general comments on reports in the news media. He has made no unauthorized disclosure of any material or information relating to the Gelb Study Group to anyone.

Rear Admiral Lemos was furnished a list of the Task Force members and in addition to those mentioned before, he identified the following as persons he knew reasonably well: Major Cooke, Captain Fitzgerald, Chief Donald L. Fox, Colonel Gard, Mr. Halperin, Dr. Kauffman, Mr. Mitchell, Dr. Moorstein and Mr. Kenneth Roberts. He could provide no information regarding these individuals that would assist in the matter under investigation.

The Gelb Study Group members identified by Rear Admiral Lemos are further identified as follows:

Major Charles M. Cooke, USA, now with the Department of Health, Education & Welfare

Captain Jean Fitzgerald, USN, now assigned to the USS YOSEMITE

Donald E. Fox, former yeoman, now retired in Arlington, Virginia

Brigadier General Robert G. Gard, former Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Morton H. Halperin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense



Dr. William W. Kauffman, associated with MIT, Boston, Mass

Willard H. Mitchell, currently assigned to OSD/ISA

Dr. Richard Moorstein, formerly with Rand Corporation.

Kenneth E. Roberts, formerly with ISA, present whereabouts unknown

Lt Colonel Herbert Schandler, US Army, now at Fort Benning, Georgia


Defense Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

|                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                         |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Title:</b> Unauthorized Disclosure<br>of Classified Information<br>Regarding U. S. - Vietnam<br>Relations 1945 - 1967,<br>Beginning 13 June 1971 | <b>Date:</b> 2 SEP '71<br><b>Period:</b> 19 August 1971<br><b>Status:</b> Pending<br><b>Prepared By:</b> T. G. Reynolds |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

**SUMMARY**

Lt Colonel Herbert Y. Schandler, U.S. Army, Coordination Division, Office of Chief of Staff Army, after being advised of his rights and waiving his right to have a lawyer present, advised he was assigned as an Assistant for Southeast Asia Affairs, Policy Planning, OSD/ISA from 1968 through July 1969 and worked in ISA on those portions of the Study he described as Program 5 Deployments and "Tet, Post-Tet Decision-Making in Washington." The OSD Vietnam Task Force had been disbanded prior to his work on the Study. He was unable to identify the titles of the final volume incorporating his work, but believed his work was included in Volume IV.C.6., Ground Forces Volume II - Program 5. Dr. Leslie Gelb was furnished his drafts and they were returned to him for proofreading as was the final typed copy. He destroyed his drafts, gave the final typed copies to Dr. Gelb, and never saw them again. Copies of the Study which were bound by acco fasteners in heavy brown hard-board folders, and typed on white paper with blue-colored print, were maintained by Dr. Gelb in two safes in Room 4C-762. These copies were placed in cardboard boxes just prior to Gelb leaving ISA in March 1969, and Schandler does not know where these boxes were moved. Various quoted portions of the Study in the 4 July 1971 New York Times article were verbatim from his input. The Times writer correctly stated in the article that the author of that portion of the Study did not have "back channel" cable traffic between Generals Wheeler and Westmoreland available to him. Schandler acknowledged taking five volumes of the Study to Col Gorman in Paris in May 1969, but said he acted only as a courier. He did not know who originally reproduced them or gave them to him, but believed they had been furnished by either Capt. Robert Pace, USN or B/Gen. Robert Pursley, USAF. Schandler provided no information relating directly to the retention of working papers or final Study volumes by Ellsberg or any other member of the Task Force.

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|                                                                                                                                |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
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|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

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## DETAILS

Lt Colonel Herbert Y. Schandler, U.S. Army, Coordination Division, Office of Chief of Staff Army and former Assistant for Southeast Asia Affairs, Policy Planning, OSD/International Security Affairs, was interviewed on 19 August 1971 by Special Agents Robert L. Jones and Thomas G. Reynolds to determine his knowledge concerning the unauthorized disclosure of information or documents relating to the classified study entitled "History of U. S. Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy - U. S." Schandler was advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and informed of the matter under investigation. He indicated he understood his rights, waived his right to have a lawyer present, and advised as follows:

He was assigned as an Assistant for Southeast Asia Affairs from January 1968 through July 1969 as a specialist regarding Vietnam. He was never assigned to the OSD Vietnam Task Force; however, in November 1968 after the disbanding of the Task Force, until the end of December 1968, he worked on two volumes of Task Force papers which he described as "Program 5 Deployments" and "Tet, Post-Tet Decision-Making in Washington." This was accomplished pursuant to instructions from Dr. Leslie Gelb, his supervisor in OSD/ISA. He was unable to specifically identify, from a review of the table of contents of the study, the titles of the final volume incorporating his work, but believed it was included in IV.C.6., Ground Forces Volume II - Program 5. He did not write the summaries, but may have written one of the chronologies. These were perhaps composed by Willard H. Mitchell, Assistant for East Asia Affairs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Policy Plans and NSC Affairs, OSD/ISA. Schandler's work was the last portion of the study to be written, and he worked on it part-time in his office in OSD/ISA except for possibly three days he spent in the Task Force's residual office space opposite the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The material he used to develop his input came from a looseleaf book maintained by Dr. Morton Halperin, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Policy Plans and Arms Control, OSD/ISA. The book contained various inter-agency committee or task force materials, State Department papers, Secretary of Defense documents, and newspaper articles. This notebook was classified Top Secret - Sensitive and was returned to Halperin when the volumes upon which he was working were completed. He reproduced some of the documents and used them as inserts in his draft. When his drafts were completed, he gave them in handwritten form, classified Top Secret - Sensitive to Dr. Gelb. His drafts were returned to him with a few corrections and then typed in final by a secretary whose name he cannot recall. No dictation was given. The office practice, concerning papers of this nature, was to type in one copy and xerox, as needed. He assumes it was done in this case. After his proofreading, he personally destroyed his drafts and returned the typed



final copies to Dr. Gelb. He did not know what became of them. He assumed that copies were made, but never saw any plastic-ring bound copies of the study. His drafts were probably typed by Carolyn R. Newlin, Kay Haygood, or Sheila Lopez, all secretaries in his office at OSD/ISA. Newlin and Haygood are still working in OSD/ISA, and Lopez is working at the White House.

The Study was maintained in two safes in Room 4C-762 and was under the control of Dr. Gelb until he left in about March 1969, though Mitchell may also have had access. Schandler described these copies of the study as being typed on white paper with blue-colored print and being bound on the left side by acco fasteners, in heavy brown hard-board folders.

He was aware that these Study volumes were being reproduced by an unidentified Lieutenant Commander, possibly Lt Commander William Dean, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but he was unable to identify the number of copies made or what portions of the Study were reproduced. Some of the reproductions were not fully legible and, at Dr. Gelb's direction, he took the acco-fastened copies -- on several occasions -- to compare with the poorly reproduced pages and inked in the correct words. This was done in various volumes and was limited only to some pages. He does not know if the ink completed pages were left as corrected, retyped, or again reproduced. The acco-fastened volumes were placed in cardboard boxes just prior to Gelb leaving his position with OSD/ISA and he (Schandler) did not know where the boxes were moved. Schandler termed Dr. Gelb an extremely able and security-conscious administrator who always tried to do things the "right way." Regardless of Dr. Gelb's conscientious attention to security, the great volume of classified papers and the need for much reproduction of this classified material for verbatim inclusion in the Study, left an opportunity for almost anyone associated with the Study to at some time make reproductions or notes for their own private purposes.

Schandler never discussed the Study with members of the press or persons not working on it. During the Study, he was officially called upon in his OSD/ISA job to provide Task Force members with material relevant to their portions of the Study. Since the completion of the Study, he has not discussed it with anyone, including two members of the press with whom he is acquainted: one, a good friend, William Beecher of the New York Times; the other, Bob Keally of the Wall Street Journal.

The article in the 4 July 1971 issue of The New York Times contained portions of the Study that he worked on, and the various quoted portions in the article were verbatim from his input to the Study. Also, the New York Times writer stated in the article that the author of that portion of the Study



did not have the General Earl Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U. S. Forces Vietnam, "back channel" cable traffic (EYES ONLY cables between these officers). He said that the Times writer was correct in noting that he did not have this material available to him.

He recalled preparing a memorandum in May 1969 about furnishing five volumes of the Task Force papers to Colonel Paul Gorman, a member of the U. S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks. At that time, he was additionally filling Gorman's former job in OSD/ISA representing DOD on study groups which were developing positions on the Paris Peace Talks. In May 1966 he attended a SEATO conference in Bangkok, Thailand, in company of Mr. Richard A. Ware, Principal Deputy Assistant, Secretary of Defense/ISA and Mr. Dennis Doolin, Assistant Deputy for Policy Plans, OSD/ISA. Subsequent to this meeting he returned home via Paris, France. Mr. Doolin and Rear Admiral Harold H. Epes, Office of Naval Operations, were with him. When he left Washington, D. C. on this trip, he had two locked pouches with him. One contained material for the SEATO conference, and the other the Study material for Gorman. He could not recall with any certainty what the Study material looked like; and, as he now recalls, it may have been furnished to him by Captain Robert Pace (Executive to Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA) or Brigadier General Robert Pursley (Executive to the Secretary of Defense). He emphasized that he acted only as a courier for the material, and that he did not originally reproduce nor was he responsible for the reproduction of the material he took to Gorman.

He became acquainted with Daniel Ellsberg during May through November 1966 while working in the Revolutionary Development Division, J-3 MACV, Vietnam. Ellsberg, who was working with the Lansdale Group in Vietnam, would stop in the office and "just talk things over." He had occasional contact with Ellsberg in Washington, D. C., mostly telephonic, during 1968. Two telephone calls were probably the extent of this contact. He believed Ellsberg to have been in the Washington, D. C. area when he called. Once, Ellsberg gave him the name of a girl (whose name he cannot recall) who worked in the Swedish Embassy, Washington, D. C. as a girl he should date. He subsequently had one date with her and did not have another because he "did not like her." While on this date he did not discuss the Study or other Government information with her.

Schandler described Ellsberg as a person who was "not as smart as he thought he was"; a vain man who thought he should have a "decision-making" position within the Government, so did not perform well at his work levels as he felt them beneath him.

Schandler indicated that he has made no unauthorized disclosure of any material or information relating to the Gelb Study to anyone.



Defense Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U. S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945 - 1967  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 2 SEP 1971  
Period: 9 August 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Dallas G. Weddle

SUMMARY

Chief Petty Officer Donald E. Fox, USN (Ret.), advised he was assigned to the OSD Vietnam Task Force (Gelb Study Group) as administrative assistant in late November 1967 and remained with the Study Group or with OSD Plans and Policy until his retirement 9 April 1970. His duties consisted of typing drafts, assembling papers, using Xerox machine, and any odd jobs assigned. At the time of his assignment there was no control system to account for incoming and outgoing material. He maintained a log of all items reproduced and the number of copies required, except for material reproduced for Dr. Gelb which was recorded as number of pages reproduced. Fox was responsible for reproducing, from original papers, the material for the volumes of the Task Force Study which he subsequently bound with various colored plastic comb bindings. He could not recall if he reproduced 4 or 5 copies from the original. He recalled stamping the covers of each volume "Copy \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ Copies" and numbering the volumes 1 through 5. The bound volumes were returned to Dr. Gelb, and he believed the original bound volume was delivered by Dr. Gelb to the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Fox believes the first volume was plastic-bound in January 1968, but he could not remember when the last volume was completed and bound. He did not recall seeing any volumes "screw-post" bound. He recalls delivering five boxes of bound volumes to RAND Corporation, Washington, D. C., but could furnish no additional significant information. He has had no official or unofficial discussions with anyone concerning the Study Group since his retirement.

65-74060-1566 26

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Approved:

J. Fred Buzhardt  
J. FRED BUZHARDT

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## DETAILS

On 9 August 1971, Donald E. Fox, Chief Petty Officer, USN (Ret.), SSAN: 166-20-2802, 1221 North Quaker Lane, Alexandria, Virginia, was interviewed by Special Agents Robert H. Hagan and Dallas G. Weddle, concerning his duties while assigned with the OSD Vietnam Task Force (Gelb Study Group). Fox stated he was assigned to the Study Group as administrative assistant to Colonel Paul F. Gorman in late November 1967 and remained there or in OSD Plans and Policy, also headed by Dr. Leslie Gelb, until his retirement from the Navy, 9 April 1970. Fox advised at the time of his assignment he was the only enlisted man in the office and he worked directly for Dr. Gelb and Colonel Gorman. Dr. Gelb gave him a comprehensive security briefing and he definitely recalls signing a debriefing certificate prior to his retirement. Fox described his duties as typing drafts for various Study members, assembling papers, using the Xerox machine, and performing any odd jobs assigned. He stated there was no log in/log out controls in being when he arrived, so he established a control system whereby all incoming mail, cables, etc., were receipted for. To the extent possible, all incoming material was routed through him. He acknowledged there were no work orders prepared on items to be reproduced; however, he was emphatic that he never reproduced anything for anybody without the personal approval of Colonel Gorman or Dr. Gelb. Fox maintained a log of all items reproduced and the number of copies requested, except for the material reproduced at Dr. Gelb's request. In those instances, he recorded only the number of pages to be reproduced. Fox was unable to state what happened to the logs he maintained after his departure from the Study Group.

He personally reproduced five copies from the original of each finished volume of the Task Force Study, as approved by Dr. Gelb, on the Xerox machine in Mr. McNamara's suite or at various reproduction stations on the third floor of the Pentagon. After a volume had been reproduced, he returned to his work area and inserted tabs to denote significant chapters, charts, pages, etc. A specifically prepared front and back cover, described by Fox as "light blue," was placed on each volume and he handcarried them to an area in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) where he machine-punched each volume and bound them with plastic comb binding. At first he used either dark blue or black plastic, but when those colors were out of stock he used red plastic on some of the studies. Fox could not recall using any other color



of plastic, nor could he recall how many volumes were bound with red plastic. Fox recalled that to the best of his knowledge the first volumes were bound sometime in January 1968. He could not recall when the last volume was completed and bound.

In an effort to reconstruct how many copies he reproduced from the original of each volume, Fox initially stated five copies were made, with distribution of the bound volumes as follows:

- 2 copies to the Office, Secretary of Defense
- 1 copy to Dr. Gelb
- 2 copies unknown
- 1 original returned to Dr. Gelb

(Fox was of the opinion the original was bound in the same manner as described above.)

Subsequently Fox stated he believed that only 4 copies were reproduced from the original. He definitely recalled stamping the blue cover of each volume "Copy \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_ Copies", and numbering them in sequence 1 through 5.

The original and 4 reproduced copies were returned to Dr. Gelb and it was Fox's opinion the original bound volume was delivered to Brigadier General Pursley, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. The disposition of the remaining copies was unknown to Fox. Fox could not recall the number he assigned to the volumes which contained the original papers.

He recalled that on occasion some pages of the bound volumes were retyped for some reason unknown to him. In each instance it was necessary for him to insert the corrected pages into the bound volumes. This was accomplished in the JCS area using the same equipment he had previously used in binding the volumes.

Chief Fox did not recall seeing any volumes bound by the "screw post" method, nor could he recall the numbering system used on the pages of each volume. He did believe all volumes were classified Top Secret.

Fox stated he was instructed by Brigadier General Robert Pursley, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, to prepare a set of the

bound volumes and deliver them to the Rand Corporation, Washington, D.C. He prepared an itemized list of the volumes and packed them in five separate boxes which he delivered to Mr. A. E. Archer, Rand Corporation, on 21 January 1969. Fox was unable to recall any other circumstances concerning this transfer of volumes to Rand. A copy of the index prepared by Fox and the receipt signed by Mr. Archer are appended to this report.

Fox stated he had not retained any notes or documents during his tenure with the Study Group, nor has he discussed this matter with anyone in either an official or unofficial capacity since his retirement.

The individuals mentioned above are further identified as follows:

Colonel Paul F. Gorman, U.S. Army, enroute from Vietnam to Ft. Benning Georgia.

Dr. Leslie Gelb, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Brigadier General Robert E. Pursley, USAF, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon.

2 Enclosures

1. Index
2. Receipt



*Handwritten:* Fred

**McBRAND Corporation**

1000 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W. • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20056

21 January 1969

To: Chief D. E. Fox

Received today, 21 January 1969, from your custody five (5) boxes..



A. E. Archer  
Administrator  
Washington Office

17 January 1969

From: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International  
Security Affairs (Policy Planning)  
To: Rand Corporation, Washington, D.C.  
Subj: Transmittal of Documents

1. The below listed documents are forwarded to you for your retention:

BOX I

|       |                                    |            |
|-------|------------------------------------|------------|
| MCNTN | Book I: Drafts, 1965               | (TS)       |
| MCNTN | Book II: Drafts, 1966              | (TS MODIS) |
| MCNTN | Book III: Drafts, 1967             | (TS MODIS) |
| MCNTN | Book IV: Pinta Summaries and Chron | (TS)       |
| MCNTN | Book V: Pressure Planning 1964     | (TS)       |
| MCNTN | Book VI:                           | (TS)       |
| MCNTN | Book VII: Late Vietnam             | (TS)       |

BOX II

|       |                                                   |           |
|-------|---------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| MCNTN | Book VIII: Cong. Brief Rules of Engage 1964-1965  | (TS)      |
| MCNTN | Book IX: Public Statements 1963-1964              | (Unclass) |
| MCNTN | Book X: Public Statements 1964                    | (Unclass) |
| MCNTN | Book XI: Public Statements 1964                   | (Unclass) |
| MCNTN | Book XII: Trip Briefs Guam, March 1967            | (TS)      |
| MCNTN | Book XIII: Memoranda 1967                         | (TS)      |
| MCNTN | Book XIV: Miscellaneous 1967                      | (TS)      |
|       | Miscellaneous Papers (Sec & TS) (One file folder) |           |

BOX III

|       |                                                      |      |
|-------|------------------------------------------------------|------|
| MCNTN | Book XV: Miscellaneous                               | (TS) |
| MCNTN | Book XIII, Tab R                                     | (TS) |
|       | Book I Department of State Material                  | (TS) |
|       | Book II Department of State Material                 | (TS) |
|       | Book III Department of State Material                | (TS) |
|       | Book IV Department of State Material                 | (TS) |
|       | Book V Department of State Material                  | (TS) |
|       | Book from State (Bundy) on Negotiations 26 July 1965 | (S)  |
|       | Book from State: Status of Work of Planning Group    | (S)  |

One envelope containing the following:

VNS #1 { Placed in Box #5  
VNS #2

(TS)  
(TS)



- Study IV.B.2: Evolution of the War; Strategic Hamlet Program  
1961-1963 Cy 1 of 5 copies (TS)
- Study IV.C.2(a): Evolution of the War; Military Pressures  
Against North Vietnam; action and Debate  
Feb-Jun 1964 Cy 1 of 5 Copies (TS)
- Study IV.C.4: Evolution of the War; Marine Combat Units go  
to Danang March 1965; Cy 1 of 5 copies (TS)
- Study IV.C.8: Re-emphasis on Pacification: 1965-1967  
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- Study VI.A: Negotiations 1965-1967: The Public Record  
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- Study IV.A.5: Evolution of the War, Origins of the  
Insurgency 1954-1960 Copy 1 of 5 copies (TS)
- Study IV.C.2(b): Evolution of the War: Military Pressures  
Against North Vietnam July-October 1964  
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- Study IV.C.2(c): Evolution of the War, Military Pressures  
Against North Vietnam, November-December 1964  
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- Study IV.C.9(b): Evolution of the War, US/GVN Relations:  
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Administration C. Kennedy Administration  
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 The Kennedy Administration: January 1961-  
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 Program Begins, Copy 1 of 5 copies (TS)

Study VI.C.2: Settlement of the Conflict (C) Histories of  
 Contacts (Marigold) Copy 1 of 5 copies (TS)

Study VI.C.3: Settlement of the Conflict (C) Histories of  
 Contacts (Sunflower) Copy 1 of 4 copies (TS)

Study VI.C.4: Settlement of the Conflict, Negotiations,  
 1967-1968, History of Contacts Copy 1 of 5 copies (TS)

Study IV.C.9(a): Evolution of the War, US/GVN Relations:  
 1963-1967 Copy 1 of 5 copies (TS)

Study IV.A.1: NATO and SEATO: A comparison, Copy 1 of 5 copies (TS)

Study IV.A.2: Aid for France in Indochina-1950-1954  
 Copy 1 of 5 copies (TS)

Study IV.A.3: Evolution of the War, U.S. and France's Withdrawal  
 from Vietnam 1954-1956, Copy 1 of 5 copies (TS)

Study IV.B.5: Evolution of the War, The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh  
 Diem, May-November 1963 Copy 1 of 5 Copies (TS)

Study IV.B.4: Evolution of the War, Phased Withdrawal of  
 U.S. Forces 1962-1964, Copy 1 of 5 copies (TS)

Study IV.C.5: Phase I in the Build-up of U.S. Force, the Debate  
 March-July 1965, Copy 1 of 5 copies (TS)

Study IV.C.10: Statistical Survey of the War 1965-1967  
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From: Rand Corporation, Washington, D.C.

To: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
 (Policy Planning)

1. Receipt of the above listed material is hereby acknowledged.



Defense Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U. S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945-1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 30 AUG 1971  
Period: 20 August 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Ralph M. Harris

SUMMARY

Mr. Charles E. MacDonald, Chief, Current History Branch, Histories Division, Office of the Chief, Military History, U. S. Army, was permitted to use the OSD Vietnam Task Force Study at the Department of State along with Mr. Thomas W. Scoville, OCMH between February and July 1970. Mr. Charles M. Cooke, then Special Assistant to Mr. Elliot L. Richardson, Under Secretary of State, gave both individuals access to the study in the Department of State and imposed no restriction on their review. MacDonald was unaware of any classified document controls at the Department of State, and discontinued his visits when he determined the study was of little or no use to him as a Current Historian. Notes made by MacDonald are retained in a safe at OCMH along with other reference material for use in preparing a U. S. Army Vietnam History. These notes concern only basic source material and no copies or other reproductions of the study were ever made by MacDonald. He never discussed the content of the study with anyone and no one has had access to his notes.

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Approved:

*J. Fred Buzhardt*  
J. FRED BUZHARDT

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## DETAILS

On 20 August 1971, Mr. Charles B. MacDonald, Chief, Current History Branch, Histories Division, Office of the Chief, Military History, U. S. Army, Temporary Building C, 2d and R Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C., was interviewed by Special Agents Ralph M. Harris and Jerry C. Sharp. According to Mr. Thomas W. Scoville, Mr. MacDonald had accompanied him to the Department of State on two or three occasions between February and July 1970 and had access to the OSD Vietnam Study which was in the custody of Mr. William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State. Mr. MacDonald stated essentially as follows:

He had heard somewhere, probably from fellow historians, that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had completed a study on Vietnam. Being vitally interested in this study as a historian, he had informally asked Dr. Rudolph A. Winnacker, DOD Historical Staff, what he knew of the study and if the Army Historians at OCMH could secure a copy for reference and background purposes. Mr. Winnacker denied any knowledge of the study at first; but later when again asked, informed MacDonald that even the DOD Historical Staff was unable to obtain access to the study. Sometime later, exact date unknown, Mr. Thomas W. Scoville, Historian, in MacDonald's office, told him that a copy of the complete study was in the Department of State and that he (Scoville) had been given access to it by Mr. Charles M. Cooke, then Special Assistant to Mr. Elliot L. Richardson, Under Secretary of State. MacDonald accompanied Scoville on two occasions to Mr. Cooke's office and had complete access to the study which was stored in the top two drawers of a safe next to what he believed was Mr. Cooke's office. On the first visit he was introduced to Mr. Cooke, and was permitted to take such volumes as he desired from the safe and review them at a large table in the same room. MacDonald scanned the entire "forty some odd" volume study and determined that his only interest centered on Volume I regarding United States and Vietnam relations from the time of President Roosevelt through the President Truman era. He made some two pages of notes regarding original source material cited in Volume I for future reference, and after his second visit determined that additional information was of very little or no use to him as a Current Historian. The study consisted of some forty individual volumes in blue covers, but MacDonald did not know the exact number of volumes contained in the complete study or how the separate volumes were bound. At no time was he required to sign any authorized access sheets, and was unaware of any classified control documents at the State Department relating to the study. The notes have been retained along with other classified reference material for a U. S. Army Vietnam History in a locked safe and no one other than himself has ever had access to them. MacDonald was of the opinion the notes listing only original source material by subject and date were not themselves classified, and he had never stamped them with any classification. MacDonald will continue to maintain the notes in the safe and will release them to proper authority upon official request.



He did not make copies or other reproductions of the study other than the brief reference notes cited above, and he has never discussed the study with anyone except Mr. Scoville when they visited the Department of State. While rumors have existed for some time that the Historians of the various military forces would obtain copies of the study for reference and background purposes, he was unaware of anyone else actually having access to the study.

Defense Department  
Office of the General Counsel  
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U. S. -Vietnam  
Relations 1945-1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 30 AUG 1971  
Period: 19 August 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Ralph M. Harris

SUMMARY

Miss Diana Giessler, Secretary to Mr. Willard H. Mitchell, Assistant for East Asia Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Policy Plans and NSC Affairs, OSD/ISA, was unaware of any original or blue-bound copies of the OSD Vietnam Study being maintained in a safe by Mr. Mitchell. Sometime in 1969, she noticed two brown accordian-type folders containing Top Secret material in the bottom drawer of the safe and advised Mr. Mitchell that she had no classified document control records for the material. Mr. Mitchell provided her a title for the material and Giessler typed out a Classified Control Record (SD Form 59-12) for internal OSD/ISA Office control. She was unaware of the contents of these folders having "some connection with the OSD Task Force" until 11 August 1971, when Mr. Mitchell gave her a list of the material to type out prior to releasing the documents to representatives of the OSD General Counsel's Office. Giessler has never had access to any part of the completed OSD Vietnam Study and is unfamiliar with the content except as released in the press.

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## DETAILS

On 19 August 1971 Miss Diana Giessler, Secretary to Mr. Willard H. Mitchell, Assistant for East Asia, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Policy Plans and NSC Affairs, OSD/ISA, was interviewed by Special Agent Ralph M. Harris to determine her knowledge of disposition of the original and one blue-bound copy of the OSD Vietnam Study. Mr. Mitchell stated on 11 August 1971 that the original and one blue-bound copy of the study were returned to General Robert Hixon, OSD, about six months after President Richard M. Nixon took office. Miss Giessler advised essentially as follows:

She was first employed by OSD/ISA in September 1967 and was aware that a "Task Group" had been set up under Dr. Leslie H. Gelb. She was never aware of what the study contained but assumed it was similar to other OSD/ISA studies on Vietnam.

When Mr. Mitchell and Dr. Gelb returned to Policy Plans from the "Task Group" sometime in 1968, she became Mr. Mitchell's secretary and has had access to his safe since that time. At no time was she aware of an original copy of the OSD Vietnam Study or any other copies of the study being stored in Mr. Mitchell's safe.

Sometime during 1969, just prior to the annual security check by the OSD/ISA Classified Control Section, she inventoried the classified material to confirm that she had a Classified Control Record (snowflakes) (SD Form 59-12) for the documents. During this check she became aware of some Top Secret material in two large brown accordion-type folders in the lower drawer of the safe in the outer office for which she had no classified document control records. She notified Mr. Mitchell who provided a title for document control purposes. Giessler typed up the "snowflake" (SD Form 59-12), and placed the control form in her classified control records. She paid no attention to the contents of the folder and never read any of the material. To the best of her recollection, these folders were never used by Mr. Mitchell or anyone else. Even during the annual security checks by the OSD/ISA Classified Control Section, no one actually inventoried the documents, and the security checks merely identified cubic feet of Top Secret material. She first became aware of the contents of these folders and that the papers "had some connection with the OSD Task Group" when Mr. Mitchell gave her a list of the contents on 11 August 1971. She typed out this list prior to Mr. Mitchell turning the folders over to representatives of the OSD General Counsel's office.

Note: These folders were obtained under proper receipt on 11 August 1971 and are being retained by the OSD General Counsel.

She was not aware of any material pertaining to the study being turned over to General Hixon and did not know of the OSD Vietnam Study material ever being maintained in OSD/ISA.

While she had access to Mr. Mitchell's safe in the outer office, she very seldom opened it unless specifically asked to do so by Mr. Mitchell. The safe was used mainly for storage of documents which were seldom used or for added storage in the event additional space was required. Mr. Mitchell normally filed his own material, and generally the safe was opened and closed by Mr. Mitchell. The amount of work in the office normally precluded the secretaries from reading any of the files, and generally a folder would be pulled only when specifically asked for by one of the supervisors. Giessler never had access to the completed OSD Study and was unaware of the content until the recent newspaper disclosures and Ellsberg publicity.



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INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
of Classified Information  
Regarding U.S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945-1967  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 30 AUG 1971  
Period: 21 August 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Robert E. De Mott

SUMMARY

Mrs. David A. Burchinal, the former Kathryn R. Kellogg, was interviewed after she was briefed on the nature of this investigation and its sensitivity. She advised that she joined the OSB Vietnam Task Force in September 1967 as secretary to Dr. Gelb, and served in this capacity until April 1968. She had little contact with other members of the Task Force, since the suite she shared with Dr. Gelb was across the hall from the suite occupied by them and because of this she was not familiar with the administrative procedures and controls utilized by the other members of the Task Force. She did not believe that any formal mission statement or security briefings were utilized for the Task Force. She recalled that drafts of two volumes had been finalized by the time she left, but she had no knowledge concerning the printing or distribution of the completed study. While she was with the Task Force, she typed partial revisions on most of the studies, but typed no study in its entirety. She could not recall having seen the McNamara briefing books, the "McNaughton Papers" or the "Lansdale Report." She was acquainted with Dr. Ellsberg, but had no knowledge of his study for the Task Force and did no typing for him. He was rarely in his office and received few telephone calls or visitors. Mrs. Burchinal has never been contacted by anyone from the news media and she has made no unauthorized disclosure of any material or information relating to the Task Force.

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## DETAILS

On 21 August 1971, Mrs. David A. Burchinal, the former Kathryn R. Kellogg, was interviewed at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, by Special Agents Robert E. De Mott and Rudolph M. Schellhammer. Mrs. Burchinal was briefed on the nature of this investigation and its sensitivity, and she advised substantially as follows:

She joined the OSD Vietnam Task Force (Gelb Study Group) in September 1967 as secretary to Dr. Leslie Gelb, and served in this capacity until April 1968. She explained that her assignment to the group was quite by chance, and that she was given this assignment by the OSD Personnel Office because she was seeking only temporary employment at that time. Inasmuch as Dr. Gelb's office, was located in a small suite across the hall from the suite in Mr. Robert Meltamara's office which was utilized by the group members, she had little direct contact with other members of the group and the names of most of them were completely unfamiliar to her. Dr. Gelb's suite consisted of two offices, one of which was occupied by Dr. Gelb and the other by Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, and an entrance hall which was shared by Mrs. Burchinal and Dolores Nagy. She could not recall who had briefed her concerning security when she reported for work, but felt that it must have been either Dr. Gelb or Colonel Paul F. Gorman, both of whom she described as being very security conscious. In any case the briefing was informal, and as she recalls it was emphasized during the briefing that the existence of the group was not to be advertised and that it was not to be referred to as the Vietnam Task Force. She never saw any mission statement for the group, but it was her understanding that it was formed to make a complete study of the war in Vietnam.

Her duties consisted primarily of taking dictation from Dr. Gelb, doing his typing, and maintaining his files. She also did some typing for other members of the group, particularly Colonel Simons. She did not type any of the studies in their entirety, but only partial revisions of them. Occasionally Dr. Gelb would ask her to reproduce copies of certain documents for him, the specific identities of which she could not recall. This reproduction usually consisted of just a page or two, and she was never asked to reproduce any complete volumes or studies. She had no responsibility for the receipt, accountability or disposition of incoming or outgoing correspondence or material for the group, but she did occasionally receipt for correspondence which had been sent to Dr. Gelb by his office in OSD/ISA. As a result, she was unfamiliar with the administrative procedures and controls, if any, which were utilized. It was her recollection that Colonel Gorman had general responsibility for the operation of the group and that he served as Dr. Gelb's assistant or executive officer during the time she was there. Most of the typing for the group members was accomplished by Anne Wassil and Margaret Burright who worked in the suite assigned to the group members. Inasmuch as Mrs. Burchinal typed only revisions for Dr. Gelb or others, she typed something on practically every study or sub-division but could not recall any of



then specifically except the Geneva Accords and the counterinsurgency studies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. She could not recall who had worked on any particular study, or the classification assigned to them. She believed that most of the studies were classified at least Secret, but she did not know who was responsible for the security classification which was assigned to them.

She was unfamiliar with the administrative duties of the military personnel assigned to the group except that Chief Fox was always delivering papers around the office. She did not know who was responsible for making reproductions of documents for the group, but felt that it was perhaps Chief Fox. She explained that there was a reproduction machine in the suite occupied by the group, and recalled that it was always breaking down as a result of the overload from the quantity of material being reproduced. She never heard anyone comment that any specific documents or material could not be reproduced, and she was never questioned when she occasionally reproduced short items for Dr. Gelb. Any material which she reproduced for Dr. Gelb she immediately gave to him. Mrs. Burchinal recalled that she had visited the cable room to make copies of specific messages for Dr. Gelb, but she never made copies of whole volumes. She could not recall that she had ever seen Mr. McNamara's briefing books. She had heard of the "McLaughton Papers" and also the "Lansdale Report," but she could not recall that she had ever seen either of them.

By the time the studies got into Dr. Gelb's office for his revision they were in fairly neat form and did not require extensive retyping except for the specific pages which Dr. Gelb had edited. After Dr. Gelb completed his revision and editing of a study, it was Mrs. Burchinal's recollection that she filed each study in an original only in Dr. Gelb's safe. Each study was filed in a black folder which was identified by a red label showing the title of the study and the name of the person to whom it was assigned. She could not recall exactly how many studies had been completed in final draft by the time she left in April 1968, but she believed that perhaps two volumes had been completed by this time. She could not recall having seen the blue cover used for the final report for each study, but she acknowledged that a sample of this cover which was shown to her did look familiar to her. At the time she left, the original typewritten single copies of the completed studies were stored in Dr. Gelb's safe, and she had no knowledge of the number of volumes in the completed study; how or by whom they were reproduced; the number of sets which were made of each; or where they were stored. She could not recall any specific paper, oily or otherwise, which was utilized in typing the final studies and did not know how or where the pages were numbered.

Once a study was submitted to Dr. Gelb he would not let it go outside his office. As a result members of the group would frequently come into the office to review documents in a particular study, but Mrs. Burchinal could not recall that anyone had made any copies of them or had asked to have them



reproduced. Aside from Dr. Gelb's appointment calendar, she kept no record of the group, and she was unaware that anyone outside the group had ever visited the office to request documents or information. She was never contacted by anyone from the news media and she has made no unauthorized disclosure of any material or information relating to the group to anyone. Since her departure from the group she has had no personal contact with any of the members of the group and does not know where they are now. She had only praise for Dr. Gelb whom she described as being most intelligent, hard working and polite.

Inasmuch as Dr. Ellsberg's office was located in Dr. Gelb's suite, she was acquainted with him. She could not recall whether or not Dr. Ellsberg was already working with the group when she arrived, but it was her recollection that he arrived sometime later. She was certain, however, that he was still there when she left in April 1968. She did not know him well and an exchange of "Good Morning" or "Good Night" was the extent of their conversation. Dr. Ellsberg spent very little time in his office and did not seem to be doing anything. On a number of occasions, Dr. Gelb showed impatience with Dr. Ellsberg because he was never there and made no progress on his study. Mrs. Burchinal could not recall what study Dr. Ellsberg was supposed to be working on, and she never did any typing for Dr. Ellsberg. She did take some telephone messages for Dr. Ellsberg, but she could not recall the substance of any of them or the names of the callers. Dr. Ellsberg did not receive many telephone calls and had very few visitors. In fact Mrs. Burchinal could recall only one or two visitors. Neither identified himself to her and neither stayed very long. Mrs. Burchinal had the combination to Dr. Ellsberg's safe and was responsible for opening and closing it. She had no knowledge of what he kept in his safe as she had no responsibility for maintaining his files as she did those of Dr. Gelb. She described his safe as being a "mess," but qualified this remark by stating his safe was used as an overflow for temporary storage of materials of other members of the group. She never furnished documents directly to Dr. Ellsberg and had no knowledge of any documents which he might have reproduced or had someone else reproduce for him.

The individuals affiliated with the Gelb Study Group mentioned by Mrs. Burchinal are further identified below:

Dr. Leslie Gelb - Head of Task Force - now working for Brookings  
Delores Nagy - A steno working for the Task Force  
Daniel Ellsberg - Now with MIT  
Paul F. Gorman - Army Colonel now in transit from Vietnam to Fort Benning, Ga  
Col Wm. Edw. Simons - Currently with OSD/ISA  
Anne R. Wassil - Now assigned SAFIL, Pentagon  
Margaret Burright - Now assigned SAFIL, Pentagon  
Donald E. Fox - now retired and living in Alexandria, Va.



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INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Title: Unauthorized Disclosure  
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Regarding U. S. - Vietnam  
Relations 1945-1967,  
Beginning 13 June 1971

Date: 23 AUG 1971  
Period: 16 August 1971  
Status: Pending  
Prepared By: Ralph M. Harris

SUMMARY

Lt Col John R. Galvin, U. S. Army, Fort Belvoir, Virginia was interviewed after being advised of his rights and waived his right to have a lawyer present. He was assigned to the OSD Vietnam Task Force (Gelb Study Group) from September to mid-December 1967. During this assignment, Colonel Galvin worked directly for Col Paul F. Gorman on two parts of the section regarding "The Geneva Accords" and for a very short time on the "Honolulu Conference." As a section of the OSD Study was completed it would be given to Dr. Gelb who would reassign it to another member for review, suggested changes and rewrite. Each draft was dated, but no numbers were used to reflect if additional copies were reproduced. Colonel Galvin never had access to any completed volumes and did not believe any had been placed in bound covers. Research and background material was obtained prior to Galvin's assignment, and he had no knowledge of who obtained or authorized the material to be used. Galvin obtained a copy of an Army study on Vietnam from the Office of the Chief, Military History, U.S. Army, and made one research visit to the Department of State during his tour of duty with the study group. Galvin was a close associate of Lt Col Schweitzer and had known Col Paul Gorman in Vietnam. He had previously known other Army members assigned to the Study Group on a casual basis and identified all Task Force members working in his office during the assignment. Galvin was introduced to Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and had lunch with him on one occasion but he had no close association with Ellsberg and never assisted him in any manner. Their contact was limited to passing the time of day or seeing each other in the hall. Knowledge of the actual study was limited to Task Force members, but by December 1967, Pentagon staff members were aware of a study on Vietnam by OSD. He was unaware of any compromise of the study until recent press releases and the Ellsberg publicity. He has made no unauthorized disclosure of any material or information relating to the study to anyone.

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## DETAILS

On 16 August 1971, Special Agents Ralph M. Harris and Jerry C. Sharp interviewed Lt Colonel John R. Galvin, Assistant Chief, Command Presentations, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. A list of Task Force personnel, dated 24 November 1967, reflects that Colonel Galvin was assigned to the OSD Vietnam Task Force from 25 September to 30 November 1967. Colonel Galvin stated he understood his rights and waived his right to have a lawyer present. He advised essentially as follows:

He returned from Vietnam on 5 July 1967 and after 30 days' leave reported for duty on 5 August 1967 with the Office of the Chief of Information, U. S. Army, The Pentagon, Washington, D. C. The original date of his assignment to the Task Force was not recalled, but Galvin believed it was approximately mid-September 1967. The assignment was originally for approximately two months but was extended until mid-December 1967. He recalled he had gone on Christmas leave immediately upon leaving the project. A representative of the OSD Security Office gave him a security briefing when he was assigned to the Task Force, and debriefed him prior to his departure in December 1967. He was personally acquainted with some members of the Task Force and was of the opinion this was the reason for his selection. He had known Colonel Paul F. Gorman, U.S. Army, for a short time in Vietnam. Lt Colonel Robert L. Schweitzer, U.S. Army, Major Michael Gillette, U. S. Army, and Major Donald Clelland were close associates. In addition, he was known for his writing ability, and had published one book entitled the Minuteman, as well as several articles in various military publications.

Galvin worked full time with the Task Force. The average day's work was from approximately 0800 to 1900, and on Saturdays from about 0800 to 1400 or 1500. Colonel Galvin was provided office space in the room next to General Pursley (then Lt Colonel Pursley), USAF, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. The following people were assigned to the same office during Galvin's assignment:

|                                  |                                        |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| Col. Paul F. Gorman, U.S. A.     | Lt Col Robert L. Schweitzer, U.S. A.   |
| Lt Col Andrew M. Simko, U.S. A.  | Major Donald Clelland, USAF            |
| Lt Col William Simons, USAF      | Mr. Richard Holbrooke, State Dept.     |
| Lt Col Cornelius Gearin, U.S. A. | Mr. Andrew J. Pierre, Hudson Institute |

Mr. Holbrooke came in only for short periods each day and occasionally worked on some unknown part of the study for Dr. Gelb. Lt Colonel Schweitzer was periodically hospitalized as a result of injuries in Vietnam and worked only part time. Lt Colonel Simons was in the office only part time, whereas all others worked full time in the office. In addition, the administrative staff



consisted of two civilian secretaries and one enlisted man. The first enlisted administrative technician was a Navy man, and his successor was from the Army. The names of either of the enlisted men were not remembered, but Galvin did recall one secretary was named Marge, last name unknown.

He was unaware of any other working areas utilized by the Task Force except Dr. Gelb had an office directly across the hall from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Dr. Ellsberg worked in the office with, or next to, Dr. Gelb.

Galvin was initially assigned the job of rewriting and editing part of the "Geneva Accords" input, exact title not recalled, which had been researched and prepared by Dr. Melvin Gurtov, Rand Corporation. Upon completing this task, Galvin was assigned another section in this general area, which he believed was "The Intent of the Geneva Accords." He submitted his suggested outline to Colonel Gorman who normally reviewed his input and, subsequently to Dr. Gelb for approval. This was the standard procedure followed by Dr. Gelb, and each person was encouraged to suggest the best approach to the study area that had been assigned. Once the assigned section of the study was completed and a draft input accepted by Dr. Gelb, he would then reassign it to another Task Force member for critical review, suggested changes, and rewrite. In this manner, each section was worked on by several members to achieve a degree of professionalism desired by Dr. Gelb. Galvin worked for a very short time on the "Honolulu Conference" which had been written by Dr. Hans Heymann, and was scheduled to work on the section concerning Ho Chi Minh, but this latter assignment was cancelled.

Very few details of the classification of documents were remembered. He could not recall seeing any classification on working papers or drafts when they were submitted to Colonel Gorman or Dr. Gelb. All documents and material were placed in Top Secret folders, and placed in security containers in the office each night or when not in use. Each draft was dated to distinguish it from earlier drafts, but he does not recall any numbers being used to reflect if additional copies were reproduced. The majority of research material was Top Secret, but Galvin was unaware of what classification was finally assigned to the completed study. Galvin did not have access to any completed volumes and does not believe any had been placed in bound covers prior to his departure. About two weeks before Galvin's departure, blue covers with cut-out view windows for the title had been made up, and several - exact number unknown - were stacked in their office. This would have occurred during late November or early December 1967.

The majority of the background material needed for research had been obtained and was stored in safes in the office, but he did not know who obtained



this material or authorized its use by the Task Force. He visited the Office of the Chief, Military History, U. S. Army (OCMH) and obtained use of the Army study on Vietnam by Dr. Charles Von Luttichan. While he could not recall the date of this visit, he remembered discussing the matter with Dr. Von Luttichan and recalled discussing the Geneva Accords to obtain added research material for that part of the study. Galvin was well acquainted with Dr. Kahn, Chief Historian, OCMH, but does not remember discussing the Vietnam Study with Dr. Kahn or requesting his assistance in obtaining any research material. He recalled making one visit to the Department of State, but only to discuss some part of the Geneva Accords with researchers, names not remembered. No research or background material was ever obtained by Galvin from the Cable Room or other offices in the Pentagon, but he recalled, as before mentioned, that copies of messages and other material were in the office when he was assigned. He specifically was unable to recall any "McNamara Briefing Books" being used by the study group. The title "Military Mission Report, FY 55" known as the "Lansdale Report," seemed vaguely familiar, but Galvin never had access to the report. Colonel Gorman may have mentioned the report, or referred to it in some manner during discussions with Galvin in the office.

Galvin was unaware of any work being done on the study outside the two office areas previously mentioned as being utilized by the Task Force. While assigned to the Task Force, Galvin was of the opinion that actual knowledge of what the study contained was limited to Task Force members, and he was unaware of any other personnel being knowledgeable of its actual content. Colonel Gorman continually stressed the need for the Task Force members to concentrate on their assigned projects and not to get involved in other members' projects. This frequently did not work out, since Dr. Gelb would reassign the draft inputs to another member for reevaluation, comments, suggested changes, and rewrites. Colonel Gorman's approval was normally required for reproduction. The majority of the copy work was accomplished through the assigned administrative personnel, but occasionally by the person preparing the input.

Many of the professional researchers appeared to be primarily interested in working on the project for personal knowledge. While nothing was ever said (and Galvin did not believe anyone intended to use the information in private publications), he felt they wanted the information for background data, possibly to guide them in future research on Vietnam. At the time, he felt this was probably the main incentive for such professionals as Dr. Gurtov, Dr. Moorsteen, and possibly Dr. Gelb to accept the assignment. Some outside professional writers or researchers would be brought into the office by Dr. Gelb for one or two days to work on one small part of the project. He could not recall specific names or where they were from, but added these individuals normally would be



introduced by Dr. Gelb and given office space for the time they worked on the study. Considerable informal interchange of ideas occurred between individual Task Force members, such as Lt Colonel Clelland helping Galvin or suggesting different approaches to the problems being encountered at the time. There were no formal briefings, but occasionally Dr. Gelb would ask for the status of a specific input or would call Galvin into his office to discuss the work being accomplished. These meetings, as well as those with Colonel Gorman, were informal and never involved any persons outside the Task Force. Gelb was not known to have briefed OSD officials, and Galvin never attended any meetings outside the Task Force where the study was discussed.

Galvin never had access to completed parts of the study and never saw any of his drafts once they had been accepted by Dr. Gelb. On one occasion some months after his assignment to the Task Force, Galvin visited the Office of the Secretary of Defense and noticed several volumes of the study in blue covers stacked in the office of the Military Assistant, General Pursley or General Gard. Galvin did not have access to these volumes and only recognized them since he had seen the covers when they had been printed in approximately November or early December 1967. Gelb never promised Galvin that he could write anonymously; and he was never promised a copy of what he prepared. These papers were for the most part Top Secret and Galvin was of the opinion they had to be maintained in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. No notes or copies of any studies were retained by Galvin, and he has not seen any part of the study except as noted above, since his assignment to the Task Force.

Dr. Ellsberg was known only as a member of the Task Force, and Galvin was aware he worked in the office of Dr. Gelb. Since he was not acquainted with Ellsberg, Lt Colonel Schweitzer, who had previously met Ellsberg in Vietnam, suggested he introduce Ellsberg and they have lunch together. Galvin accepted the offer and had lunch with Schweitzer and Ellsberg at the Pentagon. Galvin was unable to recall the date of this luncheon, or the ensuing conversation with Ellsberg.

Ellsberg never indicated any dissatisfaction with U. S. policy and Galvin considered him an expert in the field of pacification due to his extensive field experience in Vietnam and related research and study. Galvin vaguely recalled fellow members of the Task Force, names not remembered, stating Ellsberg had stacks of written material on his desk and apparently was reading all the material he could find regarding the study. Dr. Gelb apparently had Ellsberg reviewing many of these drafts and Galvin assumed, as previously noted, that many of these drafts were routed to Ellsberg for reevaluation, critical review, and final editing. Galvin never worked with Ellsberg on any part of the study and never approached Ellsberg for assistance. No unauthorized personnel were



known to be aware of the specific study until the recent press release and the Hellsberg publicity. Galvin recalled he was very surprised when first informed of the study, and had no prior knowledge that such a detailed study was being undertaken. Toward the end of Galvin's assignment to the Task Force, it appeared to be common knowledge among many military and civilian staff members in the Pentagon that some sort of study on Vietnam was in progress; however, there were no indications that the specific content or purpose of the study was known. About one year after his assignment, he heard reference to the "McNamara Study" among Army staff personnel within the Pentagon, but even these comments indicated that the actual content was not known. Galvin was unable to identify any of the people he had heard commenting on the study, other than they were Army staff personnel at the Pentagon.

Galvin never heard of any Task Force members being contacted by the press, and he has never been approached by any person(s) regarding his previous assignment to the Task Force. He has never made any unauthorized disclosure of any material and never discussed the study or his assignment with anyone except occasionally with members of the Task Force, such as Lt Colonel Schweitzer. Galvin has no knowledge of the disposition of any part of the study and until the recent press releases was unaware of the distribution.



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
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
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
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*Daniel Ellsberg*



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


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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
CASE NO. 65-74060  
LA#5 P.75A

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


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LA#5 P.244

CASE NO. 65-74060

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
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LA#5 P.232

CASE NO. 65-74060

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CASE NO. 65-74060  
LA#5 P-101

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